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ABSTRACT 
In recent years, the push for reform in the Australian public sector audit has placed 
the Office of the Auditor-General (hereafter OAG) in a more contestable or market­
like environment, where the OAG is accountable for an efficient and effective 
provision of public sector audit. The purpose of this study is to compare the cost 
efficiency of in-house and contract-out arrangements to deliver financial audits in the 
public sector. It empirically tests whether there are audit cost and audit fee 
differences between in-house providers (i.e., the OAG) and contractors (i.e., public 
accounting firms). The secondary aims of this study are to develop audit cost and fee 
models for the public sector. The unit of analysis is audit cost/fee at the audit 
engagement level. The data for this study is collected for a sample of financial 
statement audit engagements for year-end 1998, at the state level in Western 
Australia. The data is extracted from publicly available and private sources. 
The audit cost and fee models are used to test for the cost differences between in­
house providers and contractors. Prior audit production and audit fee studies in the 
private and public sectors provide the basis for the development of the two models. 
The results indicate that agency size, complexity and risk are positively associated 
with audit costs and audit fees. In addition, the total advice provided to the agencies 
by the OAG and agency type are also significantly associated with audit costs and 
audit fees. Overall, by incorporating these factors into the models, the audit cost 
model explains 82 percent of the variance in audit costs, while the audit fee model 
explains 86 percent of the variance in audit fees. 
More importantly, the main findings suggest that contract-out audits are more costly 
than in-house audits. However, this finding is conditional on agency type. Further 
analysis reveals that the type of audit arrangement is significantly associated with 
audit costs for the statutory authority audits only. There is no significant difference in 
audit costs between contract-out and in-house arrangement for hospital audits. This 
analysis shows that the statutory authority audits are driving the significance of the 
interaction between type of audit arrangement and agency type. Specifically, the costs 
of contract-out audits are, on average, significantly higher than in-house audits. This 
result is attributed to the contractor's lack of expertise in auditing statutory authority 
as there is no equivalent of this agency type in the private sector. As such, the OAG 
has the greater advantage of delivering a lower audit cost for statutory authority 
audits compared to the contractors. However, the non-significant interaction term in 
the audit fee model suggests that cost differences between in-house and contract-out 
audits for the statutory authority audits are not reflected in audit fees billed to 
agencies. Further analyses, using audit hours as the dependent variable, generally 
corroborate the findings from the audit cost and audit fee models. 
Sensitivity analyses on the OAG's supervision costs reveal that these costs have a 
significant effect on the interpretation of the cost efficiency results. By excluding 
supervision costs from contract-out audits, there are significant changes in the results 
for the total sample and the two sub-samples (partitioned by agency type). Generally, 
these changes favour the contract-out audits for all groupings, where contract-out 
audits are now more cost efficient than in-house audits for hospitals, and not 
significantly different in costs for statutory authority audits. Additional tests to 
investigate the determinants of the OAG's supervision costs in contract-out audits 
11 
reveal that agency size, risk, reliance on internal control, total advice provided by the 
OAG and packaged audits (a single contract for two or more audits) are significantly 
associated with the supervision costs of contract-out audits. 
The main contribution of this study is to add to the growing literature on audit 
market efficiency (see Dopuch, Gupta, Simunic & Stein, 2000; Knechel & Payne, 
forthcoming). It provides evidence on the production function of different type of 
suppliers in the public sector and their relative efficiency in providing audit 
services. This study contributes to the recent discussions on the changing nature of 
public sector audit market towards a market-based provision of public sector 
audits. The evidence from this study allows researchers and policy-makers to 
compare the two types of audit arrangement to undertake public sector audits. In 
part, this study also contributes to the line of inquiry that examines the difference 
between government auditors and public accounting firms in US municipalities 
(Copley, 1989; Dwyer & Wilson, 1989; Rubin, 1992). 
The secondary contribution of this study is to develop and test the audit cost and 
fee models in the public sector and provide validity on the transferability of audit 
models from the private and public sectors. This study adds to the literature that 
examines the public sector audit market. More importantly, it is one of the few 
non-US studies that examine the public sector audit market and the findings from 
this study suggest that the public sector audit studies from the US are generalisable 
to Australia. These findings add to our understanding of the range of market 
conditions under which it is so far known to hold. 
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CHAPTERl 
Introduction 
Motivation for the Study 
The public sector is undergoing significant change. Reforms in public sector 
management over the past two decades have led to a re-examination of public service 
delivery practices. Government-led managerial reforms have brought on a dramatic 
shift in the method of delivering government services to the community, with an 
emphasis on a more efficient, effective and accountable public services (Hood, 1995; 
Guthrie & Humphrey, 1996). In Australia, the National Competition Policy (NCP) 
reform and the Industry Commission inquiry provide the basis for a contestable 
environment in the public sector to deliver public services. The transition to a 
contestable environment is matched by greater private sector involvement as an 
active partner, supplier and competitor, to participate in the provision of services to 
government, with the basic aims of increasing efficiency, improving service quality 
and reducing costs for businesses and consumers. 
This thesis examines the provision of audit services in the public sector, with a focus 
on contracting-out. The push for reform in the Australian public sector audit in recent 
years (see, for example, Joint Committee of Public Accounts [JCPA], 1989; 1996; 
Maddock, Dahlson & Spencer, 1997) is noted by Funnell ( 1997, footnote 1) that, 
"there have been at least 15 enquiries throughout Australia by public sector bodies 
which have either been convened specifically to investigate reforms for public sector 
audit or have made recommendations for the future of audit offices and auditors­
general". For example, there have been inquiries into the role and function of the 
Auditor-General and, specifically, on the resources provided to the Auditor-General's 
office at the commonwealth level (JCPA, 1989; 1996). The public sector audit 
market is also undergoing major changes with private sector audit suppliers 
increasing their presence in the market (Hardman, 1991; Funnell & Cooper, 1998). 
For example, as a result of an inquiry into the notion of contestability in public sector 
audit (see Maddock et al., 1997), the Victorian Auditor-General had to open the 
majority of public sector audits in Victoria to competition for year-end 1999. 
The recent push for reform in public sector audit, to a large extent, mirrors the 
changes that have taken place in the public sector for the past two decades. These 
changes are predicated on the notions of efficiency and effectiveness in delivering 
public services. This reform has placed the Office of the Auditor-General (hereafter 
OAG) in a more contestable or market-like environment. Over the years, the public 
sector audit activities in Australia have shifted from a monopolistic operation to 
varying degrees of contestable operations. Funnell and Cooper (1998, p. 270) 
observed that there is a shift from an administrative to a corporatist model of public 
sector audit arrangement where there is a "greater operational independence for 
public sector audit by establishing it as a body separate from executive agencies, and 
greater reliance upon private sector auditors". 1 
1 According to Funnell and Cooper ( 1998), there are essentially three public sector audit models in 
Australia: administrative, corporatist and contestable markets. The administrative model is the 
traditional audit model where the audit office operated as an agency that was located within an 
executive portfolio and private sector's involvement in public sector audits is limited. The defining 
feature of a contestable markets model is the open competition between public and private sector 
auditors for all public sector audits. 
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Motivations for reform in public sector audit are complex and difficult to establish. 
Commentaries from academics, previous Auditors-General, policy makers, 
professional bodies and interested parties suggest that reform in the Australian public 
sector audit is political or a complex mix of political and economic factors ( e.g., 
Funnell, 1997; Craswell, 1997; ASCPA, 1997; ICA, 1997; Maddock et al., 1997; 
Taylor, 1998; Houghton & Jubb, 1998; English & Guthrie, 1999; Harris, 1999). 
From a political perspective, reform in public sector audit can be understood in the 
context of a political struggle over parliament's right, as exercised through the OAG, 
to oversee the accounts and management practices of the executive arm of the 
government (Funnell, 1997; English & Guthrie, 1999; Taylor, 1998; Harris, 1999). 
The reform essentially relates to matters of governance between parliament and 
executive government to determine the appropriate accountability process in the 
public sector. The rise of managerialism and the increased adoption of private sector 
models and management practices to deliver public services led parliament to review 
the adequacy of accountability mechanisms in the public sector. As the Auditor­
General provides a vital link in the chain of accountability between the executive and 
parliament, issues that relate to the audit mandate, independence and funding of the 
Auditor-General and the audit office have been placed under review (see JCPA, 
1989; 1996; Maddock et al., 1997). 
The political struggle between parliament and executive to determine a compatible 
accountability process with the 'new public management' practices resulted in two 
major discussions of and, subsequently, amendments to the audit legislation. At the 
commonwealth level, the Australia National Audit Organisation (ANAO) Audit Act 
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1901 was replaced by the Auditor-General Act 1 997. Among the important 
confirmation in this new Act is the pre-eminence of parliament in monitoring the 
financial and management activities of the executive and its service providers. The 
Act formally recognises parliament as the client of the Auditor-General and provides 
greater power to parliament, through the JCP A, to determine the resource needs of 
the OAG. At the state level, the issue of contestability in public sector audit was 
initiated and driven by the executive government (Taylor, 1 998; Harris, 1 999). The 
then Victorian premier initiated a review to examine the application of the NCP in 
Victoria's public sector audit by establishing a committee, known as the Maddock 
committee, to review the Victorian Audit Act 1994. 
From an economic perspective, reform in public sector audit can be understood in the 
context of a more efficient and effective delivery of public services. This reform is 
part of a general economic reform in the public sector that aims to enhance the 
financial accountability of government entities by making the activities of 
government more transparent. One of the most significant developments in the 
reform has been the requirement to test the market, with a view to determine the most 
efficient and effective method of service delivery (Barrett, 1999). The Hilmer Report, 
the impetus for economic reforms in the public sector, arose because of the problems 
perceived to be associated with monopolistic markets in the public sector and the 
incentives to be inefficient. The report calls for the creation of a contestable 
environment to deliver a more efficient and effective public services. 
The move towards a contestable environment in the public sector to deliver services 
has permeated the activities of the OAGs in Australia. The control and management 
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of cost in audit activities take on a greater role, with increased emphasis on 
contracting-out and benchmarking public sector audit activities as means to test the 
market.2 
The search for the most efficient and effective method of delivering public sector 
audit has resulted in various forms of contestability in the Australian public sector 
audit markets. For example, the application of NCP in the Victorian public sector 
audit market had shifted the supply of audit services from a monopolistic to a more 
competitive arrangement (Maddock et al., 1997). Under this arrangement, the 
Victorian OAG was required to competitively tender out the majority of the financial 
audits in Victoria. In New South Wales (NSW), a rotational model has been accepted 
as an alternative to the competitive tendering approach (Audit Office ofNSW, 1999). 
This model involves rotating most audits undertaken by the Auditor-General between 
the Office and private sector auditors. 
Financial Audits in the Public Sector 
State audit remains one of the important ways to ensure accountability (Lovell, 1996; 
Funnell & Cooper, 1998). A traditional component of state audit activity is the 
supervision of the regularity of accounts and the legality of expenditures.3 The 
financial audit, with its access to information and review of government activities, 
2 A survey of the OAG's Annual Report for the financial year-end 1998 in various jurisdictions 
indicate that the OAGs tend to devote a section of their reports to measures of operational efficiency 
and effectiveness. 
3 In recent times, the scope of the OAG has been widened to include the assessment of the efficiency 
and effectiveness of government operations. This type of auditing is known as "performance auditing". 
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has an important role in providing legislators with the detailed, reliable information 
necessary for control (Geist, 1981 ). Verification of the legality of an action taken by a 
public official or a person using public funds is a central element of financial audit. 
Financial audit in the public sector resembles its counterpart in the private sector in 
several technical aspects. Auditors are required to plan the audit, evaluate internal 
control, collect evidence, perform substantive tests and, based on these evidence and 
tests, provide an opinion as to whether the client's financial statements are fairly 
presented. The audit opinion allows third parties to place reliance on the financial 
statements for decision making. While the technical aspect of a financial audit is 
similar for private and public sector audits, there are differences in the level of audit 
coverage and emphasis. For instance, the Australian Audit Office's  (AAO) Auditing 
Standard (1987, s. 1 .1 .6) indicates that: 
. . .  there are large areas of commonality in standards and practices 
(between private and public sector audit) . . . but there are 
important differences of principle and practice. The most important 
of these stem from public accountability requirements and 
differences in the scope of the audit mandate. 
There is commonality in standards because government auditing standards 
incorporate, to a large extent, the standards of the private sector. However, financial 
audits in the public sector place additional emphasis on the review and evaluation of 
internal controls, and compliance with laws and regulations. The mandate in the 
public sector imposes additional obligations on public sector auditors to consider 
issues that relate to probity, equity and public interests that flow from the mandate. 
These issues are not a characteristic of private sector audits. As such, financial audits 
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in the public sector require a more comprehensive approach than audits in the private 
sector (Parker, 1 993; Raman & Wilson, 1994; Funnell & Cooper, 1 998). Financial 
audit in the public sector is known as the attest and compliance audit to reflect the 
greater level of audit scope and emphasis on agencies' financial accounts. 
Each state or territory in Australia has its own audit legislation to govern audit 
activities in the state or territory. However, each state or territory shares similar 
characteristics in regards to the role and objective of the Auditor-General and the 
audit office, and, to a large extent, the contracting processes of public sector audits. 
The Westminster model of governance requires the Auditor-General to check the 
accountability of public sector agencies and report directly to parliament.4 The 
Auditor-General, through the audit office, ensures that there is a chain of 
accountability between parliament and executive government by reporting on the 
executive's use of public funds and compliance with law and regulations. Audit 
legislation in each state imposes a statutory obligation on the Auditor-General to 
audit the accounts of public agencies and report on the financial accountability of 
these agencies to parliament. This legislation enables the Auditor-General to 
determine the extent and types of audit activities undertaken, to allocate resources to 
where the Auditor-General sees as necessary, without the influence of executives or 
bureaucrats of public agencies. Parliament normally appoints the Auditor-General for 
a fixed term and determines the resource needs of the Auditor-General and the audit 
office. This arrangement identifies the OAG as the financial audit supplier, 
4 Auditing is one of the accountability mechanisms to provide checks on the operations of government 
and the expenditure of public funds. Other accountability mechanisms in the public sector include 
scrutiny from the media, opposition parties and interest groups (Lovell, 1996). 
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parliament as the principal client and public sector agencies as the auditees. The 
OAG's independence is a critical attribute of this arrangement. 
Contracting procedures and policies for financial audits. 
Audit legislation in each state or territory provides the OAG with exclusive rights 
and responsibilities to conduct, authorise and report on the financial reports of all 
government agencies. Private sector suppliers are permitted to provide financial audit 
services to government agencies only at the discretion of, and under the supervision 
of, the Auditor-General. This arrangement identifies the role of private sector 
suppliers as sub-contractors or agents of the OAG. All states and territories have a 
mixture of both types of suppliers to undertake financial audits in the public sector. 
With the exception of the Northern Territory, a common practice in other 
jurisdictions is for the OAGs to contract-out a percentage of public sector audits to 
private sector suppliers. The OAG in the Northern Territory contracts-out all of the 
territory's financial audits. 5 
Unlike the private sector and municipal audit markets (e.g., Simunic, 1980; Ward, 
Elder & Kattelus, 1994; Hackenbrack & Knechel, 1997), government agencies at the 
state level in Australia do not have the option of choosing their auditors. In addition, 
legislation generally does not allow private sector contractors to provide audit and 
non-audit services to an agency concurrently to avoid possible conflict of interest. 
5 A recent structural change in Victoria's public sector audit market required the Victorian OAG to 
tender the majority of the state's financial audits. For the financial year-end 1999, Audit Victoria had 
to compete with private sector suppliers for tenders of public sector audits in Victoria. 
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A summary of the audit offices in Australia is provided in Table 1 .  A detailed 
summary of selected contracting procedures and policies of various states or 
territories in Australia is provided in Table 2. Selected commonwealth countries are 
included in Table 2 for comparative purposes.6 
6 The information in Table 2 is adapted from a report, titled, "Centre of Excellence - Contract Auditing 
(The Final Report)". This report was prepared by the OAG for the Northern Territory in 1994 as part 
of the Centres of Excellence's projects. The aim of this project was to lead public sector auditing in 
the subject of contract auditing by developing and providing advice on current and emerging issues. 
The information was collected through surveys sent to Auditors-General in Australia, Canada, UK and 
New Zealand. The first draft copy of the report was sent to the Auditors-General for additional 
responses before it was finalised. All the contracting procedures and policies contained in this report 
reflect the practices of the OAGs in various jurisdictions at year-end 1994. 
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Table 1 
A Summary of Audit Offices in Australia for Financial Year-end 1998 
State/Territory Audit mandate Number of Percentage of Expenditure on Average 
financial financial audits contract audits expenditure per 
statement contracted to private contracted audit 
audits sector firms* 
Victoria Audit Act 1994 538 55% $5,365,252 $18,132 
Tasmania Financial Management & Audit Act 1990 1 19  5% $144,000 $24,202 
Northern Territory Audit Act 1995 n/a 100% $1 ,493,000 n/a 
ACT Auditor-General Act 1 996 58 n/a $571 ,551 n/a 
Financial Management Act 1996 
New South Wales Public Finance & Audit Act 1983 430 15% $1 ,932,000 $29,953 
Western Australia Financial Administration & Audit Act 1985 314 30% $1,339,000 $14,214 
South Australia Public Finance & Audit Act 1 987 200 n/a $899,000 n/a 
Queensland Financial Administration & Audit Act 1977 645 50% $3,286,000 $1 0,189 
Note: * responses to a questionnaire sent to the OAGs in various jurisdictions in Australia n/a = information not available 
1 0  
Table 2 
A Summary of Selected Contracting Procedures and Policies in Australia and Other Commonwealth Countries 
Policy/Procedure/Documentation 
• The Financial Administration and Audit Act (or equivalent) yes 
rovides the OAG with the ower to a oint contract auditors. 
• Notwithstanding no stated Government (Govt.) Policy on use no 
of private sector auditors, there is a perceived expectation by 
overnment that this will occur. 
• . In the absence of Govt. Policy on contracting audit services, yes 
the OAG has issued a policy (i.e., to use or not use private (7) 
sector auditors). 
• In regard to policy (Govt. or OAG), there is a limitation placed no 
on es of audits to be ut out to contract auditors. 
yes 
yes 
(4) 
yes 
(6) 
no 
(8) 
yes 
yes 
(3) 
yes 
no 
yes 
yes 
no 
n/a 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
(7) 
yes 
n/a 
n/a 
(5) 
no 
( 1 ) History of contracting out. In 1 989, 2600 separate accountable bodies were established these were contracted out. 
yes 
yes 
(2) 
no 
n/a 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
yes 
no 
no 
n/a 
(2) The electricity distribution industry and District area Health Services contracted out. Plus area Health Services and some miscellaneous audits. 
(3) Audit of Govt. authorities. 
( 4) History of contracting out to cover peak workload since mid-eighties. 
(5) Policy statements issued reinforce those of Govt. 
(6) Manual for contract audits in use. 
(7) OAG policy currently excludes Govt. departments from contract audits (and core local authorities in NZ) 
yes 
yes 
( 1 )  
yes 
yes 
(7) 
(8) Other than in hospital, water and education sectors, where the majority of these audits are contracted to agents, major audits not generally contracted out. 
1 1  
yes 
n/a 
yes 
no 
yes 
n/a 
n/a 
(5) 
no 
Table 2 
A Summary of Selected Contracting Procedures and Policies in Australia and Other Commonwealth Countries ( continued) 
Po !icy/Procedure/Documentation 
open invitation. However, selective representation to 
ective contractors to submit uotes or tenders. 
( I )  Contract may require contract auditor to  use AGO staff on assignment. 'Manage' i s  meant loosely here and does not necessarily equate to control. Control i s  examined in 
greater depth in Section 7. 
(2) In a large competitive environment, open tender preferred. This can be reduced to a short list of sufficient representative number of competent potential auditors. Individual 
appointments can occur but reasoning must bear up to public scrutiny. 
(3) Open to all CA firms. 
1 2  
Table 2 
A Summary of Selected Contracting Procedures and Policies in Australia and Other Commonwealth Countries ( continued) 
Policy/Procedure/Documentation 
• An adhoc/non-documented evaluation process exists, e.g., yes no yes yes yes yes no yes yes no yes yes 
eneral criteria listed but evaluation rocedure not fonnalised. (2) ( 1) (1)  
• Criteria includes: yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
1 )  Ability to undertake work (professional standing, (4) 
appropriateness of methodology, previous experience, industry 
knowledge etc) 
2) Adequacy of resources to actually perfonn the audit 
assignment 
3) An assessment of quality control within the contractors 
organisation and depth of personnel to supervise and review 
the ro·ect. 
• Evaluation is divided into two stages, i.e., initial acceptance to yes yes yes no yes n/a yes no no yes yes no 
register/tender, followed by review for specific assignment (3) 
tenders/offers. 
( 1 )  Review and selection completed in accordance with general procurement policies and guidelines. No print score or other fonnalised measurement system operates to rank 
applications. 
(2) Review required by Executive Director Audit but no criteria listed. 
(3) n/a where limited tender used. 
(4) infonnation is not supplied on the last criteria. 
1 3  
Table 2 
A Summary of Selected Contracting Procedures and Policies in Australia and Other Commonwealth Countries ( continued) 
Policy/Procedure/Documentation 
( I )  Proforma contract is a fairly simple form. 
(2) Formal contract but not under seal. 
(3) OAG can determine a set fee. 
( 4) Subject to further negotiation ifnecessary. 
(5) Both hourlv and fixed orice used. 
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Table 2 
A Summary of Selected Contracting Procedures and Policies in Australia and Other Commonwealth Countries (continued) 
Policy/Procedure/Documentation 
• Audit reviews and approves audit plans before work yes 
commences. 
• Audit reviews interim and final workpaper files before any yes 
re orts are issued excludin Mana ement Re orts . 
• Audit reviews financial statements of auditees. yes 
• Audit prescribes the audit methodology to be used in the no 
assi ent. (4) 
• Audit evaluates contract auditors at completion of assignment. yes 
5 
• Audit undertakes a quality assurance review program. yes 
5 
• External reviews of contract auditors arranged by Audit. no 
( I )  Where auditee or contract auditor i s  new, Audit reviews audit plan. 
(2) Audit plan received at end of audit. 
yes yes yes 
yes yes yes 
yes yes yes 
yes no yes 
yes yes yes 
yes yes yes 
no no no 
(3) Brief description of the methodology to be employed by the firm to be included in tender submission. 
(4) Except for small hospitals where Audit office methodology is used. 
(5) May be subjected to normal quality review procedures adopted by the OAG. 
( 6) Audit returns for each assignment. 
yes no 
( 1 )  
yes yes 
yes yes 
no no 
yes yes 
yes yes 
no yes 
8 
(7) Contract allows for AG with 7 days notice to examine all relevant files of contract auditor for purpose of quality review. 
yes yes yes no 
(2) 
yes yes yes no 
yes yes yes yes 
no no no no 
(3) 
no yes yes yes 
(6) 
yes yes yes yes 
7 
no no no no 
yes yes 
yes yes 
yes yes 
no n/s 
yes no 
yes yes 
no no 
(8) The Basic Financial Audit (BF A) is controlled by a contract auditor known as a group leader. The group leader reviews the work of other contract auditors in their 
completion of the BFA program. 
1 5  
Table 2 
A Summary of Selected Contracting Procedures and Policies in Australia and Other Commonwealth Countries (continued) 
Policy/Procedure/Documentation 
• Contract auditor to advise Audit immediately of any potential 
conflicts of interest. 
• Contract auditor to seek Audit approval before any direct work 
can be com leted for auditee. 
yes 
yes 
yes yes 
no yes 
(7) 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
(8) 
yes 
yes 
(6) 
yes yes 
yes yes 
( 1) Procedural letters can be issued by contract auditor. Other correspondence can be issued by contractor once approved by ANAO officer. 
yes 
yes 
(2) In the case of management reports, the contract auditor reports to the AG who sends the report under the cover of his own report to the auditee. 
(3) Senior ANAO staff involved in development of planning strategy. 
(4) For new auditees and contract auditors Audit is involved in the review and approval of the strategic audit plan before implementation. 
(5) Office reviews such plans and provides feedback where required. 
yes 
no 
(9) 
yes 
yes 
(6) Contract auditor and associates cannot offer to perform, perform for, or provide any other work to any auditee of the AG without the prior written approval of the AG. 
(7) New contracts do not allow the conduct of any internal audit work by contract auditor. Other services can only be undertaken with the prior approval of the AG. 
(8) Contract auditor barred from doing other work for the auditee. 
(9) Provided they stay within !!Uidelines. 
1 6  
yes 
yes 
Adapted from: Centre of Excellence - Contract auditing: Final Report, 7 October 1994, Prepared by the Office of the Auditor-General for the 
Northern Territory. 
Yes = substantially complies; no = usually does not comply; n/a = procedure not applicable; n/s = information not supplied to make assessment 
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Objective of the Study 
This study focuses on the economic issues that surround the current reform in public 
sector audits. It seeks to compare the main methods of delivering audit services in the 
public sector and provide evidence on their relative efficiency. Specifically, it 
attempts to answer the question of whether contracting-out audits is the more cost 
efficient form of delivery for public sector audits when compared to an in-house 
arrangement. 
The research question is motivated from the recent move to a more contestable 
environment to deliver public sector audits. This move has increased the focus on 
outsourcing as a means to deliver public sector audits. In Victoria, the Maddock 
Report (1997) proposed that greater competition in the public sector audit market 
will bring benefits to the Victorian public. The main assumption that underlies this 
report is the perceived superiority of a competitive model to deliver more cost 
efficient and effective audits in the public sector audit market. Consequently, a more 
competitive model has been adopted as the preferred model of supplying audit 
services in Victoria. The recent changes in Victoria (i.e., Audit Act and the OAG) 
have raised the possibility that competition may play a key role in delivering public 
sector audits. The developments in Victoria will, no doubt, influence the operations 
of the OAGs in other jurisdictions. While, to date, there is no compulsion in other 
jurisdictions to adopt a more competitive model to deliver public sector audits, 
outsourcing has been emphasised as a means to benchmark audit services in the 
public sector. 
1 8  
The Victorian government justified the application of the NCP to public sector audits 
on the basis of conserving public sector resources and engendering a more 
competitive public service to improve efficiency and effectiveness (Maddock et al., 
1997; Craswell, 1997; Houghton & Jubb, 1998; Taylor, 1998; Harris, 1999). 
Predictably, the economic issues revolve around the monopoly power conferred on 
Auditors-General to supply audits to public sector agencies and questions of 
efficiency and effectiveness in performing these duties are inevitably raised 
(Maddock et al., 1997). The efficiency and effectiveness of the OAG in carrying out 
these duties are often discussed in the context of the various models of contestability, 
with the competitive model being perceived as being more efficient and effective 
( e.g., Houghton & Jubb, 1998). On the other hand, several commentators have 
questioned the economic benefits of introducing competition and increasing the role 
of alternative audit suppliers in the public sector audit market (see Craswell, 1997; 
Houghton & Jubb, 1998; Taylor, 1998; Harris, 1999). For example, Harris (p. 34) 
noted that: 
The review [Maddock Report (1997)] did contemplate that overall 
the cost of audits might rise. This, perhaps understandably, was 
never quoted by the premier when announcing the government's 
decision or when introducing the associated legislation. Many 
people might not comprehend that a decision to increase 
competition might lead to increase prices. 
While the sole provision of public sector audits by the OAG has been questioned and 
criticised, particularly in regards to efficiency, no attempt has been made to measure 
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this performance criterion and compare the criterion to various models of public 
sector audit delivery. In countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand and United States, the OAGs ( or its equivalent) are the primary 
suppliers of audits at the state and federal levels and, as such, play an important role 
in the financial reporting process of public sector agencies. An emphasis towards a 
market-based provision of public services in recent years, as exemplified by the 
recent developments in Victoria, has increased the role of contestable models (with 
involvement from private sector suppliers), in the public sector audit market. As 
such, investigations and debate that seek to identify the most efficient and effective 
form of delivering public sector audits are timely. 
While public funds are channelled into the public sector audit, there is limited 
evidence on the allocation of audit resources in the market. For year-end 1999, the 
funding allocated to attest and compliance function amounts to $6 million and 
comprised 60 percent of the funding received by the OAG in WA (OAG WA, 1999). 
In NSW, 90 percent of the resources received by the OAG flow to the attest and 
compliance function. Given that one of the main motivations for reform in the public 
sector audit is to provide a more effective and efficient audits, it is important to 
examine the economic activities of audit suppliers in this market. 
An issue that is closely related to discussions of the preferred model of delivering 
public sector audit is the use of outsourcing as a means of benchmarking public 
sector audits. Benchmarking audit activities usually involves comparisons of 
efficiency and effectiveness measures (1) with previous years, (2) against other 
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jurisdictions and overseas audit offices and (3) against private sector auditors (see 
Victorian Auditor-General's Office, 1998; Auditor-General's Department of South 
Australia, 1 998; OAG WA, 1998; Queensland Audit Office, 1 998). As noted by the 
Audit Office ofNSW (1999, p. 11 ): 
The Office recognises the value and importance of comparing 
Office performance against our counterparts in other jurisdictions 
and the private sector. We have compared/benchmarked a number 
of our processes and outcomes, for example, the university and 
health sector audits and the operation of computer services. . . . 
During the coming year the Office will be developing measures to 
compare ourselves against appropriate external benchmarks. 
One of the often-cited benefits of outsourcing is that the system of outsourcing 
enables the OAGs to compare the performance of their internal staff (i.e., in-house 
providers) against the private sector suppliers (i.e., contractors) (Craswell, 1997). The 
benchmark can include the audit methodology adopted and audit costs for a 
comparable engagement. The rationale for undertaking a benchmarking exercise is to 
bring the OAG's practices closer to those with whom the OAG should be contestable 
(Barrett, 1999). A major reason why private sector practices are used as a benchmark 
is that they have the economies of scale to spend more on research and development 
of audit technologies. 
In summary, the arguments for introducing competition in public sector audit are 
based on the assumption that a competitive model, through greater use of outsourcing 
and the involvement of private sector suppliers, is the more efficient form of delivery 
compare to a relatively monopolistic arrangement (i.e., the OAG as in-house 
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providers). This assumption implies that the public sector audit market should be 
open to competition because a monopoly on the market by the OAG may cause 
inefficiencies in the provision of those audits. This also implies that outsourced 
audits should be the benchmark for public sector audits. Thus far, there is no 
evidence on whether outsourcing results in more cost efficient audits. 
This study compares the costs of undertaking financial audit work in the public sector 
between an in-house (i.e., the OAG as supplier) and contract-out (i.e., private audit 
firms as suppliers) arrangement. This study focuses on financial audits and uses 
contractors as a proxy for suppliers that must exist in a competitive market, i.e., a 
benchmark. Audit efficiency in the public sector audit market is examined within the 
context of the current public sector audit arrangement at the state level in WA. 
Testing audit efficiency allows this study to simultaneously consider the issue of 
benchmarking of public sector audits. The activities of contractors in the public 
sector are often viewed as benchmarks for public sector audits. By examining the 
audit work of private sector suppliers in the public sector, this study controls for 
potential market-related differences that can affect audit production costs when 
comparing the work of public and private sector suppliers. As noted by Craswell 
(1 997) and, Guthrie and English (1 997), benchmarking is a complex process and a 
benchmarking exercise that adopts a straightforward comparative analysis of private 
and public sector audit costs is problematic because of differences in audit mandate, 
market structure and the demand for audit services. 
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Empirical evidence on the relative cost efficiency of in-house and contract-out audits 
will enable the OAGs to compare their performance with private sector contractors 
and determine the more efficient form of public sector audit delivery. A potential 
issue that may arise out of this benchmarking exercise is the need to partition public 
sector audit costs into the costs for the actual audit work and the costs for oversight 
or supervisory work for contract-out audits. As a result, a further issue is to decide on 
whether the OAG's supervision activities, and, hence, costs, should be factor into the 
contract-out audits when evaluating contractors' performance. 
At the firm level, deciding on the mix of in-house and contract-out arrangement for 
audit delivery is important because tendering is a costly process. As noted by 
Craswell (1997, p. 1 7), "the organisation calling tenders incurs not only 
administrative costs but also risks discouraging tenderers for whom the probability of 
success is a function of the number of firms bidding". At the market level, such 
evidence is important because it has the potential to influence government policies in 
matters relating to the most efficient form of public sector audit delivery. As an 
example, the evidence from this study can provide a framework for the policy makers 
in Victoria to evaluate their decisions regarding contestability in the public sector 
audit market. By identifying the factors that drive efficiency in the public sector audit 
market ( e.g., type of suppliers, market structure, incentives, institutional 
environment), the evidence from this study may provide input to policy decisions on 
matters relating to the structure of the public sector audit market that best fulfils the 
efficient and effective criteria. In the long run, the benefits will accrue to the public, 
through a more efficient and effective use of public funds. 
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To examine audit efficiency in the public sector, production function and fee moqels 
of audit services in the public sector are developed. Prior literature in the private 
sector market has identified client-related characteristics as potential determinants of 
audit fees and hours (see Simunic, 1980; O'Keefe, Simunic & Stein, 1994b; 
Hackenbrack & Knechel, 1997). However, knowledge of the public sector audit 
market and its production of audit services and, audit fees, is still limited and, hence, 
the available evidence is tentative. Consequently, the secondary motivation for this 
study is to develop appropriate audit production and fee models for public sector 
audits. 
Based on the above, the three research questions are ( 1 )  What are the factors that 
influence the costs and fees of financial audits in the public sector? (2) After 
controlling for major factors identified in (1 ), is there a difference in the costs of 
financial audits between the in-house and contract-out arrangement? and (3) After 
controlling for major factors identified in (1 ), is there a difference in the fees of 
financial audits between the in-house and contract-out arrangement? 
Notions of Audit Efficiency and Audit Effectiveness 
This section discusses the notions of audit efficiency and audit effectiveness. The 
latter is also discussed and examined in this section and subsequent chapters because 
audit efficiency is inextricably linked with audit effectiveness. The first part of this 
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section describes the criteria for audit efficiency that will provide a benchmark for 
theory development while the second part provides the notion for audit effectiveness. 
Notion of audit efficiency. 
The first step in defining efficiency is to identify the input and output components of 
a production process. A general definition of efficiency is "the relative amount of 
inputs used to achieve a given level of output" or, stated alternatively, the relative 
amount of output produced for a given level of input (Homgren, Foster & Datar, 
1 997, p. 992). 
In an auditing context, the audit effort and audit opinion issued would be the input 
and output of an audit production process respectively. The economics of auditing 
literature has adopted the views that: ( 1 )  the output of an audit firm is not directly 
observable to the market; and (2) the firm is assumed to supply a fixed level of audit 
assurance, i.e., one type of audit quality, across audit engagements at a given point in 
time. Therefore, any cross-sectional differences in the audit firm's production 
function on different audit engagements are due to client characteristics. Prior studies 
have operationalised audit fees or hours as the dependent variable and client-related 
characteristics as the independent variables, thereby implying that, audit hours or fees 
vary, depending on the client's characteristics. 
An alternative way of conceptualising efficiency, using the input-output model, is to 
view the quantity of audit services provided to a client, i.e., the amount and costs of 
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audit effort, as the output and the client's characteristics as the input of the 
production process. In audit production studies, the amount of audit effort is proxied 
by audit labour hours ( e.g., O'Keefe et al., 1994b; Stein et al., 1994; Hackenbrack & 
Knechel, 1997). Human capital is the main resource in most service firms and since 
the product supplied by an audit firm is a service that is labour intensive, audit labour 
hours often serve as a proxy for effort. Therefore, in a production model of audit 
services, client-related characteristics constitute the inputs that influence the amount 
of output, i.e., labour hours, at a given level of audit quality. 
This study uses the costs of providing an audit opinion on financial statement at a 
specific (implicit or explicit) level of audit quality for a given level of client-related 
characteristics as the measure of audit efficiency. 
Notion of audit effectiveness. 
A general definition of effectiveness is "the degree to which a predetermined 
objective or target is met" (Homgren et al., 1 997, p. 992). In an auditing context, 
audit quality ( defined as the probability of discovering misstatements or omissions in 
the financial statement and reporting those misstatements or omissions) encompasses 
audit effectiveness, i.e., the achievement of a desired level of assurance that material 
client errors have been detected and reported (Bedard, Gopi & Vij�yalakshmi, 1 991). 
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Conclusions 
This chapter has documented the recent reform in the Australian public sector audit 
market to provide the motivation for this study. As exemplified in the discussions of 
the public sector audit market in Victoria, there was a shift towards a contestable 
model in the public sector audit market. This study aims to provide empirical 
evidence on the relative cost efficiency of in-house and contract-out audits. A brief 
overview on the role of financial audits in the public sector and the current audit 
arrangements in various jurisdictions in Australia provide the background to the 
study. This study relies on prior audit fee and production function studies to examine 
the issue of audit efficiency in the public sector. The next chapter provides a review 
of the relevant literature on audit fees and production function, and a set of 
conclusions from this literature. 
Chapter Outline and Organisation 
This thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 provides a review of the relevant 
literature on audit fees and audit production function. Summary tables and 
conclusions from the literature review are also provided. Chapter 3 discusses the 
theory underpinning concepts such as audit effectiveness and audit efficiency that 
lead to hypotheses formulation. Chapter 4 proposes empirical models for audit costs 
and audit fees in the public sector. The research method is also presented in this 
chapter where the sample selection and measurement instruments are explained and 
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justified. Chapter 5 presents the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for 
dependent and independent variables. Chapter 6 presents the results of regression 
models while chapter 7 presents further tests on the models. Chapter 8 concludes 
with a summary of the major findings and the implications of the results. Limitations 
of the research and further research avenues are also discussed. 
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CHAPTER2 
Literature Review 
Introduction 
This chapter is divided into two main sections: (1) audit fee studies; and (2) audit 
production function (hereafter audit production) studies. The first section reviews 
prior audit fee studies and examines the differences between fee models in the private 
and public sector audit markets. The next section examines the audit production 
studies and the assumptions regarding the input and output of an audit firm. 
To examine issues in audit efficiency and audit effectiveness, this study relies on a 
branch of literature in auditing known as the economics of auditing. This literature 
has focused primarily on the role of audit firms in the private sector market and, to a 
lesser extent, the public sector market. The major issues examined in prior studies 
include the level of competition in the private sector audit market (e.g., Simunic, 
1980; Maher, Tiessen, Colson & Broman, 1992), product differentiation through 
industry specialisation ( e.g., Craswell, Francis & Taylor, 1995), initial audit 
engagements (e.g., Ettredge & Greenburg, 1990; Craswell & Francis, 1999), audit 
contract type ( e.g., Palmrose, 1989), auditor choice ( e.g., Simon & Francis, 1988), 
audit qu,ality ( e.g., Deis & Giroux, 1992) and provision of non-audit services ( e.g., 
Davis, Ricchiute & Trompeter, 1993). These studies constitute a body of research 
that examines the factors that influence audit fees or audit effort in a competitive 
audit market. A common characteristic of these studies is the use of an audit fee or 
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audit production model to provide a framework for the research questions. An audit 
fee or audit production model enables the researchers to identify factors that impact 
on audit pricing and audit cost functions in the private and public sector markets. 
To date, there has been no significant prior work on production efficiency in auditing. 
There is no research that directly examines the efficiency of public or private sector 
auditors or, the comparative efficiency between public and private sector auditors in 
their undertaking of public sector audits. Discussions of audit efficiency in the 
literature are usually not undertaken because audit efficiency is often implied in the 
ways an audit firm allocates its resources in a competitive audit market. 7 
Notwithstanding the differentiated audit market, the assumption is that market 
mechanisms provide incentives for firms to operate at minimal costs and maximise 
resource utilisation for an agreed level of audit quality. In a competitive audit market, 
firms that are inefficient will lose their market share, which will affect their profit 
margin and possibly their survival in the long run. Recent studies are beginning to 
focus on the efficiency of audit firms in the private sector (see Dopuch, Gupta, 
Simunic & Stein, 2000; Knechel & Payne, forthcoming). 
To answer the research questions, audit fee and audit production models need to be 
developed for the public sector audit market in Australia. Therefore, the relevant 
literature for this study are prior studies that focused on the development of audit fee 
and audit production models and, issues relating to audit quality in the public sector. 
Greater emphasis is placed on the review of audit production studies because these 
7 Evidence of a competitive audit market in the private sector is suggested by Simunic (1980) and 
Maher et al. ( I  992). 
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studies provide a direct examination of audit costs, with the use of labour hours to 
proxy for auditor effort, and specification of an input-output model for the production 
of audit services. 
Audit fee studies are included in the literature review because the pricing of audit 
services in a competitive market is assumed to approximate the cost structures and 
production processes of audit firms ( e.g., Simunic, 1 980). Audit fee studies that 
focused on the development of audit fee models are selected for the literature review. 
These studies highlight the conceptual and measurement issues associated with the 
development of audit fee models. Emphasis is on the audit fee models developed in 
different countries to illustrate the extent of generalisability and transferability of the 
models. Simunic's (1980) study is the starting point in the literature review because it 
is one of the earliest and influential studies to provide a basic conceptual framework 
for an audit fee model. Other studies in the review are Francis (1984), Firth (1985), 
Chung and Lindsay (1 988) and Chan, Ezzamel and Gwilliam (1993); selected to 
illustrate the early development of audit fee models in countries other than the United 
States (US), specifically, in Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United 
Kingdom (UK) respectively. 
Thus far, the selected audit fee studies are based on the private sector market. Several 
audit fee studies in the public sector are also reviewed to provide greater relevance to 
the focus of this study, that is, an examination of audit efficiency in the Australian 
public sector market. Potential differences between the private and public sector 
markets, for example, the political environment, may give rise to differences in the 
pricing of audits. Therefore, studies that developed audit fee models in the public 
3 1  
sector to test the unique aspects of the environment are included in the literature 
review. These studies are Baber, Brooks and Ricks (1987), Rubin (1988), Copley 
(1989) and Ward et al. ( 1994 ). Baber et al. and Rubin are two of the earliest studies 
that examined audit fees in the public sector audit market, with Copley and Ward et 
al. extending their audit fee models subsequently. Since audit efficiency is 
inextricably linked with audit effectiveness, prior studies that examined audit quality 
in the public sector audit market are also reviewed. These studies are Copley and 
Doucet ( 1993 ), Raman and Wilson (1994 ), O'Keefe, King and Gaver (1994a) and 
Brown and Raghunandan (1995). Major audit fee studies in the public sector have, to 
date, been based exclusively in the US. 
With regard to audit production studies, all major studies in this area are reviewed. 
These studies are O'Keefe et al. (1994b), Stein, Simunic and O'Keefe (1994) and 
Hackenbrack and Knechel (1997). 
Audit Fee Studies 
This section reviews the initial development of an audit fee model and the 
assumptions applicable to the model. Next, it reviews the generalisability of the 
model in various countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the UK. 
More importantly, this section reviews the public sector audit fee models and the 
differences between public sector and private sector audit fee models. Selected 
studies for this section include Simunic (1980), Francis (1984), Firth (1985), Chung 
and Lindsay ( 1988), Baber et al. (1987), Rubin (1988), Copley (1989), Chan et al. 
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(1993) and Ward et al. (1994). 
Private sector audit fee studies. 
Numerous studies in the economics of auditing literature have proposed various 
approaches and models to explain the variation in audit fees paid by firms in the 
private sector market. Simunic (1980) is an influential study in this research area 
because it provides the basic conceptual framework for an audit fee model. The 
study's main objective is tu provide evidence on the existence of competition among 
audit firms in the private sector audit market. To test the competitiveness of the audit 
market, Simunic developed a model of the process by which audit fees are 
determined. This model represents the product of unit price and the quantity of audit 
services demanded by the client, hence, factors that cause variations in these 
components need to be controlled before any inference about competition can be 
made from observed fee data. 
The fee model is based on an important assumption that auditors and clients are 
jointly liable to financial statement users and, therefore, both parties have incentives 
to avoid liability. The external financial reporting system, of which auditing is a part 
of, is designed to reduce expected liability losses of auditors and clients. Given that 
liability loss exposure and assessed loss-sharing ratios vary across audit 
engagements, sources of liability losses need to be identified and controlled before 
any inference about competition can be made from observed fee data. The control 
variables selected for Simunic's (1 980) study are client's total assets, number of 
consolidated subsidiaries, client industry, the ratios of foreign assets to total assets, 
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accounts receivable to total assets, inventories to total assets, net income to total 
assets, losses in any of the last three financial years, audit qualification and tenure of 
auditors. 
Simunic' s (1980) results suggest that, with the exception_ of two variables, all 
variables are significant in explaining audit fees. The insignificant variables are the 
ratio of net income to total assets and tenure of auditors. For the total observation of 
397 publicly-listed companies in the US, the research model explains approximately 
46 percent of the variability in audit fees. In the context of the research question, the 
results failed to reject the hypothesis that price competition prevails throughout the 
markets for audits of publicly-held companies. The coefficients for auditor type 
(measured as Big 8 versus non-Big 8) are not significantly different from zero for the 
total observation and two sub-samples of "large" and "small" clients. Therefore, the 
allegation that the Big 8 firms are monopolising the market for audit services cannot 
be supported. 
The ability of various client-related factors to explain the variability in audit fees is 
also investigated in other countries such as Australia, Canada, United Kingdom (UK) 
and New Zealand. Prior studies such as Francis (1 984), Firth (1985), Chung and 
Lindsay (1988) and Chan et al. ( 1 993) have adopted Simunic' s (1 980) audit fee 
model to test the generalisability of the model in countries other than the US. 
Francis (1 984) found that control variables such as client's total assets, number of 
consolidated subsidiaries, percentage of current assets and Big 8 accounting firms are 
significantly associated with audit fees for the total sample of Australian companies. 
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Using the logarithm of the external audit fee as the dependent variable, the model 
explains 71 percent of the variance in audit fees. In a study using a New Zealand 
sample, Firth ( 1985) found client's total assets, account receivable to total assets, the 
variance of rates of return for stock and on the market portfolio and, systematic risk 
of stock to be significant explanatory variables for differences in audit fees across 96 
manufacturing firms. Chung and Lindsay (1988) investigated audit firm pricing in the 
Canadian market. They replicated Simunic's study by using data for 228 Canadian 
audits of publicly-held companies in 1980. Results suggest that significant variables 
include client's total assets, number of subsidiaries and level of inventory. The extent 
of foreign assets and amount of receivable are significant determinants of audit fees 
for large and small companies respectively. Chan et al. (1993) provided evidence 
from the UK on the determinants of audit fees. Client-related factors such as turnover 
(measured as inventory/total assets), return on shareholders' equity, audit delay 
(measured as lag in weeks between the accounting year-end and the audit report 
date), diversification, ownership (measured as directors' beneficial and non­
beneficial shareholdings and, all disclosed shareholdings in excess of 5 percent) and 
number of subsidiaries and, auditor-related factors such as auditor size (measured as 
Big 6 versus non-Big 6) and location (measured as London versus non-London 
office), are significant and explains 87 percent of the variability in audit fees. 
Prior studies have conventionally classified audit fee determinants into three broad 
groups of client-related characteristics: size, complexity and risk. Size and 
complexity have shown strong relationships with audit fees and accounted for the 
largest percentage of the variance in audit fees. However, measures in the risk 
category typically exhibit a weak relationship with audit fees (Simunic & Stein, 
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1996). In the auditing literature, it is generally accepted that the audit risk concept is 
composed of two distinct but related concepts; "audit risk" and "business risk" (Jubb, 
Houghton & Butterworth, 1 996). The audit fee literature has treated "audit" and 
"business" risks as a single construct to encompass the concept and measurement of 
audit risk.8 In reviewing prior audit fee studies, Simunic and Stein (p. 126) conclude 
that, "on balance, the US evidence is consistent with audit firms increasing their audit 
fees in the face of higher than usual litigation risk. However, the relationship between 
litigation-risk measures and audit fees is generally not very strong". Examples of 
litigation risk measures are whether the client reported a net loss in the current or two 
previous financial years, audit qualification and client ownership (measured as public 
versus non-public). The mixed results in non-US studies led them to suggest that, 
overall, it is not possible to generalise the results on the relationship between risk and 
audit fees. They noted that a possible reason for the weak relationship is the 
difference in auditor behaviour in different national legal environments and, hence, 
studies have to be carefully designed to enable meaningful comparisons between 
studies. 
Prior audit fee studies have used total assets, sales and/or turnover as proxies for 
client size and, number of subsidiaries, foreign assets, receivable proportions and/or 
diversification as proxies for client complexity. Audit risk is usually proxied by items 
8 "Audit risk" is the probability that an auditor will issue an inappropriate opinion on an auditee's 
financial statements that are materially misstated, while "business risk" is the probability that an 
auditor will suffer a loss or injury to his/her professional practice (Brumfield, Elliott & Jacobson, 
1 983). "Audit risk" is often represented by an audit risk model which consists of three components; 
inherent risk, control risk and detection risk. The second element of audit risk is "business risk" and it 
is the probability that an audit firm will incur litigation costs, sanctions imposed by private or public 
regulatory bodies (e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC], Australian Securities 
Commission [ASC], professional bodies) and impaired professional reputation (Brumfield et al., 
1 983). Both concepts of risk are inter-related and have the potential to influence the amount of 
evidential matter needed to support an audit opinion (i.e., audit effort) and the fee premium charged to 
clients. 
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in the client's balance sheet such as debt-to-equity ratio, operating losses and audit 
qualification. This approach captures the financial risk of the firm only and does not 
wholly reflect the nature of the business of the firm and the control environment 
instituted by the firm (Chan et al., 1993). 
Overall, the results from audit fee studies suggest that the fee models have high 
explanatory power and are robust across different countries, markets and time 
periods. A summary of selected audit fee studies in the private sector market is 
presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3 
A Summary of Selected Audit Fee Studies in the Private Sector Market 
Sample size 
Sample origin 
Explanatory variables 
Client size 
Risk 
Simunic (1980) 
397 
us 
total assets*# 
operating losses** 
audit qualification** 
Francis (1984) 
136 
Australia 
total assets* 
operating losses 
audit qualification 
equity/debt 
38 
Firth (1985) 
96 
New Zealand 
total assets** 
operating losses 
unsystematic risk** 
Chung & Lindsay 
(1988 
228 
Canada 
operating losses 
Chan et al. (1993) 
280 
UK 
turnover* 
unsystematic risk 
gearing & liquidity 
ratios 
return/sh. equity* 
ownership* 
Table 3 
A Summary of Selected Audit Fee Studies in the Private Sector Market (continued) 
Simunic (1980) 
Client complexity no. of subsidiaries* *  
receivable & 
inventory** 
foreign assets** 
Other variables Big 8 audit firms 
auditor tenure 
Adj. R of audit fee 46% 
model 
Note: * 
**  
***  
significant at 0.01 level 
significant at 0.05 level 
significant at 0.10 level 
Francis (1984) Firth (1985) 
no. of subsidiaries* no. of subsidiaries 
receivable & 
inventory** 
Big 8 audit firms* Six major audit firms 
71% 70-72% 
Chung & Lindsay Chan et al. (1993) 
1988) 
no. of subsidiaries**  no. of subsidiaries* 
receivable & 
inventory** 
foreign assets* * 
diversification* 
Big 8 audit firms Big 6 audit firms* 
auditor tenure 
audit delay* 
busy season 
location* 
61% 87% 
# in Simunic's (1980) fee model, this variable is used to deflate audit fees. A regression of audit fees on total assets indicate 
that the variable is significant and positively related to audit fees and, explains 57 percent of the variance in audit fees. 
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Public sector audit fee studies. 
There are several studies that examine the pricing of audit services in the public 
sector audit market. Among the relevant studies are Baber et al. ( 1 987), Rubin 
(1 988), Copley ( 1 989) and Ward et al. (1 994). 
Baber et al. ( 1 987) is one of the earliest studies that examined audit fees in the public 
sector audit market. One of the main objectives of the study is to relate the 
differences in audit fees to differences in the financial and political characteristics of 
the county governments. Cross-sectional analysis of the audit fees paid by 100 North 
Carolina county governments indicates significant associations between audit fees 
and client size (measured as county population), audit firm size (measured as Big 8 
versus non-Big 8), audit scope (measured as single audit versus other)9, political 
factors (measured as party membership)10 and outstanding debt. Audit qualification is 
not significantly associated with county audit fees. 
Rubin ( 1988) develops an audit fee model for municipalities by extending prior 
research in the private sector audit market. His study adopts many of the 
determinants of private sector audit fee models to develop a municipal audit fee 
model. Rubin argues that it is important to extend research in audit pricing practices 
to the public sector because the public sector may differ from the private sector in 
both the environment and procedures surrounding the audit contracting process. The 
9 Baber et al. ( 1987) note that a single audit is more comprehensive than audits required prior to 1979 
and 3 1  of the 100 North Carolina counties adopted the single audit prior to fiscal year-end 1985. 
10 A dichotomous variable where " 1" signifies one or more Republicans are elected to the Board of 
County Commissioners during the period 1978-84. 
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main differences are the accounting systems and types of financial reports associated 
with governmental units, users of financial statements and contracting procedures for 
audits in the public sector, which may be regulated by statute. As such, new variables 
need to be developed to capture the unique aspects of the municipal government 
environment. 
Rubin (1988) classifies the determinants of the fee model into client size, loss 
exposure, client complexity, report complexity, auditor retention and auditor size. 
Results based . on a sample of 189 cities suggest that significant variables include 
client size (measured as population of the city), loss exposure (measured as debt per 
capita and bond rating of city), complexity (measured as service index of the city 1 1 , 
number of separate reports, Comprehensive Annual Financial Report [CAFR] versus 
non-CAFR), auditor tenure and audit production factors (whether the audit is 
performed during the auditor's busy season and, the length of auditee's Chief 
Financial Officer [CFO] tenure). He found that auditor tenure has a positive and 
significant association with audit fees in non-bid cities. He argues that . this result 
supports DeAngelo' s ( 1981) expectation that audit fees may rise over time due to 
"low balling". Contrary to prior audit fee studies in the private sector (e.g., Simunic, 
1980; Palmrose, 1 986; Houghton & Jubb, 1 999), audit qualification is not associated 
with municipal audit fees. The audit fee model explains approximately 58 percent of 
the variance in audit fees of municipalities in his sample. 
1 1  The service index reflects the number of non-ordinary services a city offered to its constituents. As 
such, the index excludes public safety and general administration activities because it is assumed that 
these activities are provided by all cities. The index is a count of activities that are not uniformly 
provided by all municipal governments. 
4 1  
Copley (1989) undertook a similar study in the public sector audit market. He 
extended Rubin's (1 988) study by examining a larger sample of local governments, 
which include both city and county governments. His study incorporates variables not 
examined in Rubin's study such as type of auditor (measured as CPA versus state 
agency), form of municipal administration (measured as manager versus mayor­
operated), size of client's accounting staff, number of client CP As, inter­
governmental revenue and the existence of state-mandated Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) and non-GAAP (e.g., cash basis revenue 
recognition). Results based on a sample of 330 municipals indicate consistency with 
Rubin's results for variables that relate to client size (measured as revenues), busy 
season, OtJtstanding debt, low bond ratings and audit qualification. With the 
exception of audit qualification, both studies found significant and positive 
associations between these variables and municipal audit fees. Both studies did not 
find a significant association between audit qualification and audit fees. However, in 
contrast to Rubin's study, auditor size (measured as Big 8 versus non-Big 8) is 
significantly associated with audit fees, but the number of non-ordinary services 
provided by the governmental unit is not a significant variable. 
In regards to the additional variables in Copley's (1989) audit fee model, the only 
significant variable is the existence of state-mandated GAAP. An interesting variable 
in this study is the fees charged by state agencies versus private sector audit firms. 
While the result is not significant for the total sample (city and county governments), 
the relationship is marginally significant for the city government sub-sample, with 
state agencies charging higher audit fees compared to private sector audit firms. He 
did not, a priori, predict the direction of the relationship between audit fees and type 
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of auditors due to the lack of information regarding the pricing of state agency audits. 
He attributed the possible differences in the audit cost functions for these two type of 
auditors to differences in exposure to liability losses and opportunity costs of audit 
resources, given that local government audits are only a subset of the services 
provided by the CPA. The audit fee model explains approximately 50 percent of the 
variance in audit fees of municipalities in Copley's sample. 
Additional evidence on the differences between the audit services provided by 
government audit organisations and private sector audit suppliers in the municipal 
audit market is provided by Dwyer and Wilson (1989) and Rubin (1992). Results in 
Rubin's study suggest that, for a sample of municipals in Ohio, private sector 
auditors charge higher audit fees and are associated with more timely audits. He 
attributed the fee difference to the profit incentive of the private sector auditors. 
Government auditors are expected to charge fee levels that will enable a recovery of 
the full costs of the audits. In regards to timely audits, Rubin's result is consistent 
with Dwyer and Wilson's result. Private sector auditors are more timely in providing 
audit reports because they have a greater pool and flexibility of resources compared 
to government auditors. Rubin also examined the municipal' s preference for the 
types of audit supplier in the municipal audit market. He found that cities with 
modified audit opinions and new debt issues are more likely to request and use 
private sector auditors. 
Ward et al. ( 1994) provide further evidence on the determinants of municipal audit 
fees. They extend prior studies in municipal audit fee models (e.g., Rubin, 1988; 
Copley, 1989) by incorporating additional variables that reflect the unique aspects of 
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the municipal accounting and auditing environment. Specifically, they replicate 
Rubin's audit fee model and incorporate five additional variables that relate to 
auditor expertise, audit adjustments, audit qualifications, political costs and agency 
costs, into the model. Agency costs are defined and measured as costs that relate to 
the extent of taxpayer funding of services (measured as the percentage of locally­
raised revenues and property tax rate) and form of government (measured as city­
manager versus mayor) while political cost is defined as political competition 
(measured as turnover of elected officials and percentage of seats held by minority 
party). The agency costs reflect a set of incentives for monitoring in the public sector 
by taxpayers/voters on elected officials. 
Ward et al. ' s ( 1 994) audit fee model explains a greater portion of the variation in 
audit fees than previous studies. The high explanatory power of the fee model (i.e., 
83 percent) can be attributed to the inclusion of five additional variables and the use 
of a relatively homogeneous sample. The sample is based on 171 municipalities 
located in Michigan 1 2, thereby ensuring that the municipals comply with similar state 
legislation and, accounting and auditing policies. Results suggest that control 
variables from previous research, which include client size (measured as revenues), 
loss exposure (measured as bond rating of city), complexity (measured as number of 
significant funds and CAFR reports), audit bidding, auditor size (measured as Big 6 
versus non-Big 6) and auditor tenure, are significant and generally consistent with 
previous research. However, in contrast to Rubin's (1988) and/or Copley's  (1 989) 
studies, they did not find significant results for CFO's tenure, busy season audits and 
1 2  The municipalities consist of 92 cities and villages with a population greater than 2,500 and 79 
townships with a population greater than 5,000. 
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debt per capita. 
In regards to the additional explanatory variables in Ward et al. 's (1994) fee model, 
auditor experience (measured as a dichotomous variable for the regional CPA firm 
that audited a significant portion of audits in the sample) and number of audit 
adjustment entries are significant explanatory variables. They note that audit 
adjustment entries may proxy for the level of inherent risk and control risk for the 
client. They further note that these adjustments appear to be an important element of 
the auditors' cost function in the governmental sector. 1 3  Consistent with Rubin's 
(1988) and Copley's ( 1989) results, their study did not find a significant association 
between audit qualification (measured as general fixed asset qualifications and other 
audit qualifications) and audit fees. Results for agency costs and political cost 
indicate that only one measure of agency costs, i.e., the extent of taxpayer funding of 
services, is related to audit fees while the political cost (measured as political 
competition) did not significantly affect audit fees. 
A summary of selected audit fee studies in the public sector market is presented in 
Table 4. Following Rubin (1988) and Copley (1989), explanatory variables are 
broadly classified as client size, client inputs, auditor cost function, loss exposure, 
client complexity, report complexity and accounting regulation. 
13 Ward et al. ( 1 994) found that audit adjustments are common in the government sector with the mean 
of 34 adjustments in their sample, which is "considerably greater than found in studies of audit 
adjustments in the commercial studies. Studies by Kreutzfeldt and Wallace ( 1 986) and Hylas and 
Ashton ( 1 982) report average audit adjustments of 5 .75 and 1 .85 respectively" (p. 401 ,  footnote 5). 
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Table 4 
A Summary of Selected Audit Fee Studies in the Public Sector Market 
Baber et al. (1987) Rubin (1988) 
Sample size 100 189 
Population Counties in North Carolina Cities with population > 
50,000 
Explanatory variables 
Client size population* population* 
Client inputs CFO tenure* 
Auditor cost function Big 8 audit firms* Big 8 audit firms 
busy season* 
auditor tenure in bid cities* 
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Copley (1989) 
330 
Cities & counties with 
population > 25,000 
revenue and population* 
mayor vs. manager 
size of client accounting 
staff 
no. of client CP As 
Big 8 audit firms* 
busy season* 
state auditor 
Ward et al. (1994) 
1 71 
Cities, villages & townships 
in Michigan with 
population > 5,000 
revenue* 
CFO tenure 
mayor vs. manager 
Big 6 audit firms* 
busy season 
auditor tenure* 
competitive bidding* 
Table 4 
A Summary of Selected Audit Fee Studies in the Public Sector Market (continued) 
Baber et al. (1987) Rubin (1988) Copley (1989) Ward et al. (1994) 
Loss exposure bond rating* bond rating* bond rating* 
debt per capita* debt per capita* non-guaranteed debt* debt per capita 
income per capita 
no. of audit adjustments* 
Client complexity no. of services* no. of services no. of significant funds* 
inter-governmental revenue 
Report complexity qualified opinion modified opinion qualified opinion qualified opinion 
CAFR* CAFR* 
no. of audit reports* 
single audits* 
Accounting regulation state-mandated GAAP* 
state-mandated non-GAAP 
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Table 3 
A Summary of Selected Audit Fee Studies in the Public Sector Market (continued) 
Baber et al. (1987) Rubin (1988) Copley (1989) Ward et al. (1994) 
Political costs party membership* turnover of elected officials 
commissioner turnover % of seats held by minority 
Agency costs taxpayer funding of 
services* 
Adj. R of audit fee 76% 58% 50% 83% 
model 
Note: * significant at 0.10  level or lower 
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Characteristics of public sector audit studies. 
Prior audit fee studies in the public sector have four characteristics. First, these 
studies have focused on the public sector audits at the local government level, i.e., 
municipalities, which include cities, counties, townships and villages. Second, 
evidence of public sector audit pricing is based solely on the samples from the US. 
Third, there is evidence to suggest that pµblic sector audit fee models are different 
from private sector fee models. Fourth, while there is evidence to suggest unique 
aspects of the municipal accounting and auditing environment and their effects on 
audit fees, the focus of prior audit fee studies in the public sector is on private sector 
auditors and their implied production costs of undertaking audits in the public sector. 
These characteristics of prior public sector audit fees studies have implications for 
future research in this area. 
The focus on US-based samples at the local government level raises the issue of 
generalisability of the public sector audit models to other countries and at other levels 
of the public sector, i.e., state and federal levels. There is a need to test the public 
sector fee model in other countries because, as noted by Simunic and Stein (1996), 
auditors could behave differently in different national legal environments ( and, by 
implication, different institutional public sector audit market arrangements) and, 
hence, will require carefully designed studies to enable comparisons between studies. 
In addition, the public sector audit market and audit pricing at the state and federal 
levels have not been empirically tested. Stein et al. (1 994) provide evidence that 
results from one industry do not extend easily to another industry. They found across­
industry differences within the private sector audit market, due to the differences 
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between financial service and industrial firms in the nature of the assets, complexity 
of information systems and the regulatory environment on the strength of control 
procedures. Baber et al. (1987, p. 294) noted that "differences both between and 
among public and private enterprises can lead to differences with respect to factors 
that determine the supply and demand, and thus the fees for audit services". 
As there are institutional differences between public and private sector markets and, 
within the private sector market, this study assumes that there are institutional 
differences within the public sector that may affect audit fees. Municipals at the local 
government level in the US differ from agencies at the state or federal level in the 
nature of ownership and primary objective of agencies and, regulatory environment. 
These aspects may impact on, among other things, the specification and measurement 
of risk, due to the absence of a capital market at the state level, and the measurement 
of client size. The importance of testing for across-industry differences is stressed by 
Stein et al. ( 1994, p. 130) who state that: 
For empirical research, the existence of across-industry differences 
will affect the proper specification of models. Researchers who 
pool industries in studies of audit fees or audit competition (which 
rely upon assumptions about audit production) need to know which 
variables to include and which variables have differential effects 
across industries. Such knowledge can prevent specification errors 
which can lead to the acceptance of false hypotheses. 
Similar to private sector audit fee studies, client size has consistently accounted for 
the largest percentage of the variance in municipal audit fees. However, proxies for 
client size in the municipal audit fee studies are municipal population or revenues 
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rather than total assets. Measures of loss exposure in the public sector, i.e., audit risk, 
such as bond rating and debt per capita, are significant variables in several audit fee 
models (e.g., Rubin, 1988; Copley, 1989; Ward et al., 1994). Bond rating reflects the 
level of clients' securities risk. Significant explanatory variables unique to the 
municipal environment include the number of audit adjustments and complexity of 
audit reports, which relate mainly to comprehensiveness (e.g., CAFR, single audits, 
number of separate reports). (Rubin, 1988; Copley, 1989; Ward et al., 1994). 
Measures that relate to agency costs and political competition have been suggested in 
prior studies as being potential determinants of audit fees in the public sector (see 
Baber, 1983; Baber et al., 1987; Ward et al., 1994). Thus far, results for these 
variables have been mixed (see Ward et al., 1994). Ward et al. attribute the lack of 
association between audit fees and, political and agency variables to crude 
measurements and the inability of audit fees to adjust for short-term effects ( e.g., 
presence of an election). 
In contrast to the private sector studies, audit qualification appears to have no effect 
on audit fees in the public sector (e.g., Rubin, 1988; Copley, 1989; Ward et al., 
1994). In the private sector, audit qualifications may impact on the audit production 
process and audit fees in three stages. In the initial stage, where auditors are faced 
with the possibility of issuing a qualified audit report to the client, they collect more 
evidence before presenting their case to the client. In the next stage, the client 
negotiates with the auditors for an unqualified audit opinion. This process incurs 
additional time spent on the audit and usually involves higher audit skill levels (i.e., 
partners or managers) (O'Keefe et al., 1994b). In the final stage, the auditors collect 
more evidence before and after issuing the qualified audit report to protect 
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themselves from potential legal actions taken by the client, its stakeholders or third 
parties that rely on the audit report. Therefore, a qualified audit report is likely to 
increase audit costs and audit fees in the private sector. 
The lack of a significant association between audit qualification and audit fees in the 
public sector may -reflect the weak demand for audit reports in the sector. The 
existence of a relatively risk-free debt or equity capital market (i.e., debt is 
guaranteed by government) in the public sector suggests that the demand for an 
unqualified audit report is weaker in the public sector when compared to the private 
sector. Therefore, agencies and auditors do not invest a significant amount of time to 
investigate and deal with audit qualifications in the public sector. Ward et al. ( 1994) 
suggest that the high incidence of audit qualifications in the public sector may not 
significantly contribute to adjustments in auditors' effort, hence, audit fees. 1 4  In 
addition, the fixed tender contracts for contractors ensure that extra costs wouldn't 
find their way into the audit fees. Therefore, the impact of audit qualification on the 
audit production process and fees are modest in the public sector. Another possible 
explanation is the timing differential in the relationship between audit fees and 
qualifications (Houghton & Jubb, 1999). They found that audit costs from audit 
qualifications are not incorporated into the current year's audit fees but are taken into 
account in the following year's audit fees (i.e., recognition lag). A survey of public 
sector audit fee studies indicate that audit opinions are measured contemporaneously 
14 Ward et al. ( 1 994, p. 40 l ,  footnote 6 & 7) note that approximately 29 percent of municipalities in 
their sample and Rubin's ( 1 988) sample received audit qualifications. In contrast, only 8 percent of the 
companies in Palmrose ( 1 986) received qualified opinions. Furthermore, studies by Robert and Glezen 
( 1 990) and Deis and Giroux ( 1992) on Texas school districts found a positive relation between audit 
fees and audit qualifications. Both studies report that less than 5 percent of school districts received 
audit qualifications. 
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in the audit fee models. 
The audit fee literature has focused mainly on the role of private sector audit 
suppliers in the public sector market. This emphasis has the advantage of controlling 
for type of audit supplier while investigating differences in the determinants of audit 
fee models in both markets. However, the role of government auditors in the 
financial reporting process in the public sector should not be neglected. Government 
auditors have different roles, responsibilities and incentives from the private sector 
suppliers and these differences may affect the audit cost functions and pricing of 
government auditors. In comparing the audit services provided by government 
auditors and private sector suppliers in the public sector, prior studies have inferred 
the government auditors' production costs from the audit fees that they charged ( e.g., 
Copley, 1 989; Rubin, 1992). Unlike the private sector market, where audit fees are 
assumed to reflect the audit costs due to competitive pressures, audit fees of the 
government auditors may not reflect their production costs. The main reason is that 
public sector agencies may be charged nominal fees only, rather than the fees that 
reflect the full costs of the audits. Therefore, an audit production model may be a 
more accurate reflection of the government auditors' use of resources in the public 
sector. Knowledge of the production function is necessary because it may contribute 
to discussions of government auditors' operations vis a vis alternative audit suppliers 
in matters relating to audit efficiency and effectiveness. 
The role- of private sector suppliers and their impact on audit quality in government 
audits is another important issue in public sector audit studies ( e.g., Raman & 
Wilson, 1 994; Copley & Douc_et, 1993; O'Keefe et al., 1994a; Brown & 
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Raghunandan, 1995). These studies are motivated from the reports and findings of 
Treadway Commission (1987) and US General Accounting Office (GAO) (1985 ; 
1986). As summarised by Raman and Wilson (p. 520): 
The results of federal monitoring revealed the widespread problem 
of substandard audits and, in Congressional hearings, the 
profession was publicly chastised for "sloppy, unprofessional, 
substandard CPA audits" (Meinhardt et al., 1987; 86). The GAO 
(1985, 1986) indicated that substandard audits were being 
performed by both small and large audit firms (including the Big 
Eight), although the proportion of substandard audits was lower for 
the larger firms". 
Raman and Wilson (1994) highlight the important role of contracting processes as a 
mechanism for enhancing the credibility of public sector audits. They argue that 
auditor moral hazard is particularly acute in the government environment because 
governmental bankruptcy is a relatively rare event and, hence, the potential for 
auditor legal liability (in the form of large financial settlements) is correspondingly 
reduced. 1 5  They further argue that the contracting practices of municipal entities play 
an important role in ensuring the credibility of public sector audits, in addition to 
being less expensive relative to other forms of monitoring in the public sector such as 
federal monitoring of audit reports, quality control reviews and disciplinary actions. 
The four critical attributes of the audit procurement process, as identified by the 
15 Auditor moral hazard, in the context of government audits, refer to the existence of information 
asymmetry between the auditor and ( 1 ) outsiders (including bondholders) and (2) government client, 
with respect to the quality of the audit that is actually delivered (Raman & Wilson, 1 994). The 
problem of auditor moral hazard in the private sector is less likely due to the existence of capital 
markets. The probability of financial failure and the threat of litigation, with the potential loss of quasi­
rents on fixed investments from the failure to deliver the implied audit quality and the subsequent 
revelation of such failure, are mechanisms in the private sector to discipline the auditors (Simunic & 
Stein, 1 987). 
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GAO (1987), are: (1 ) competition, i.e., the invitation of bids from at least two firms; 
(2) solicitation, i.e., a written Request for Proposal, intended to communicate needs 
and requirements to audit firms; includes costs and technical information; (3) 
technical evaluation, i.e., auditor selection guidelines, includes auditor's 
qualifications, past experience and peer review; and ( 4) written agreement that 
permits the client to monitor auditor compliance with terms of contract and, if 
necessary, to take recourse against the audit firm in the event the auditor's 
performance falls short of expectations. Results from a sample of 539 cities suggest 
that audit contracting practices, as an aggregate, are significantly related to yield 
premium on seasoned general municipal bonds. This result suggests that, in addition 
to the Big 8/non-Big 8 audit firm dichotomy, the use of audit contracting practices 
can signal information about audit quality to bond investors in the public sector. 
Copley and Doucet (1993) investigate the impact of one the procurement processes, 
competition, on the quality of governmental audits. This study is motivated from the 
policy makers' concerns that increased competition may have an adverse effect on 
audit quality in the public sector, through pressure to minimise audit fees. This study 
used a direct measure of audit quality and, as such, has the advantage of analysing the 
relation between audit quality and competition. Audit quality is defined as 
compliance with professional standards for reporting and fieldwork. 1 6  Results based 
on a sample of 140 audits of federal assistance programs indicate that the likelihood 
of receiving an audit of acceptable quality is positively and significantly related to 
competition (measured as number of bids received for an audit engagement). In 
16 The government officials, who were responsible for reviewing the work of independent CPAs 
engaged in audits of federal assistance programs, made the assessments of audit quality. 
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addition, they found that higher competition is related to lower audit fees. 
O'Keefe et al. (1994a) seek to address the question of non-compliance in 
governmental audit. Regulators have asserted that the reasons for non-compliance are 
due to: (1 ) the procurement practices of governmental entities that focus on low audit 
fee rather than compliance with GAAS (Generally Accepted Auditing Standards); 
and (2) that some audit firms lack knowledge of the unique aspects of governmental 
auditing, i.e., they lack industry-specific knowledge. O'Keefe et al. develop a 
production function for audit quality in the public sector to test the two assertions. 
The proxy for audit quality is the level of compliance with GAAS reporting standards 
and is measured by the number and importance of violations of GAAS reporting 
standards. The production function model for compliance with GAAS is comprised 
of labour hours, client characteristics (size [measured as the school's revenue], 
internal control) and audit firm characteristics (size, industry-specific knowledge, 
general knowledge, client-specific knowledge). Audit fee is used as a proxy for 
labour hours and industry-specific knowledge is measured as the number of school 
district audits performed by the local office of the audit firm in 1986. Results based 
on 935 school district audits indicate that the number and importance of violations of 
GAAS reporting standards decrease, i.e., higher audit quality, with increases in audit 
fees and audit firm's industry specialisation. In addition, higher audit quality is 
associated with Big 8 firms, bigger client size, participation in the state CPA society 
and audit firms that provided a substandard audit in the previous year. The quality of 
client's internal control has no effect on the level of compliance with GAAS 
reporting standards. 
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Brown and Raghunandan (1995) provide further evidence on audit quality in the 
public sector by comparing the audit quality of independent public accountants in 
non-federal audits with public company audits and state/local auditors. They argue 
that the absence of litigation threats, coupled with the pressure to reduce audit fees 
significantly in the bidding process, can lead to the use of inexperienced staff in non­
federal audits. As non-federal audits require compliance with Governmental Auditing 
Standards (GAS), which are broader in scope than the GAAP, the use of 
inexperienced staff can result in lower quality audits when compared to public 
company audits and state/local auditors. The measures of audit quality for non­
federal audits are based on the results of desk reviews and quality control reviews 
conducted by the Inspectors General of various federal agencies. The measurement of 
audit quality for public company audits is based on the peer review program of the 
SEC Practice Section of the AICPA's Division for Firms. The results support both of 
their arguments. Audit quality in non-federal audits is lower than audit quality in 
public company audits and the quality of audits performed by state and local auditors 
is superior to the quality of audits performed by independent public accountants. 
Prior studies that examine audit quality in the public sector suggest that audit quality 
is an important issue to consider if alternative suppliers are allowed to conduct audits 
in the public sector. Studies by Raman and Wilson (1994) and Copley and Doucet 
(1993) suggest that procurement (or contracting) practices play an important role in 
the public sector to ensure that the desired audit quality is provided by non­
government suppliers. Raman and Wilson (p. 536) state that "by emphasizing 
procurement practices, the GAO and the AICP A are relying on client monitoring as a 
mechanism for controlling auditor moral hazard in governmental audits". In addition, 
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they argue that these practices are less costly compared to ex-post approaches for 
assessing auditor compliance with professional standards ( e.g., federal monitoring of 
audit reports, quality control reviews and disciplinary actions) and provide another 
proxy or indicator for audit quality in the public sector. Brown and Raghunandan 
(1995) provide a direct link between the litigation environment and audit quality. 
Their results suggest that the absence of litigation threats and a more complex audit 
requirement for public sector audits have implications for audit quality in the public 
sector. Their results also suggest that state/local auditors have greater industry­
experience because, as a result of their work experience, they are generally more 
knowledgeable about governmental rules, regulations and specific public sector 
auditing standards. This result is supported by O'Keefe et al. ( 1994a) who found that 
violations of GAAS are more likely to result from the audit firm's lack of industry­
specific knowledge. 
Audit Production Studies 
Research on audit production function is a recent feature in the economics of auditing 
literature. It is a continuation in a line of research that explored the characteristics of 
audit markets with audit fee models. The general purpose of audit fee studies is to 
examine factors that determine audit fees and, as noted by Firth (1997, p. 5 11), 
"analyzing audit fees is of interest in examining cost structures of accounting firms, 
predicting future fees, measuring audit efficiency, and investigating pricing policies". 
However, audit fees may not accurately reflect the production process of audit firms 
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because fee level may be affected by pricing policies and competition in the audit 
market. Studies by O'Keefe et al. (1994b), Stein et al. (1994) and Hackenbrack and 
Knechel ( 1997) develop and refine the production function of audit firms in the 
competitive audit market. 
O'Keefe et al. (1994b) is perhaps the most significant work in the development of the 
production function of audit firms. Their main objective is to examine the empirical 
relation between client characteristics and, the nature and mix of labour resources in 
the private sector. Their study measures audit effort using audit hours charged to an 
engagement and utilises disaggregated labour hours by rank within the firm. O'Keefe 
et al. argue that a simple sum of hours to measure auditor effort can lead to a loss of 
information and loss of statistical efficiency in estimating the effect of changes in 
client characteristics, given that resources are used in different proportions as client 
characteristics vary. Results based on 249 audits in the US indicate that client size 
(measured as total assets), complexity (measured as partner's assessment on a 5-point 
ordinal scale from "very simple" to "very complex", the number of separate audit 
reports issued) and risk (measured as liabilities/total assets, overall inherent risk, 
private versus public holdings of client's shares or debt securities) are all significant 
determinants of at least some class of labour hours. The models are based on hours in 
the four labour categories, i.e., partner, manager, senior and staff hours. The models' 
explanatory power ranges from 70 to 81 percent. There is no systematic effect on 
auditor's internal control reliance or the joint production of non-audit services on 
either the level or mix of audit labour inputs. The number of years an audit has been 
performed (i.e., auditor learning over time) has no significant impact on the level and 
mix of labour hours. This result may indicate the absence of auditor learning, 
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systematic under-reporting of audit hours in the early years of an audit or the failure 
of firm to produce the target level of assurance in those early years. 
0 'Keefe et al. (1994b) found that size and risk measures are associated with 
significant changes in the mix of labour inputs. As clients increase in size, the 
proportion of junior staff hours increases, while the proportion of manager and senior 
hours decreases. This result suggests that the audit firm substitutes relatively cheaper 
labour as client size increases. On the other hand, a higher risk of bankruptcy 
(measured as leverage) results in the use of relatively more "high level" labour (i.e., 
partners and managers) in an engagement while having no significant effect on the 
level of senior and junior staff hours. O'Keefe et al. note that high levels of audit 
expertise are needed to address concerns such as the appropriateness of the going­
concern assumption and the possibility of deliberate manipulation of accounting 
numbers for firms on the brink of bankruptcy. The greater use of high levels of audit 
expertise also applies to public firms. However, the results for another risk measure, 
inherent risk, suggest that increased inherent risk leads to greater use of "low level" 
labour in the audit while having no significant impact on partner and manager hours. 
While measures of client complexity are positively and significantly associated with 
audit hours in all labour categories, they do not affect the labour mix. 
The use of disaggregated labour hours by rank within the firm in O'Keefe et al. 
(1994b) is innovative because it reveals changes in labour mix and, therefore, 
provides a more powerful test to examine the influence of client characteristics on 
audit production. The insignificant results for several variables, including auditor's 
reliance on internal control, in their sample provide opportunities for further research. 
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0' Keefe et al.' s ( 1 994b) study investigates the demand for factors of production and 
extent of factor substitution in an industrial sample (i.e., manufacturing and 
wholesale/retail trade firms). Stein et al. (1994) extend O 'Keefe et al.' s study by 
testing for industry-specific differences in the production of audit services. The 
motivations for Stein et al.'s study are to determine the generalisability of O'Keefe et 
al.'s results and to investigate whether certain anomalous results in O'Keefe et al. are 
due to industry effects. The sample was divided into an industrial sample and a 
financial service sample (banks and, savings and loans firms). Across-sample 
comparisons are performed using the empirical model developed in O'Keefe et al. 
Results suggest that the financial service model has a lower explanatory power and, 
as such, may be misspecified. The effect of size on labour hours in .each category is 
consistent with O'Keefe et al.'s results. However, in contrast to O'Keefe et al.'s 
results, two risk measures, leverage and ownership of firm, have no effect on auditor 
effort for financial service clients. In addition, inherent risk affects the high-level 
labour hours (i.e., partners and managers) only in the financial service sample. This 
result is in contrast to industrial clients, where only seniors and staff hours are 
significant. Similar to O'Keefe et al.'s results, the degree of reliance on internal 
controls, auditor tenure and joint production of non-audit services have no effect on 
audit hours. 
Due to concerns of model mis-specification for the financial service sample, Stein et 
al. (1994) re-specified the model by including three new variables to reflect the 
operating environment in the financial service sample. The additional variables are 
the existence of a negative net income in the current year, the extent of internal audit 
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assistance and the extent of client assistance. Results based on 108 financial audits 
indicate that client size (measured as total assets), complexity (measured as partner's 
assessment on a 5-point ordinal scale from "very simple" to "very complex", the 
number of separate audit reports issued), risk (measured as the existence of a 
negative net income in the current year), quality of internal control and internal audit 
assistance are all significant determinants of some classes of labour hours. 
The effects of client size and complexity on the mix of labour hours are consistent 
with O'Keefe et al. ' s  (1994b) results. A new risk measure that relates to the existence 
of a negative net income in the current year is found to be positively associated with 
all classes of labour hours, except senior hours. In regards to labour mix, both "high" 
and "low" levels of labour are significant when the incidence for negative net income 
in the current year increases. Measures that relate to internal control and their impact 
on audit effort in Stein et al.' s study provide interesting results. Contrary to 
expectations, the level of assistance provided by a client's internal auditors is 
positively and significantly associated with external audit staffs effort (for partner, 
manager and senior hours). Stein et al. attribute the result to the increased need for 
supervision and review time. The level of client assistance is generally not 
significant, except for staff hours. The quality of clients' internal controls is 
negatively and significantly associated with two classes of labour hours (manager and 
senior hours). This result led Stein et al. to conclude that a measure of internal 
control quality is a more significant determinant of auditor effort than the measures 
of auditor reliance on internal controls for the financial service sample. Since 
O'Keefe et al. did not find significant effects of internal control quality variations, 
Stein et al. note that the role of internal control quality is an important industry effect. 
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Stein et al. (1994) provide evidence that factor demands in response to client 
characteristics, are not the same for industrial and financial service clients. For 
example, the financial service production model includes a new risk variable, the 
existence of a negative net income in the current year, and deletes two risk variables 
that are found to be important in O'Keefe et al.'s (1994b) model. This analysis 
suggests that each industry has a unique set of risks that place varying demands on 
the factors of production of audit services. Stein et al. also attributed the role of 
internal control quality as an important industry effect. In addition, auditor effort in 
financial service audits displays greater unexplained cross-sectional variation than for 
industrial audits. The differences could be due to the nature of assets, regulations and 
regulatory complexity. Stein et al. 's study highlights the need to take into account 
across-industry differences when undertaking a study on the production of audit 
services in a different audit environment. This has implication for future audit 
production studies because the measurement of risk and internal controls and their 
impact on audit production may vary across industries. An accurate specification of 
audit production models is essential if researchers are to understand the provision of 
audit services in different markets. 
Disaggregated labour hours are useful in revealing changes in labour mix and provide 
a more powerful test for research on the production of audit services. However, 
further work on labour hours could relate to how an audit firm allocates its audit 
hours to different audit activities and how that allocation is influenced by client 
characteristics. These questions form the basis for Hackenbrack and Knechel' s 
(1997) study. They extend prior audit production research by refining the use of audit 
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hours to examine task assignment patterns (hours by activity and rank), instead of the 
level (total hours) or mix (hours by rank) of labour inputs. Their measures of 
resources by audit hours are considered in terms of activity and rank-specific 
allocations. Types of audit activities examined are: ( 1 )  audit planning; (2) evaluation 
of internal control; (3) critical substantive testing; (4) non-critical substantive testing; 
(5) critical review of substantive tests; (6) non-critical review of substantive tests; (7) 
preparing financial statements; and (8) interactions with clients. 
Results in Hackenbrack and Knechel's (1997) study suggest that client characteristics 
such as size, industry affiliation, complexity, nature of ownership and level of 
consulting services provided to the client are associated with changes in the 
allocation of labour among audit activities. Specifically, increases in client size and 
complexity are associated with increases for seven out of eight audit activities. 
Proportionately more demand is placed on substantive testing and review of critical, 
audit objectives for increases in client size, while more demand is placed on 
substantive-non-critical activity for increases in client complexity. In regards to 
industry effects, financial service clients consume significantly fewer labour 
resources in substantive-non-critical, review, financial statements and client 
interaction activities. In regards to ownership effects, public entities demand 
significantly higher labour resources in planning, substantive-critical, review and 
client interaction activities. Proportionately more demand is placed on the review­
critical or client interaction activities. These activities are the primary sources of 
demand for high grades of labour and, as such, this result is consistent with O'Keefe 
et al.' s ( 1994b) labour mix results for public clients. The level of reliance on internal 
controls has no significant effect on any audit activities. This result is consistent with 
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O'Keefe et al. and Stein et al. (1994), in that there is no association between internal 
control reliance and audit effort (in total or by rank). As a result, they suggest that, 
"the lack of association between control reliance and audit effort (in total or by rank) 
in prior audit production studies is not caused by the substitution of labour from 
substantive testing to internal control review and testing" (p. 495). 
Further analysis in Hackenbrack and Knechel's ( 1997) study examines the allocation 
of labour hours among ranks within each activity. Results suggest that client 
characteristics such as size, complexity, risk and level of consulting services 
influence the use of a different mix of staff level on planning, substantive testing 
(both critical and non-critical), critical review of substantive tests and client 
interaction activities. 
In summary, studies by O'Keefe et al. (1994b), Stein et al. ( 1994) and, Hackenbrack 
and Knechel ( 1997) have investigated the cross-sectional relation between different 
grades of professional labour and various client characteristics (i.e., demand for 
factors of production). These studies also investigate the changes in labour mix as 
client characteristics vary (i.e., extent of factor substitution). 
In developing a theory of production of audit services, prior studies have considered 
the main factors or resources used to provide those services and the resultant output. 
An understanding of a firm's production function allows inferences to be made in 
regards to allocation and control of scarce resources and, hence, efficiency in 
conducting audits. A difficulty in the studies of the production function of service 
organisations, such as audit firms, is the measurement of a firm's output. Unlike 
65 
manufacturing firms, the output of service-oriented firms is often not directly 
observable or measurable. The literature in economics of auditing has adopted the 
view that, while the output of an audit firm is not directly observable to the market, 
the output is observable to the purchasers of audit services, i.e., clients ( e.g., Simunic, 
1980; Simunic & Stein, 1987; O'Keefe et. al., 1994b). Clients purchase audit 
services to obtain a level of assurance for its financial reports. The level of assurance 
varies across clients, depending on the level of quality demanded by the clients. 
In O'Keefe et al. (1 994b), an audit firm is assumed to supply a fixed level of audit 
assurance, i.e., one type of audit quality, across all audit engagements at a moment in 
time. Investments in knowledge are costly for an audit firm. Given that the 
investments are fixed costs, an audit firm that supplies its services to more clients 
with similar demand for a given audit quality level will decrease its audit costs to 
each client. Holding audit quality constant for all audits, cross-sectional differences 
in the firm's audit production function on different audit engagements are due to 
client characteristics. As such, the output of an audit firm can be viewed as the 
quantity of audit services demanded by the client, i.e., the amount of audit effort and 
the costs of labour. In audit production studies, the amount of audit effort is proxied 
by audit labour hours ( e.g., O'Keefe et al., 1 994b; Stein et al., 1 994; Hackenbrack & 
Knechel, 1 997). Human capital is the main resource in most service firms and since 
the product supplied by an audit firm is a service that is labour intensive, audit labour 
hours often serve as a proxy in an audit production model. Client characteristics such 
as size, complexity, risk and internal audit constitute the input for an audit firm 
because these characteristics affect the quantity of audit services demanded by the 
client. Therefore, in a production model of audit services, client-related 
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characteristics constitute the input that influences the amount of output, i.e., labour 
hours, at a given level of audit quality. 
Thus far, the development and analyses of a production model are based on 
observations from a single audit firm. As discussed above, examining a single audit 
firm has the advantages of controlling for pricing policies, audit product, in terms of 
assurance level, and production technologies. Results from audit production studies 
suggest that cross-sectional variation in labour hours can largely be explained by the 
same client size, complexity and risk measures found to be important in previous 
audit fee studies (O'Keefe et al., 1994b; Hackenbrack & Knechel, 1 997). However, 
Stein et al. (p. 142) conclude by noting that, "this line of research needs to be 
expanded in many directions before a complete picture of audit production emerges. 
Extensions across auditors, additional industries, different auditing environments, 
and time periods appear to be fruitful areas for future research". 
Prior audit production and fee studies have stressed the importance of client's 
internal control and internal auditors' work in influencing the external auditors' 
work. The degree of reliance on internal control and internal audit can affect audit 
hours and, hence, audit fees. Auditing guidelines recommend that external auditors 
may place reliance on internal controls and internal audit in performing their tasks, 
where the work of the internal audit is satisfactory (refer to AI CPA SAS no. 9, "The 
effect of an internal audit function on the scope of the independent auditor 
examination" or SAP AUs No. 2, "Using the work of an internal auditor"). Thus far, 
empirical evidence on the links between the two factors and, audit hours and fees 
have not uncovered any significant association. For example, Simunic (1 980), 
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O'Keefe et al. (1994a; 1994b) and, Hackenbrack and Knechel (1997) did not find any 
significant association between the quality of internal controls and the degree of 
reliance on internal controls and, audit hours and fees. Stein et al. ( 1994) suggest that 
the effects of internal controls might vary from one industry/audit environment to 
another. They provide evidence that the measure of internal control quality is a more 
suitable measure of auditor effort for the financial service sample than measures of 
the degree of auditor reliance on controls ( as measured in O 'Keefe et al.' s [ 1994b] 
study). The industry effect on internal control quality and audit effort shows that 
managing cash with good internal control is critical in financial institutions. Stein et 
al. highlight the importance of investigating different audit environment/industries 
when examining the relationship between internal controls and auditor effort. This 
finding has implication for studies investigating the public sector environment. 
Simunic (1980) argues that total audit activity is comprised of external audit and 
internal audit activities. As such, both activities are substitutes and can serve as 
alternative monitoring mechanisms. External auditors and their clients have an 
interest in the mix of internal and external audit activities because it has economic 
implications for the audit firm and clients. Thus far, results for reliance on internal 
audit and, audit hours and fees have been mixed. Stein et al. (1994), contrary to 
expectations, found that audit hours are positively associated with internal audit 
assistance for some classes of labour but no association with audit fees. A recent 
study by Felix et al. (1999) found that internal audit contribution to a financial 
statement audit is a significant and negative determinant of external audit fees. 
Further analysis reveals that the contribution of internal audit to a financial statement 
audit is explained by the interaction between internal audit quality and the contingent 
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effects of inherent risk and (1 ) internal audit availability, and (2) co-ordination 
between external and internal audit groups. 
Limited evidence from the audit production literature regarding (1) reliance on 
internal audit and, (2) reliance on internal controls, on external audit effort seem to 
suggest that there is a tendency for private sector firms to "overaudit". The rationale 
for this tendency could be due to higher litigation risk in the private sector. An 
interesting question is whether the tendency to "overaudit" is prevalent in audits 
conducted by government auditors. Government auditors have often been criticised 
on their approach to auditing financial statements in the public sector because they 
tend to "nitpick" and audit every transaction by the clients. However, Murphy (1994) 
argues that auditor's  reliance on internal control may not affect audit effort because 
auditors, in most cases, may adjust the nature and timing of substantive testing only, 
rather than the extent of the testing. Therefore, studies that investigate the link 
between internal control and audit effort should differentiate between the types of 
substantive testing. 
On the issue of audit risk, there is general consensus in the audit fee/production 
literature on characteristics that constitute audit risks in private sector audits. Audit 
production studies show that the conduct of an audit is influenced by audit risk and 
business risk (see O'Keefe et al., 1994b). Examples of audit and business risks, as 
identified in the literature, are the client's leverage level (liabilities/total assets), 
ownership (public versus private), inherent risk and the existence of a negative net 
income in the current year ( e.g., O'Keefe et al., 1 994b; Stein et al., 1994; 
Hackenbrack & Knechel, 1997). In contrast to a few audit fee studies in the private 
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sector, prior audit production studies did not find an association between audit 
qualification and auditor effort (e.g., O'Keefe et al., 1994b; Stein et al., 1994). 
A summary of audit production studies is provided in Table 5. 
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Table 5 
A Summary of Audit Production Studies 
Sample size 
Sample sector 
Dependent variables 
Explanatory variables 
Client size 
Risk 
O'Keefe et al. (1994b) 
249 
Private 
Audit hours by rank (i.e., partners, 
managers, seniors, staff) 
total assets* 
leverage* 
ownership* 
inherent risk* 
Stein et al. (1994) 
108 
Private 
Audit hours by rank (i.e., partners, 
managers, seniors, staff) 
7 1  
total assets* 
leverage 
ownership 
inherent risk 
audit qualification 
operating loss* 
Hackenbrack & Knechel (1997) 
241 
Private 
Audit hours by activities (i.e., 8 audit 
activities) 
total revenue* 
ownership* 
industry* 
Table 5 
A Summary of Audit Production Studies (continued) 
Client complexity 
Other variables 
Adj. R2 of audit 
production model/s 
O'Keefe et al. (1994b) 
foreign assets* 
scale of complexity* 
number of separate audit reports* 
reliance on internal control 
internal control quality 
auditor tenure 
consulting services 
78-81% 
Note: * significant at 0.05 level or lower 
Stein et al. (1994) 
scale of complexity* 
number of separate audit reports* 
reliance on internal control 
internal control quality* 
auditor tenure 
internal audit assistance* 
client assistance 
consulting services 
28-55% 
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Hackenbrack & Knechel (1997) 
presence of subsidiaries* 
reliance on internal control 
consulting services* 
14-53% 
Conclusions 
This study relies on a branch of literature in auditing, known as the economics of 
auditing, to provide the framework to investigate issues that relate to audit efficiency 
in the public sector audit market. Specifically, it reviews several audit fee studies and 
audit production studies. This section provides a set of conclusions from this 
literature in regards to the nature of the research questions and the underpinning 
theory, major findings, data collection method and analysis employed. 
The focus of audit fee studies is to examine the demand for audits in the private and 
public sectors through audit fees. The fee model is based on an important assumption 
that auditors and clients are jointly liable to financial statement users and, therefore, 
both parties have incentives to avoid liability (Simunic, 1980). Audit fees are 
assumed to reflect the use of resources in an audit firm because the audit markets are 
competitive. The audit firm is assumed to operate at maximum efficiency by 
minimising its costs and charging fees that reflects the use of those resources and the 
firm's profit component. Three major client characteristics, conceptually measured as 
size, complexity and risk, have been noted as factors that can influence the demand 
for audits, which will, in tum, affect the audit firm's resource allocation decisions 
and audit fees. Prior audit fee studies have consistently found that client size, 
complexity and risk are significant determinants of audit fees in the private and 
public sector, although these determinants are measured . differently in both sectors 
(e.g., Simunic, 1980; Chung & Lindsay, 1988; Rubin, 1988; Chan et al., 1993; Ward 
et al., 1994). Results of private sector studies are generalisable across national 
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boundaries and are robust across different samples and time periods. The explanatory 
power of audit fee models ranges from 46 to 87 percent. These findings suggest that 
client size, complexity and risk are important control variables in audit fee models. 
The operations of private sector suppliers in public sector audits have received 
scrutiny from academics and regulators in the past decade (e.g., Rubin, 1988; Copley 
& Doucet, 1993 ; Raman & Wilson, 1994; Brown & Raghunandan, 1995). A strand of 
research has focused on the development of audit fee models in the public sector 
while another strand of research has investigated the impact of audit quality in the 
publi� sector. Specifically, prior studies have examined audit pricing and production 
costs in the public sector (e.g., Rubin, 1988; Deis & Giroux, 1992; Ward et al., 1994; 
O'Keefe et al., 1994a) and the effect of procurement practices and litigation threats in 
the public sector on audit quality (Copley & Doucet, 1993; Raman & Wilson, 1994; 
Brown & Raghunandan, 1995). 
Prior audit fee studies in the public sector are motivated from the need to develop fee 
models that capture the unique characteristics of the public sector environment ( e.g., 
Rubin, 1988; Copley, 1989; Ward et al., 1994). Comparisons between private and 
public sector audit studies reveal that client characteristics such as size, complexity 
and risk account for a large percentage of variance in audit fees in both sectors. The 
differences lie mainly in measuring client size, complexity and risk for the fee 
models. In addition, audit qualifications appear to have no effect on audit fees in the 
public sector (Rubin, 1988; Copley, 1989; Ward et al., 1994). While unique public 
sector variables that relate to agency costs and political competition that may affect 
audit fees in the public sector have been proposed, the empirical evidence suggest 
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that these variables have an insignificant or marginal impact on audit fees in the fee 
models (see Ward et al., 1 994). Overall, the evidence from public sector audit studies 
suggests that private sector audit fee models are generally transferable to the public 
sector environment. 
A review of audit fee studies in the public sector also raises the issue of audit quality 
in the public sector ( e.g., Rubin, 1988; Copley & Doucet, 1993; O'Keefe et al., 
1 994a; Raman & Wilson, 1994; Brown & Raghunandan, 1995). These studies 
examine the role of private sector suppliers and their impact on audit quality in 
government audits. Evidence suggests that Big 8/6 audit firms have a positive and 
significant association with audit fees, indicating that there are demands for high 
quality audits at the local government level in the US (Baber et al., 1 987; Copley, 
1989; Ward et al., 1994). On the supply-side, the Treadway Commission (1987) and 
GAO (1985; 1986) indicate that private sector suppliers are providing substandard 
audits in the public sector. Raman and Wilson (1 994) and, Brown and Raghunandan 
(1995) argue that the substandard audits in the public sector are due to the absence of 
litigation threats and a more complex audit requirement for public sector audits. 
Studies by Raman and Wilson and, Copley and Doucet ( 1993) suggest that 
procurement practices play an important role in the public sector to ensure that the 
desired audit quality is provided by non-government suppliers. Studies that examine 
audit quality in the public sector suggest that audit quality is an important issue to 
consider if alternative suppliers are allowed to conduct audits in the public sector. 
This has implications for studies that examine the Australian public sector audit 
market because the move towards a more efficient and effective delivery of public 
services has increased the participation of private sector suppliers in this market. 
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Audit production studies extend the line of research that explored the characteristics 
of audit markets and products with audit fee models. Since the products supplied by 
audit firms are services that are labour intensive, the use of audit hours by audit 
engagements and grades of labour enable researchers to directly examine the 
production function of audit firms. An audit firm is assumed to supply a fixed level 
of audit quality across all engagements at a moment in time (O'Keefe et al., 1 994b; 
Stein et al., 1 994; Hackenbrack & Knechel, 1997). Furthermore, audit quality is only 
observable ex-post in some circumstances by some observers. As such, the 
production function of an audit firm consists of audit hours as its output and client 
characteristics as the input. 
Evidence from audit production studies provides support to audit fee studies for the 
use of client characteristics such as size, complexity and risk to explain the audit 
firms' use of resources in their conduct of private sector audits. Additional issues in 
audit production studies include the need to conceptualise and measure the roles of 
internal control and internal audit in the production model. In addition, Stein et al. 
( 1994) provide evidence that audit production models need to incorporate the unique 
characteristics of an industry. They found that audits in the financial service sample 
place more emphasis on internal control quality and the existence of a negative net 
income in the current year, as compared to the industrial sample. 
Audit production studies also refine the use of audit hours to examine the changes in 
the mix of labour inputs (O'Keefe et al., 1 994b; Stein et al., 1 994) and task 
assignment patterns (Hackenbrack & Knechel, 1 997). The findings indicate that 
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resources are used in different proportions as client characteristics vary. As clients 
increase in size, the audit firm substitutes relatively cheaper labour to conduct the 
engagements while increase in complexity does not affect the labour mix (O'Keefe et 
al., 1 994b; Stein et al., 1 994). An increased risk of bankruptcy is positively 
associated with the use of more expensive labour (O'Keefe et al., 1994b ). 
Hackenbrack and Knechel found that client size, industry affiliation, complexity, 
nature of firm ownership and level of consulting services are associated with changes 
in the allocation of labour among audit activities. 
The method employed in audit fee and production studies to test the effects of control 
and experimental variables on audit fees and hours has been cross-sectional in nature. 
The data is usually based on audit engagements over a one-year period. The cross­
sectional method has the advantage of controlling for potential changes in audit 
technology over time. The technique used in audit fee and production studies to 
analyse the data is the ordinary least-square (OLS) regression. Client size, complexity 
and risk are assumed to have linear relationships with audit fees and hours. The 
transformation of measures that relate to audit fees or audit hours and, client size and 
complexity, to logarithm figures, suggests that audit fees and audit hours increase 
with client size and complexity at a decreasing rate. As the range of client increases 
in size and complexity, the audit firm is able to capitalise on its economies of scale. 
This study relies on the audit fee and production literature to provide the basic 
framework and assumptions of audit fee and production models. The set of 
conclusions from this literature enables this study to develop a public sector audit 
model by identifying appropriate measures and variables to include in the model and 
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the underlying assumptions of the model. Thus far, there is limited evidence on how 
the public sector audit suppliers allocate their resources to audits. In addition, while 
there is increasing interest in the literature to examine production efficiency in 
auditing (see Dopuch et al., 2000; Knechel & Payne, forthcoming), there are limited 
studies that examine the comparative efficiency between private sector and 
government auditors in their undertaking of public sector audits. The next chapter 
provides a theoretical framework on the relative cost efficiency of private sector 
suppliers (as contractors) and government auditors in their undertaking of public 
sector audits. 
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CHAPTER3 
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses Development 
Introduction 
This chapter begins with a discussion on the institutional framework of the public 
sector audit market in Western Australia (WA). Specifically, it examines the role and 
appointment of the Auditor-General in WA, the characteristics of financial audits, 
and the contracting model adopted by the OAG in WA. This discussion provides a 
framework to develop the theories on audit effectiveness and audit efficiency in the 
public sector. The majority of the chapter is devoted to the development of the 
hypotheses, which relate to the comparative cost efficiency of in-house and contract­
out audit arrangements in undertaking public sector audits. 
Financial Audits in WA 
In WA, the Financial Administration and Audit Act 1985 (FAAA) and Treasurer's 
Instructions (TI) govern the conduct, operations and funding of the Auditor-General 
and the audit office. The F AAA was amended in 1989 and 1991 to enhance the 
powers and responsibilities of the Auditor-General. The Governor, with the 
Premier's recommendation, appoints the Auditor-General (FAAA, s.71), with 
parliament as the principal client. The Auditor-General is empowered by the F AAA 
to audit all agencies, i.e., departments, statutory authorities, government business 
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enterprises and government-owned corporations. If requested by the Treasurer, the 
Auditor-General is required to audit the accounts of any person or institution in 
receipt of a specific purpose grant or advance (F AAA, s. 78). As part of the attest and 
compliance audit, which includes providing an annual audit opinion on the financial 
statements and internal controls, the OAG in WA must provide an opinion on the 
relevance and appropriateness of an agency's performance indicators (FAAA, s.93). 
This feature of the financial audit is unique to WA. In summary, the OAG is required 
to perform the following tasks for financial statement audits: 
• form opinions, required by Sec 93 of F AAA 1985 in relation to 
controls and financial statements; 
• report audit findings and significant control weaknesses; 
• report any significant legislative non-compliance for the 
purposes of Sec 79 (2) of F AAA; and 
• form an opinion on performance indicators. 
In regards to funding, the OAG's budget is presented to Treasury for review prior to 
being included in the state's budget. Audit fees received from agencies are 
transferred to the Consolidated Fund Revenue where the total fees become the basis 
for determining the amount of funding for the OAG in the following year. The 
Treasury determines the amount to be allocated to the OAG from this reserve. 
Contracting procedures and policies for financial audits in WA. 
Similar to other jurisdictions in Australia, the OAG in WA has the authority to 
contract qualified auditors to carry out functions on the OAG's behalf (F AAA, s.82), 
with the OAG retaining responsibility for the audit opinions. For the financial year-
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end 1 998, the OAG contracted-out 30 percent of financial audits to public accounting 
firms. Audits for departments are not contracted-out (OAG WA, 1998). Discussions 
with the OAG staff reveal that, for statutory authorities and hospitals, the OAG 
rotates these agencies to be contracted-out. The OAG does not contract-out a few 
statutory authority audits and contracts-out indefinitely the audits in which it has no 
expertise, for example, the audits of Western Power and State Government Insurance 
Commission (SGIO). Public agencies in WA do not have the option of selecting 
auditors to audit their accounts. 
As in other jurisdictions, audit engagements are contracted-out for a set period of 
time in WA. The term of the contract is usually three years, and on rare occasions, 
there is a "roll-over" in the contract for a further one or two years. Potential 
contractors compete for public sector audits through a tender bidding process. The 
appointment starts with a selective tender where the OAG invites prospective 
contractors to submit quotes or tenders. This method of appointment is also used in 
NSW and at the commonwealth level. This process generally elicits three to four 
offers from prospective contractors to undertake an audit engagement, thereby 
ensuring that the tender market is competitive. 
The WA OAG adopts a two-envelope system to evaluate tender bids. The first 
envelope requires prospective contractors to provide information on the types of 
expertise, audit methodology and audit plan to be used in the engagement. 
Specifically, the OAG evaluates prospective contractors based on criteria that 
include: (1 ) ability to undertake work (e.g., professional standing, appropriateness of 
methodology, previous experience, industry knowledge); (2) adequacy of resources to 
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actually perform the audit assignment; and (3) an assessment of quality control 
within the contractor's organisation and depth of personnel to supervise and review 
the project. The OAG evaluates the information contained in the first envelope before 
opening the second envelope. The second envelope contains information about the 
tender fees, total budgeted audit hours and a breakdown of audit hours by rank level 
(i.e., partners, managers, seniors and juniors). The two-envelope system ensures that 
both quality and price are taken into account when deciding the best value-for-money 
audits. 
Audit Effectiveness in the WA Public Sector Audit Market 
There are two major assumptions in this study on audit effectiveness in the WA 
public sector audit market. The first assumption focuses on the audit quality of in­
house audits, and the second assumption focuses on the audit quality of in-house and 
contract-out audits. 
This study assumes that audit quality for in-house audits is homogeneous across 
audits in the WA public sector audit market. Consistent with the literature, the OAG 
is assumed to deliver a fixed level of audit assurance ( quality) at any given point in 
time (see O'Keefe et al., 1994b). O'Keefe and Westort (1992) argue that an audit 
firm's investments in knowledge are fixed costs and the firm would find it more cost 
efficient to deliver audit services to clients who demand an audit quality that is 
consistent with those investments. Given that the provision of audit services in the 
WA public sector audit market at the state level is supply-driven, it is plausible that 
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the OAG is motivated to deliver one level of audit quality across agencies to be more 
cost efficient. In addition, the demand from parliament (the OAG's principal client) 
is assumed to be relatively homogeneous. 
The WA public sector audit market at the state level is also served by private sector 
audit firms; as sub-contractors to carry out audit functions on behalf of the OAG. The 
presence of non-government audit suppliers, e.g., contractors, has implications for 
audit quality in the public sector. Commentators and researchers suggest that audit 
quality in the public sector should be monitored when dealing with private sector 
audit suppliers and their apparent efficiencies in providing audit services. 1 7  The 
Treadway Commission in the US found that both small and large audit firms 
performed substandard governmental audits (including the then Big 8, although to a 
lesser extent). An explanation is that the private audit firms may shirk their 
responsibilities in a low litigious environment. Raman and Wilson (1994) argue that 
auditor moral hazard (see footnote 15) is acute in the government environment 
because the likelihood of auditees' financial failure and consequent ex-post revelation 
of lower-than-implied audit quality are minimal. The allocation of proportionately 
more junior or inexperienced staff to public sector audit engagements, and the 
absence of capital market incentives in the public sector to discipline audit firms 
make public sector agencies susceptible to lower quality audits (Raman & Wilson, 
1994; Brown & Raghunandan, 1995). In Australia, the current short-term contracting 
arrangement (i.e., three to five years) may be another reason for the lower-than­
implied "audit quality in the public sector. This arrangement is costly to the 
17 Refer to Raman and Wilson ( 1 994), Copley and Doucet ( 1 993), O'Keefe et al. ( 1 994a) and, Brown 
and Raghunandan ( 1 995) for studies that examined audit quality in the US public sector audit market. 
Refer to Taylor ( I 998) and Houghton and Jubb ( 1998) for commentaries on audit quality in the 
Australian public sector audit market. 
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contractors because they incur frequent set-up costs for each new audit engagement. 
To remain competitive, the contractors may absorb these costs by compromising on 
the quality of the audits. In addition, the limited role of private sector audit firms in 
the public sector audit market, due to the short-term contracting arrangement and 
small audit market, may discourage or prevent firms from investing in public sector 
audits. 
While the presence of private sector audit suppliers suggests that it is possible to 
have different types of audit quality in the market, this study assumes that the audit 
quality of contract-out audits meet, at least, the minimum level of audit quality 
required by the OAG; given the current public sector audit arrangement in WA. This 
implies that audit quality of contract-out audits can be similar to or higher than in­
house audits. 
The OAG has incentives to ensure that contract-out audits meet the minimum level 
of audit quality required by the OAG. Although the contractors are required to form 
audit opinions on agencies' financial statements, it is the OAG that makes the final 
certification on the agencies' audit reports. Since the OAG is responsible for signing 
off the agencies' audit reports and, therefore, accountable to parliament for the 
reports, the OAG needs to ensure that the contract-out audits meet a minimum level 
of audit quality. The OAG achieves this objective by implementing quality control 
procedures before, during and after the conduct of contract-out audits. 
The OAG's quality control procedures start with the tender process, where the OAG 
selects and invites several potential contractors to put in their bids for the tender. In 
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addition to fees requested for an audit job, the OAG selects a contractor for its ability 
to meet and deliver the OAG's level of audit quality for any given agency or class of 
agency. Successful tenderers are usually repeat suppliers or have experience in 
auditing public sector agencies. 1 8  This selection process reduces the OAG's risk of 
contracting low quality contractors. The OAG also provides the overall direction in 
matters relating to the conduct of the audit. For instance, contractors need to get their 
audit plans approved by the OAG before commencing the audit. Contractors also 
report significant issues during the course of the audit and present their work to the 
OAG for review. These activities ensure that the contractors' work meets, at least, the 
minimal audit quality as required by the OAG before the audit reports are released to 
each agency and tabled in parliament. If a contractor's work is not satisfactory, i.e., 
provides a lower audit quality level than demanded by the OAG, the OAG undertakes 
further work, or requests the contractors to undertake further work to ensure that the 
audit meets the OAG's desired audit quality level. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
assume that the quality of audit service provided to public sector agencies is 
acceptable and delivery of audits with a quality level lower than expected by the 
OAG is minimal. 
The issue on whether contractors provide a higher audit quality level than required by 
the OAG is ambiguous. Discussions with the OAG staff indicate that they view all 
audits as having a similar quality, and try to impose the same quality level for all 
audits. One can also assume that contractors have limited incentives to provide a 
higher audit quality than requested by the OAG. Since the final audit report bears the 
18  The OAG's willingness to accept the quality of particular audit suppliers can be assessed by the 
extent to which audit suppliers are re-hired. The presumption is that if they are not re-hired for any job 
then they, among other things, do not necessarily match the quality designed by the OAG. Price and 
efficiency are the other factors that may affect re-hiring. 
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signature of the OAG, regardless of the suppliers that undertake the audit, the market 
can only identify the final report to the OAG's "brand name". Since the contract-out 
audits are not identified with the contractors' "brand name", they would have limited 
incentive to deliver audit quality beyond the level required by the OAG. In addition, 
it can be argued that, in selecting the best value-for-money tender offer, the OAG 
selects contractors that meet its quality criteria and reject the higher-than-required 
audit quality offered by the contractors. On the other hand, some contractors, who 
view the OAG as their client, might vary audit quality upward to impress the OAG, 
in the hope of securing future audit engagements. 
In summary, contractors are assumed to deliver, the very least, a minimal audit 
quality, as determined by the OAG, as a result of the OAG's quality control 
procedures on contract-out audits. This implies that audit quality for contract-out 
audits can be similar to or higher than in-house audits. The contractors may deliver a 
higher audit quality than required by the OAG to impress the OAG. 
The two major assumptions in this study have implications for the findings. Studies 
that examine audit efficiency need to be aware that variations in audit costs can be 
influenced by both the efficiency and effectiveness aspects of a production process. If 
it is reasonable to assume that audit quality is homogeneous across agencies and 
audit suppliers, the effect of type of audit arrangement on audit efficiency can be 
examined in the context of a model that explains total audit costs or fees required to 
achieve a given level of audit quality. 
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Audit Efficiency in the WA Public Sector Audit Market 
The issue of production efficiency in auditing arises at the firm level because client 
specificity gives rise to differentiated production process and auditors need to 
exercise judgment in the production process. In the public sector audit market in 
Australia, the presence of alternative audit arrangements and the involvement of 
private sector audit firms raise additional issues in production efficiency as to the 
most efficient form of audit arrangement to undertake public sector audits. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, the arguments for increasing competition in the public sector 
audit market are generally based on the assumption that a competitive model, through 
a greater use of outsourcing and the involvement of private sector suppliers (hereafter 
contractors), is able to improve the efficiency of public sector audits. 
To compare the cost efficiency between the in-house and contract-out arrangements 
to undertake public sector audits, this study considers the differences in market 
structures and capital investments and, hence, differences in incentives between the 
OAG and contractors. Since the OAG and contractors face different incentives in the 
public sector market, the issue of production efficiency becomes important because 
these incentives influence their allocation of resources and, therefore, audit efficiency 
in the public sector. As discussed in the later section of this chapter, there are also 
other factors to consider when examining the suppliers' set of incentives in the public 
sector audit market. 
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Level of competition. 
Audit legislation affects the level of competition faced by each type of supplier in the 
public sector audit market and, therefore, places the OAG and contractors in different 
market structures. Legislation provides the OAG with exclusive rights and 
responsibilities to conduct, authorise and report on external audits of all public sector 
agencies. In addition, the OAG has the power to determine the amount of financial 
audit work and types of agency to be contracted-out to private sector suppliers. Since 
the OAG does not have to compete for the audits, the legislation, in effect, provides 
the OAG with a monopoly on the supply of financial audits to public sector agencies. 
Contractors, on the other hand, are subject to competitive pressures. Unlike the OAG, 
potential contractors are required to compete for public sector audits through a tender 
bidding process. The tendering process in WA generally elicits three to four offers 
from prospective contractors to undertake an audit engagement, thereby ensuring that 
the market for contract audits is reasonably competitive. This contributes towards 
price equilibrium in contract-out audits. 
While evidence from the US suggests that tender bids are often selected on the basis 
of lowest price and tend to be fee-driven (Beck & Barefield, 1986; O'Keefe et al., 
1994a), the contracting procedures in WA suggest that the OAG evaluates 
prospective contractors based on both quality and cost criteria. As such, the OAG 
selects the prospective contractor that offers the lowest price for a given level of audit 
quality deemed appropriate by the OAG. Therefore, the tender process has the 
potential to drive competition between prospective contractors and force them to 
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lower their engagement fees and, subsequently, to lower the costs of production. The 
tender process also ensures a minimum level of audit quality. 
Firms that operate in a competitive environment need to minimise their costs and 
maximise resource utilisation within the constraints of a specified level of quality to 
be able to charge competitive prices for audit services. In addition, they need to 
generate and maintain a profit margin. Since the product supplied by the audit firm is 
a service that is labour intensive, increasing audit hours will increase service cost 
unless there are compensating improvements in efficiency (McNair, 1991). Audit 
firms in the private sector reduce costs by investing in new audit technologies to 
improve efficiency (Craswell, 1 992; Maher et al., 1 992) or by continually reducing 
audit hours for an audit engagement (McDaniel, 1 990; Otley & Pierce, 1996). 
Given that the OAG and contractors operate in relatively different market structures, 
they face different economic incentives in their conduct of financial audits in the 
public sector. Differences in market structures suggest that suppliers who operate in a 
competitive market, i.e., contractors, are more cost efficient than the suppliers who 
operate in a relatively monopolistic market, i.e., the OAG. The tender process creates 
a competitive market, which ensures that the prospective contractors compete against 
each other and provide incentives for contractors to lower their fees and costs 
(Copley & Doucet, 1993). In addition, Houghton and Jubb (1998, p. 31) note that 
"competition also relates to the issues of ongoing development, refinement and 
utilisation of new audit technologies and how this is best achieved". Contractors have 
the ability to develop and refine new audit technologies because they have the capital 
and economies of scale to spend more on research and development activities. The 
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OAG, on the other hand, has limited capacity to develop new audit technology 
because of its limited budget cycle in the public sector. The greater use of innovative 
and new audit technologies and the continual emphasis on reducing audit hours for 
audit engagements may ensure that contractors are more cost efficient than the OAG 
in undertaking financial audits in the public sector. 
Nature and proximity of the relationship between audit suppliers and 
agencies. 
Another factor that could impact on audit suppliers' cost efficiency is the nature and 
proximity of the relationship between audit suppliers and agencies. The OAG 
maintains an obligatory relationship with the agencies as their external auditor. The 
length of audit engagements runs indefinitely or until the accounts are contracted-out 
to private sector suppliers. Public sector agencies at the state level do not have the 
option of selecting, retaining or switching auditors. Parliament is the principal client 
of the OAG, while public sector agencies are the auditees of the OAG. A typical 
relationship between the OAG and the agencies is succinctly noted by the Victorian 
Auditor-General (Price Waterhouse, 1995): 
While there is a growing trend to view client services as the 
objective of all audit activities, this trend runs the risk of failing to 
recognise the unique responsibilities to the wider community that 
attach to the audit function in the public sector. . . .  To be able to 
report publicly in such circumstances, without being unduly 
concerned about any possible adverse impact on relationships with 
client agency management, reinforces the independence of an 
Auditor-General and provides an important safeguard to the 
primary audit clientele, namely the Parliament and taxpayers of 
Victoria. 
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The power invested in the Auditor-General by parliament allows the Auditor-General 
to determine the extent and types of audit activity undertaken. It also allows the OAG 
to allocate resources to where he/she sees as necessary, without the influence of 
executives or bureaucrats of public agencies (Taylor, 1998; Harris, 1999). As such, 
the resourcing strategy of the OAG is supply-driven and, consequently, there are 
minimal pressures for the OAG to justify and account for their audit hours to the 
agencies. 
There is a higher level of proximity in the relationship between the OAG and 
contractors compared to the relationship between the OAG and parliament in 
accounting for audit resource utilisation. Due to the rotation practice in the 
contracting process, the OAG, as the client, has the option of switching contractors 
and may not contract with them for future audit engagements. A non-obligatory 
relationship and the rotational tender arrangement suggest that the contractors are 
more likely than the OAG to account for and justify their billable audit costs. 
Therefore, contractors have greater incentives to manage their hours ( amount and 
mix) and, therefore, audit costs compared to the OAG. These incentives may result in 
contractors being more cost efficient than the OAG in undertaking financial audits in 
the public sector. 
Thus far, arguments based on the market structures and capital investments of audit 
suppliers, and the level of proximity between audit suppliers and clients suggest that 
contractors are more cost efficient than the OAG. However, market-based pressure is 
only one of the factors that affects resource utilisation. Institutional factors in the 
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public sector provide non-market-based incentives that affect the use of resources by 
the audit suppliers and, hence, audit cost efficiency. Examples of non-market based 
incentives for the OAG include the appropriation received from parliament, pressure 
from potential entrants into the public sector audit market by private audit suppliers 
and the increasing demand for public accountability with respect to financial 
efficiency. 
Reforms in the public sector. 
The total costs available to the OAG to undertake public sector audits are determined 
by the size of the budget approved by parliament. Consistent with other areas in the 
public sector, the size of budget for audit is decreasing as a result. of the cost cutting 
reforms in the public sector. Recent inquiries in Australia indicate that the OAG at 
the commonwealth level has not been receiving adequate resources for its audit 
services in prior years (JCPA, 1 989; 1996). This implies that the OAG is pressured to 
maximise its use of resources. 
Due to the reforms in public sector management and the increasing adoption of 
competitive structures in the public sector, there is the threat that the OAG may lose 
its monopoly on public sector audits. The threat of government's intervention to 
decrease existing barriers to entry in market service areas may provide incentives to 
the OAG to place a greater emphasis on managing costs. 
The decreasing budget for public sector audits and calls for a contestable public 
sector audit market can be linked to increasing public accountability for efficiency 
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and effectiveness in public services. In the last decade, there have been many reviews 
on the role, functions and operations of the OAGs at the state and federal levels (see 
JCPA, 1989; 1996, Price Waterhouse, 1995; Maddock et al., 1997). For example, 
public accounting firms have conducted independent performance reviews of the 
Victorian OAG's operations since 1991 (refer to Price Waterhouse, 1995; Ernst & 
Young, 1998). 1 9  All three reviews conclude that the Victorian OAG has achieved its 
objectives effectively in an economical and efficient manner. In respect of financial 
audits, the reviews found that the Victorian OAG compares favourably with the "Big 
6" chartered accounting firms in Australia. Furthermore, the Victorian OAG reported 
that for year-end 1998, "the in-house auditing costs are considerably less expensive 
than similar costs incurred by contractors" (Victorian Auditor-General's Office, p. 
47, 1998). It compared the average annual audit cost to the Office for in-house and 
contract-out audits per million dollars of income and expenditure transactions and, 
total assets of the agencies. 
In a bid to improve their efficiency and effectiveness, the OAGs are adopting and 
customising private sector audit technologies to undertake public sector audits (Price 
Waterhouse, 1995; OAG WA, 1998; Simnett, Luckett & Wright, 2000). For 
example, the OAG in WA adopted the Arthur Andersen audit methodology in 1996, 
while the Victorian OAG had used the Coopers and Lybrand audit methodology for 
its operations. 
19 Price Waterhouse conducted the examination of the performance of the Victorian OAG for the three 
years ended 30 June 1995. Similar reviews are planned for the NSW OAG where a Public Accounts 
Committee (PAC) sponsored peer reviews are to be conducted at least once every three years to 
examine the auditing practices and standards of the Auditor-General (Audit Office of New South 
Wales, I 999). 
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Audit specialisation. 
Another factor that may contribute towards the OAG's audit cost efficiency is its 
audit specialisation in public sector audits. Due to the audit legislation, the OAG has 
been the traditional supplier of audits in the public sector market and controls the 
whole of the public sector audit market. The need to allocate audit resources annually 
allows the OAG to develop insight into the history and background of the market and 
the inter-dependence between agencies. At a micro level, an obligatory relationship 
with agencies enables the OAG to develop and update agency-specific knowledge 
continuously. This relationship allows the OAG to be familiar with the operations 
and internal controls of agencies, and, as a result, enables the OAG to develop 
expertise in the audit of public sector agencies. Familiarity and subsequent expertise 
should contribute to greater cost efficiency. In addition, the OAG, as an industry 
specialist, may achieve economies of scale as a result of having a large clientele in 
the public sector and a greater understanding of the agencies' institutional and 
organisational context (Eichenseher & Danos, 1981). O'Keefe et al. (1994a) found 
that the number of school districts performed by the local office of the audit firm is 
negatively associated with violations in GAAS compliance. This suggests that 
industry-specialisation is important in providing high quality audits. 
Specialisation in public sector audits is essential because public sector audits are 
inherently complex and subjective (Brown & Raghunandan, 1 995; Funnell & 
Cooper, 1998). As discussed earlier, public sector audits require more than a 
substantive audit approach because the nature of the public sector environment 
requires strong accountability requirements and, therefore, requires additional testing 
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of internal controls and matters that relate to compliance with regulations and 
statutes. Another factor that could account for the complex and subjective nature of 
public sector audits is the inherent instability in the public sector. Instability in the 
public sector is due to, among other things, the frequent restructuring of organisations 
and changes in legislation and regulations. As such, auditing in the public sector 
requires highly specialised knowledge and skills (Simnett et al., 2000) and potential 
audit suppliers need to invest and develop industry-specific knowledge and 
technology (Parker, 1993; Raman & Wilson, 1994; O'Keefe et al., 1994a; Brown & 
Raghunandan, 1995; Houghton & Jubb, 1998). A response to an inquiry from the 
Maddock Report ( 1997) indicates that government audits require specialist skills and 
that the OAG possesses these skills. Even within the public sector, the OAG divides 
its resources by types of industry-related knowledge in public sector audits (Simnett 
et al., 2000). 
The need to develop and invest in public sector audits is evident from the US General 
Accounting Office's (GAO) (1986) report. Evidence suggest that there is variation in 
audit quality provided to public sector agencies, with many audits of government 
agencies in US not complying with GAAS. For example, quality review reports 
indicate that 3 1  percent of audits violated either fieldwork or reporting standards, or 
both standards (US GAO, 1986). Two major reasons for substandard audits in the 
public sector are: (1) the private sector suppliers' low expertise in public sector 
audits, which is caused by the low investment in knowledge and technology in this 
area; and (2) the low litigious environment in the public sector, which can lead to the 
use of inexperienced staff in public sector audits by private sector suppliers (O'Keefe 
et al., 1994a; Brown & Raghunandan, 1995). 
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In the context of WA, substandard audits by contractors are minimal because they are 
managed and monitored by the OAG. However, there are limited incentives for 
contractors to invest in knowledge and expertise in the public sector industry. Major 
reasons include the limited opportunities for private sector suppliers to enter the 
public sector audit market and the short-term contracting arrangement. The term of 
the contract usually operates between three to five years. In addition, the OAG has a 
policy of contracting-out the audits to several audit firms instead of favouring one or 
two audit firms to undertake the audits. 
The short-term contracting arrangement may impact on the efficiency of the 
contractors. This arrangement may not allow contractors sufficient time to develop 
substantial client-specific knowledge and, hence, some form of industry or client 
specialisation in the public sector. This limitation is compounded by the OAG's 
tender rotation where the contract for an agency is terminated at the end of the 
contract and the conduct of financial audit for that agency is taken up again by the 
OAG for another three to four years. Therefore, it can be argued that the OAG 
possesses greater knowledge and expertise of the public sector industry and, for a 
given level of audit quality, is more cost efficient than the contractors. 
"Set-up" costs. 
Another factor that may contribute to the OAG's greater cost efficiency lies in the 
contractors' "set-up" costs. These costs are spread over a short time period due to the 
high turnover of contracted-out audits. While contractors may adopt the latest audit 
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technology to manage mor� efficiently, they do not operate in a similar structural 
setting as the OAG (i.e., long-term relationship with agencies) and, therefore, the 
resulting efficiencies may be lost in the "set-up" costs. Since it is not viable for 
contractors to absorb these costs every time, they price these costs in their tender 
fees. Combined with a profit margin component in the tender fees and other factors, 
the "set-up" costs make the contract-out arrangement less cost efficient when 
compared to the in-house arrangement. 20 
Additional costs of contract-out audits: Supervision costs 
The inclusion of supervision costs as part the costs of contract-out audits is another 
factor that adds weight to the argument that the in-house arrangement are more cost 
efficient than the contract-out arrangement. 
Supervision costs are an important feature of contract-out audits. These costs are part 
of the contracting costs where services are contracted-out (Domberger & Rimmer, 
1 994; Craswell, 1 997). Supervision costs reflect the additional tasks that are 
undertaken by the OAG as part of the quality assurance program for contract-out 
audits. These tasks include managing and evaluating the tenders, reviewing the 
contractor's audit plan before contractors can commence with the audit, monitoring 
for contractors' deviations from the plan, gathering evidence to confirm contractor's 
findings, reviewing contractors' working papers and reporting findings to parliament. 
20 However, it needs to be noted with respect to "set-up" costs, that some contractors may have a 
comparative advantage in the audit technology that deals with set-up issues, that is, they have a 
standard structure or form documents that help them get familiar with public sector clients. 
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Supervision costs should be included as part of the total costs for contract-out audits. 
As noted by Talbot in his review of the Victorian OAG's performance (Price 
Waterhouse, 1995, p. 48): 
I am aware of some criticism of this process [ review of the work of 
all agents] but I did not find the time taken to fulfil this auditing 
standards requirement to be excessive. The Office incurs a cost for 
this review and signing process and this is correctly passed on to 
the auditee. 
In addition, Mulgan (1997) argues that one of the reasons for the perceived greater 
efficiency of the private sector, when undertaking projects in the public sector, is the 
reduction in accountability requirements. He argues that private sector providers 
generally should be subjected to the same accountability requirements as public 
officials. The inclusion of supervision costs in contract-out audits reflects the 
fulfilment of accountability requirements for contract-out audits. 
The overall combination of non-market based incentives, due to the reforms in the 
public sector, audit specialisation, "set-up" costs and supervision costs suggests that 
the contract-out arrangement is less cost efficient when compared to the in-house 
arrangement in undertaking public sector audits. 
Overall, there are clearly two competing arguments on the effect of type of audit 
arrangement on audit cost efficiency in the public sector. These arguments can be 
resolved empirically. The conflicting arguments lead to the following null 
hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1 :  There is no difference in the costs of providing public 
sector financial statement audits between the in­
house and contract-out arrangements. 
The effect of type of audit arrangement on audit cost efficiency is expected to be 
conditional on client industry. Client industry has been found to affect audit fees and 
audit hours (see O'Keefe et al., 1994b; Stein et al., 1 994; Butterworth & Houghton, 
1 995; Hackenbrack & Knechel, 1997). Presumably, this is due to differences in audit 
risk across industry groupings or differences in audit requirements that require 
different amount of work in the audit (Butterworth & Houghton, 1 995). Stein et al. 
found across-industry differences within the private sector market and concluded that 
the results from one industry do not extend easily to another industry. They argue that 
the differences between financial services and industrial firms are due to the 
differences in the nature of assets, complexity of information systems and the 
regulatory environment on the strength of control procedures. 
In the context of this study, industry-type effects on audit costs can be operationalised 
using different types of agencies in the public sector. Public sector agencies can be 
classified into three types, namely, department, statutory authority and hospital. 
Agency type may interact with type of audit arrangement to affect audit costs. This is 
due to the contractors' expertise in auditing different types of agencies in the public 
sector. Discussions of agency type is limited to statutory authority and hospital only. 
As noted earlier, the OAG did not contract-out departmental audits for year-end 
1998. 
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Hospital audits that are contracted-out may be associated with lower audit costs. The 
contractors' experience with hospital audits in the private sector and the similarity in 
the hospital's organisational structure and operations in both sectors allow 
contractors to utilise and transfer their experience of hospital audits from the private 
to the public sector. Therefore, the contractors may possess similar auditing expertise 
as the OAG for hospital audits. However, since contractors compete for audits and 
adopt greater use of innovative and new audit technologies, these factors may 
translate into higher cost efficiency, and therefore, lower audit costs for the 
contractors compared to the OAG. 
Alternatively, the interaction between agency type and type of audit arrangement may 
be driven by statutory authority audits. There may be no equivalent of statutory 
authorities in the private sector. Therefore, the contractors do not have an advantage 
over the OAG, in terms of expertise in auditing statutory authorities which may 
translate into lower cost efficiency, and therefore, lower audit costs for the 
contractors compared to the OAG. Therefore, the statutory authority audits that are 
contracted-out may be more expensive than the in-house audits. 
Therefore, in addition to the main effect of type of audit arrangement on audit costs, 
type of audit arrangement is expected to interact with agency type to affect audit 
costs. The second null hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: There is no interaction effect between agency type 
and type of audit arrangement on audit costs. 
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The OAG's pricing policy is expected to be based on the audit costs, therefore, the 
effect of type of audit arrangement, and the interaction between agency type and type 
of audit arrangement on audit fees are expected to be similar to audit costs. 
Therefore, the following null hypotheses for audit fees are: 
Hypothesis 3: · There is no difference in the fees for public sector 
financial statement audits between the in-house and 
contract-out arrangements. 
Hypothesis 4: There is no interaction effect between agency type 
and type of audit arrangement on audit fees. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has presented arguments on which type of audit arrangement is more 
cost efficient and concluded that the contract-out arrangement may be more cost 
efficient or less cost efficient than the in-house arrangement. In addition, the 
interaction effect between agency type and type of audit arrangement has been 
proposed to affect audit costs and audit fees. These arguments can be resolved 
empirically. The next chapter discusses the development of a public sector cost/fee 
model to test the hypotheses. It identifies the variables that affect the production of 
audit services in the public sector and the measurements of those variables. The 
chapter also discusses the sample selection, data collection and estimation technique. 
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Research Method 
This chapter is divided into three main sections: (1) production of audit services in 
the public sector, (2) data collection and (3) estimation technique. The first section 
identifies the factors that affect the production of audit services in the public sector. It 
discusses the conceptual and measurement issues associated with those factors, 
including the factor of interest, and develops an audit cost and audit fee model in the 
public sector. The next section discusses sample selection and data collection. The 
final section presents the estimation techniques and empirical models to test the 
hypotheses. 
Production of Audit Services in the Public Sector 
To compare the audit costs and audit fees between in-house and contract-out 
arrangements, this study needs to identify factors that affect variability in audit costs 
and audit fees. Prior literature has developed audit fee and production function 
models to explain the variability in audit costs. Specifically, client-related 
characteristics such as client size, complexity and risk have been suggested as the 
main factors that contribute to the variability in audit costs ( e.g., Simunic, 1980; 
Firth, 1985; Chan et al., 1993; O'Keefe et al., 1994b; Hackenbrack & Knechel, 
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1997). Other factors include the level of audit quality demanded by clients ( e.g., audit 
firm size or membership in the top-tier audit group to proxy for audit quality) and the 
characteristics of audit suppliers ( e.g., the supplier's client portfolio). 
Most audit fee and production function models have been developed for private 
sector audits. To adapt private sector audit models to a public sector environment, 
these models need to consider the nature of the clients and stakeholders in the public 
sector, and the institutional arrangements that govern the activities and objectives of 
agencies in the public sector. Based on municipal samples in the US, Rubin ( 1988) 
and Copley (1989) conclude that private sector audit models are transferable to the 
public sector environment. However, their studies suggest that the private sector 
audit models need to be modified (in terms of measurement and variable issues) to 
take into account the unique characteristics of the public sector. Overall, both studies 
suggest that client-related factors such as size, complexity and risk are applicable in 
the public sector to explain variability in audit costs and fees. 
Audit production factors. 
Prior audit fee and production studies have found that client size explains the largest 
component of the cross-sectional variability in audit fees and audit hours, explaining 
more than 50 percent of these variations. As client size increases, the amount of audit 
effort required to undertake audits is also expected to increase. Auditors have to 
perform more work to ensure adequate compliance and substantive testing 
(Butterworth & Houghton, 1995). However, prior studies suggest that the 
relationship between client size and audit costs (i.e., hours or fees) is not strictly 
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linear (e.g., O'Keefe et al., 1994b; Firth, 1997). Audit costs increase at a decreasing 
rate as client size increases. The larger the client, the easier it is for the auditors to 
achieve economies of scale, which result in a more efficient use of resources within 
the audit firm. Simunic ( 1980) suggests that the audit sample size, required to give a 
certain degree of control, will increase at a decreasing rate as the client increases in 
size. Therefore, auditors perform proportionately less work for each increase in unit 
size of the client. Due to pressures in a competitive market (for contractors) or the 
need to operate efficiently in the public sector (for the OAG), the savings from 
economies of scale should be reflected in the tender fees or billable hours charged to 
agencies. Overall, audit costs and audit fees are expected to increase as client size 
increases, but at a decreasing rate. 
Client complexity is another factor that consistently explains the variability in audit 
fees and hours. As client complexity increases, the amount of audit effort required to 
undertake these audits is also expected to increase. This is due to the greater amount 
of resources needed to understand the diverse operations of the client ( e.g., different 
markets, various regulations and laws) and to co-ordinate and integrate the audit 
functions that relate to these operations (Butterworth & Houghton, 1995). Similar to 
client size, audit costs and audit fees are expected to increase as client complexity 
increases, but at a decreasing rate. 
Client risk plays a major role in explaining the variability in audit hours and fees in 
the private sector. Business and economic operations of a client affect client risk, 
which, in tum, influences the auditor's business and audit risk (Johnstone, 2000).2 1  
2 1  See footnote 8 for the distinction between the concept of "audit risk" and "business risk". 
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Audit risk arises in the private sector because the risk of a firm going bankrupt or 
suffering consecutive losses is shared between management and auditors where they 
are "jointly and severally liable to financial statement users for losses attributable to 
defects in the audited financial statements" (Simunic, 1980, p. 1 64). The increasingly 
litigious environment in the private sector has motivated auditors to increase their. 
audit effort and/or fee premium when undertaking audits of risky clients (Simunic & 
Stein, 1 996). Auditors increase their effort to collect sufficient amount of evidential 
matter to support an audit opinion. 
While the concept and measurement of risk in the private sector audit models are 
fairly consistent, the extent of audit risk in public sector at the state level is, at 
present, not clearly defined. At the local government level in the US, the existence of 
a bond market affects client risk, although the litigation environment is relatively 
weak when compared to the private sector market (Raman & Wilson, 1 994). Audit 
risk derived from shared risk of business losses and litigation activities may not apply 
in the public sector environment at the state level. Organisations in the public sector 
are funded by taxpayers and their primary objective is not to maximise profit but to 
serve community needs, that is, to provide social, economic and infrastructure 
services. While maximising profit is not the primary objective of these organisations, 
the bureaucrats and politicians are accountable to the public for the appropriate use of 
funds. In addition, litigation cases in the public sector at the state level are rare. 
However, risk is still expected to drive the auditor's effort in the public sector 
environment. The risk that an auditor will issue an inappropriate opinion on an 
auditee's financial statement is still relevant while business risk of public sector 
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auditors is more likely to relate to professional reputation rather than litigation costs. 
Examples of client risk that would impact on the auditor's audit and business risk in 
the public sector are sparse and mostly anecdotal (e.g., Parker, 1993; Craswell, 1997; 
Guthrie & English, 1997). Assessment of client risk in the public sector may be better 
served with the concept of political sensitivity (see Zimmerman, 1977; Baber et al., 
1987, Ward et al., 1994 ). Politically-sensitive agencies could be associated with a 
high scrutiny by parliament, interest groups, politicians, the media and general 
public, due to the nature and sensitivity of services provided, handling of sensitive 
issues and previous discoveries of financial mismanagement. These agencies 
influence the OAG's business risk because findings of mismanagement in these 
entities will inevitably elicit extreme political reactions, with consequences for the 
ministers, government-of-the-day and auditors. The desire to protect and maintain the 
reputation and profile of the OAG drives business risks in the public sector. Overall, 
audit costs and audit fees are expected to increase as client risk increases. 
Another important factor is the role of internal control in public sector audits. 
Internal control systems play an important role in the public sector to ensure 
compliance with laws and regulations and to minimise waste and fraud (Raman & 
Wilson, 1994). A high reliance on a client's internal control should decrease the 
amount of external audit effort due to a decrease in the amount of substantive testing. 
Evidence from prior studies indicates that reliance on internal controls have no effect 
on the external auditors' effort (O'Keefe et al., 1994a; 1994b; Hackenbrack & 
Knechel, 1997). However, Stein et al.'s (1994) found that the effect of internal 
controls on the production of audit services is industry specific. A tight regulatory 
environment in the financial sector could induce auditors to rely on clients' internal 
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controls. In the public sector, there is an emphasis on government agencies to have 
good internal controls to protect public funds. Furthermore, public sector auditors 
must provide an opinion on the agencies' internal control system as part of the 
financial statement audit. A higher reliance on client's internal control is expected to 
be associated with lower ( external) audit costs and audit fees. 
Prior studies have also found that Big 5 audit firms are associated with higher audit 
hours and fees ( e.g., Palmrose, 1986; Deis & Giroux, 1 992; 1996; Raman & Wilson, 
1 994). These studies used audit firm size or top-tier affiliation to proxy for audit 
quality. In the context of this study, if contractors deliver a higher audit quality level 
than required by the OAG, it is more likely to be a Big 5 audit supplier. DeAngelo 
(1981 ) argues that big audit firms are more likely to deliver a higher audit quality 
because they have greater resources, competence and independence. To control for 
possible variations in audit costs and audit fees as a result of the higher audit quality, 
the Big 5 and non-Big 5 audit suppliers dichotomy is included as a control factor in 
the models. Generally, audit costs and audit fees are expected to increase if a Big 5 
audit supplier conducts the audit. 
As discussed earlier, client industry has been found to affect audit fees and audit 
hours ( see O 'Keefe et al., 1 994b; Stein et al., 1994; Butterworth & Houghton, 1995 ; 
Hackenbrack & Knechel, 1997). Presumably, this is due to differences in audit risk 
across industry groupings or differences in audit requirements that require different 
amount of work in the audit (Butterworth & Houghton, 1995). Stein et al. found 
across-industry differences within the private sector market and concluded that the 
results from one industry do not extend easily to another industry. They argue that the 
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differences between financial services and industrial firms are due to the differences 
in the nature of assets, complexity of information systems and the regulatory 
environment on the strength of control procedures. 
In the context of this study, the effects of industry on audit costs and audit fees are 
analogous to the effects of agency type on audit costs and audit fees in the public 
sector. 
Public sector agencies can be classified into three types, namely, department, 
statutory authority and hospital. A department is a body established or deemed to 
have been established under the Public Sector Management Act 1994 (OAG WA, 
1999). A statutory authority is a person or body specified in Schedule 1 of the 
Financial Administration and Audit Act 1985. These agencies are established by 
parliament under legislation for specified purposes (OAG WA, 1999). In line with 
the OAG's classification of agency type in its annual report, a hospital is defined as 
statutory authority but is treated as a separate agency type. 
Statutory authorities differ from government departments in the nature of their 
creation (by statute) and by extent of their activities (Funnell & Cooper, 1998). 
According to Funnell & Cooper (1998, p. 58): 
Statutory authorities have considerably more operating freedom 
than departments and many, for practical purposes, are free to 
operate as they think fit within the mandate given to them by their 
Enabling Act. Statutory bodies. . . have greater administrative 
flexibility when compared with departments. They also have an 
ability to accommodate a wide spectrum of expert contributions 
and concerned interests. 
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Hospitals are expected to incur lower audit costs compared to departments and 
statutory authorities. A less diverse and complex nature in terms of asset base, basic 
services, management structure, regulatory environment and control procedures leads 
to the expectation that, on average, hospital audits require less effort and time that 
translate to audit costs and audit fees relative to departments and statutory authorities. 
Departmental audits are expected to incur higher audit costs relative to statutory 
authority audits because departments have more variation in terms of the services, 
conformance to different set of legislation and control procedures. 
Drawing from the audit fee and audit production function literature, the factors 
expected to drive audit costs and fees in the public sector are agency size, 
complexity, risk (audit and business), reliance on internal control, Big 5 audit firms 
and agency type. The audit production model treats audit costs and audit fees as the 
dependent variables. The model is as follows: 
Audit costs/fees = f [size, complexity, risk (audit and business), reliance on internal 
control, Big 5 audit firm, agency type, test variables] 
Variable measurement - dependent variables. 
The dependent variables are audit fees and audit costs. Audit fees refer to the fees 
billed to the agencies. The OAG determines the fees for all agencies, irrespective of 
whether the audit is conducted by in-house staff or contractors. Audit costs are 
defined as the costs of issuing an audit opinion in the public sector. The unit of 
1 09 
analysis for cost efficiency in this study is costs at the audit engagement level. An 
audit engagement is assumed to be more efficient if it incurs less audit costs than 
another engagement in providing an audit opinion at a specific level of audit quality, 
for a given level of client-related characteristics. This study uses the dollar amount of 
costs, rather than labour hours, to define audit efficiency because the labour mix (i.e., 
partner, manager, senior and junior or OAG's equivalent levels) in an audit 
engagement can affect the total costs of the engagement. For example, the total costs 
of an engagement increase where there is a greater use of auditors' effort at the 
partner level.22 Resource allocation in audit firms requires knowledge, not only on 
the amount of time needed to complete an audit engagement, but also the type and 
mix of audit staff in the engagement (Palmrose, 1989; O'Keefe et al., 1994b; 
Hackenbrack & Knechel, 1997). Therefore, a measure of cost efficiency that 
considers labour hours and the associated costs of those labour hours is more 
appropriate than a measure that calculates labour hours only. 
The cost of issuing an audit opinion in the public sector is measured differently, 
depending on the type of audit arrangement. For in-house audits, audit costs are 
comprised of the sum of billable labour hours times the standard billing rate of the 
OAG staff at each staff level. The standard billing rate is based on the full cost of 
maintaining an auditor in the field, that is, the auditor's salary, information 
technology infrastructure and office overhead, among other things. Audit costs also 
include out-of-pocket costs associated with the audit (e.g., travel, lodging and meals). 
Therefore, the costs of in-house audits are based on full cost recovery. While 
22 The normal hierarchy for an audit firm consists of four levels; juniors, seniors, managers and 
partners, with partners at the highest level. The labour rates increase with each step in the audit firm's 
level of hierarchy, with partners at the highest level. 
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overhead allocation is a problem in most costing exercises, discussions with the 
OAG reveal that the rates gave a fairly accurate account of the total audit costs at the 
end of the year (i.e., less than 3 percent difference) between costs incurred and costs 
charged to jobs. 
For contract-out audits, audit costs are comprised of the actual audit fees charged by 
the contractors and the costs of supervision by the OAG staff. As noted earlier, 
supervision costs are an important feature of contract-out audits. The costs reflect the 
additional tasks that are undertaken by the OAG as part of the quality assurance 
program for contract-out audits. Therefore, supervision costs should be included as 
part of the total costs for contract-out audits. In addition, Mulgan (1997) argues 
private sector providers should be subjected to the same accountability requirements 
as public officials. Therefore, to compare the work of private and public sector 
suppliers, supervision costs should be included in the cost of contract-out audits to 
reflect the fulfilment of accountability requirements. Sensitivity analysis is conducted 
as part of the data analysis to examine the inclusion and exclusion of the supervision 
costs. 
Variable measurement - independent variables. 
Examples of proxies used in prior studies to measure client size are client' s  total 
assets, total revenue or total population. Examples of proxies used in prior studies to 
measure client complexity are client's total subsidiaries, the ratio of accounts 
receivable to total assets, number of separate audit reports and percentage of foreign 
assets (Simunic, 1980, Ward et al., 1 994). 
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There are potential differences between private sector and public sector audit models 
in measuring and proxying for agency size and complexity. These measures need to 
consider the unique characteristics of the public sector environment. Proxies from the 
private sector and municipal studies may not apply to public sector agencies at the 
state level because, unlike private sector organisations, public sector agencies do not 
have a profit maximisation goal. As such, total revenue and total assets may not be 
suitable proxies for agency size in the public sector. 
Public sector agencies are consumers of . public funds through grants and 
appropriations from government. They exist to serve social and community needs 
and obligations. Since the capital required to fund these agencies is raised by 
compulsion, the major task of financial audits in the public sector is to ensure that the 
agencies' transactions and activities comply with various rules and regulations. This 
is to ensure that taxpayers' funds are properly accounted for and used in the 
community's best interest. Therefore, issues that figure prominently in public sector 
audits relate to, among other things, compliance, probity, equity and protection of 
public funds with possible political overtones. As such, tracing the flow of monetary 
resources is the main focus of financial audits in the public sector. Hence, larger 
monetary transactions require more audit effort to verify transactions and ensure that 
the transactions are properly accounted for and compliant with regulations. In the 
context of the Australian public sector audit at the state level, total expenditure is 
expected to be a suitable proxy for agency size.23 
23 Measuring agency size using financial measures can be affected by differences in measurement and 
recognition criteria between public sector agencies, e.g., accrual versus cash/fund basis (Copley, 
1 989). In this study, the measurement of expenditure is expected to be consistent across public sector 
agencies in WA because, as of year-end 1 996, all agencies in WA are required to adopt the accrual 
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Similarly, proxies for client complexity such as the client's total number of 
subsidiaries, the ratio of accounts receivable to total assets, number of separate audit 
reports and percentage of foreign assets are not suitable proxies for agency 
complexity in the public sector. Discussions with the OAG staff indicate that agency 
complexity can be proxied by an agency's operational complexity in terms of the 
breadth and scope of functions and activities performed by the agency. This proxy is 
similar to the proxy for client complexity in Rubin's (1988) and Copley's (1989) 
studies. They used the index of the number of non-ordinary services provided by the 
municipalities. However, this study recognises that complexity can be proxied not 
only by the number of services, but also the intricacies of those services. To measure 
complexity, the auditors-in-charge provided an ex-post assessment of the agency 
overall complexity on a five-point Likert-type scale, where 1 denotes "very simple" 
and 5 denotes "very complex" (see also O'Keefe et al., 1 994b). 
This study uses three proxies for audit risk in the public sector. First, this study relies 
on the OAG's ex-ante assessment of agency's overall financial statement risk to 
measure audit risk. The overall risk measure is a categorical variable of high (1) or 
low (0) and is assessed during the planning stage of the audit. The other measures of 
audit risk are the audit opinions for the financial statements and the performance 
indicators. Prior audit fee studies in the private sector found audit qualifications to be 
positively associated with audit fees ( e.g., Simunic, 1980; Palmrose, 1986) while 
prior audit fee studies in the public sector did not find any significant association 
(e.g., Rubin, 1 988; Copley, 1 989; Ward et al., 1994). The audit opinion for 
basis for accounting. 
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performance indicators is used as an audit risk measure because public sector 
auditors in WA must express an opinion on the agency's performance indicators, as 
part of the financial audit. For both opinions, a qualified audit opinion is coded as 
" l"  and an unqualified audit opinion is coded as "O". 
A proxy for business risk in the public sector is the advice provided to agencies by 
the OAG. This proxy may capture the concept of political sensitivity in the public 
sector. Discussions with the OAG indicate that the advice usually relates to problems 
affecting the agency. The desire to protect and maintain the reputation and profile of 
the OAG drives business risk in the public sector. The advice is provided throughout 
the year and generally covers issues relating to accountability and performance of 
agencies, which includes advice on the application of F AAA and Treasury 
Instructions, accounting standards, performance indicators and EDP audit on major 
computing issues (OAG WA, 1999). The advice also includes the attendance of the 
OAG staff on the agency's audit committee meetings. The advice provided by the 
OAG to the agencies is measured as the sum of billable labour hours times the 
standard billing rate of the OAG staff at each staff level. The standard billing rate for 
advice is similar to the rate for audit costs. However, the labour hours for total advice 
and, financial statement and PI audits, are billed and recorded separately in different 
codes, i.e., the total hours for the financial statement and PI audits do not include the 
total hours from advice provided by the OAG. 
The level · of reliance on internal control is measure� by a three-point scale, that is, 
limited, moderate or extensive. For the purpose of analysis, the scale is treated as a 
continuous scale where "limited" reliance is coded as " l  ", "moderate" is coded as 
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"2" and "extensive" is coded as "3". Unlike prior studies, this study considers the 
level of reliance on internal controls that allows for changes in the extent of 
substantive procedures only. This study recognises that auditors' reliance on internal 
controls may affect the nature and timing of substantive testing only, which may not 
affect auditors' total effort (Murphy, 1994). Focusing on the extent of changes in 
substantive procedures may increase the sensitivity of the scale. The auditors-in­
charge provided an ex-post assessment of the level of reliance on internal controls. 
Consistent with prior studies, audit firm size or affiliation with top-tier audit group is 
a dichotomous variable and is proxied by the suppliers' affiliation with a Big 5 audit 
firm ( I )  or otherwise (0). The agency type measure consists of two dichotomous 
variables, that are, "Department" (department [1], otherwise [O]) and "Hospital" 
(hospital [1 ], otherwise [O]). The test variable, type of audit arrangement, is a 
dichotomous variable, where a contract-out arrangement is coded as " l"  and an in­
house arrangement is coded as "O". For the interaction variable, this study considers 
the interaction between the "Hospital" variable and type of audit arrangement only 
because departmental audits were not contracted-out for year-end 1998. The contract­
out hospital audits are coded as " 1" and others as "O". Since there are three types of 
agencies and two dichotomous variables, the coefficient for the "Hospital" variable 
shows the difference between the intercepts for hospital and statutory authority. 
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Data Collection 
The population of financial statement audits for the WA OAG for the 1998 audit 
cycle is 3 14 audits (OAG WA, 1999). Subsidiaries, corporatised entities and local 
cemetery boards were excluded from the analysis because their financial audits are 
conducted under legislation other than F AAA (the legislation for majority of the 
audits in WA), or under F AAA and other legislation specific to these entities. Thirty­
four agencies were also excluded from the analysis because they are inactive or have 
ceased operations during year-end 1998. The application of legislation other than 
F AAA, and the application of additional or unique audit procedures to agencies that 
were in the process of winding up, may give rise to different cost and pricing 
structures for these agencies. Finally, due to missing data in one or more fields as a 
result of non-response to questionnaires, fourteen agencies were eliminated from the 
analysis, leaving a sample of 223 agencies for tests of hypotheses. In summary, the 
sample of 223 agencies is derived from eliminating the following agencies from the 
population: 
Total financial statement audits for year-end 1998 
less: 
Treasurer's annual statement 
Financial statement audits conducted under legislation other than F AAA: 
subsidiaries 
corporatised entities 
local cemetery boards (conducted under the Cemeteries Act) 
request audits 
Agencies not active or have ceased operations during year-end 1998 
Information relating to independent variables was not determinable due to 
non-response to the questionnaires 
Total sample 
1 1 6 
3 14 
(1) 
(18) 
(3) 
(11) 
(10) 
(34) 
( 14) 
223 
A list of agencies in the sample ( categorised by agency type) is provided in Appendix 
1. Data was collected for the financial year-end 1998 audit cycle. Using the 1998 
year-end audit data has the advantage of ensuring that all agencies are consistent in 
regards to the type of accounting treatment for financial reporting, i.e., accrual 
accounting.24 In addition, two years have lapsed since the OAG adopted the Arthur 
Andersen methodology and, therefore, would be familiar with the methodology in 
planning and executing audit programs. No major changes in the structure of the 
public sector audit market in WA, public sector auditing requirements or the internal 
structure of the OAG were noted for year-end 1998. These events provide assurance 
that variations in audit costs or fees are not overly affected by extraneous factors. 
The data for the empirical models was collected from three sources; the OAG's 
internal records, agencies' year-end 1998 annual reports and questionnaires. A 
questionnaire, attached with a covering letter, was distributed to an in-house auditor 
or contractor in charge of each audit engagement by an OAG senior staff. A total of 
two hundred and thirty seven questionnaires were distributed to auditors, and, within 
a month, two hundred and twenty three questionnaires were returned, providing a 94 
percent response rate. Due to the high response rate, no test was conducted for non­
response bias. 
The total audit costs for each audit engagement (and supervision costs for contract­
out audits), the OAG's assessments of agencies' overall risk, total costs of advice 
provided by the OAG and Big 5 classification were collected from the OAG's 
24 As of year-end 1996, all public sector agencies are required to adhere to accrual accounting for their 
financial reporting purposes. 
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internal records. Audit fees, total operating expenditure, audit opinions for financial 
statement and performance indicators, and agency type were obtained from the 
agency's year-end 1998 annual report. Measures for agency complexity and the level 
of reliance on the agency's internal control were obtained from questionnaires. For 
agency complexity, the respondents answered the question, "The level of agency 
complexity in terms of breadth and scope of agency's functions and activities", on a 
Likert-scale of 1 (very simple) to 5 (very complex). For reliance on internal control, 
the respondents answered the question, "The level of reliance on agency' s  internal 
controls to allow for changes in the extent of substantive procedures in performing 
the audit engagement", on a three-point scale of limited, moderate and extensive. 
Respondents recognised that "limited" reliance can also mean "zero" reliance on 
internal controls. Information on the test variable, type of audit arrangement, was 
obtained from the OAG's internal records. 
Table 6 summarises the concept and measurements of the variables and the source of 
data for the variables. The table also summarises the predicted direction of the 
relationship between each independent variable and audit costs/fees. 
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Table 6 
A Summary of the Audit Production Model 
Construct 
Dependent variables 
Audit costs 
Audit fees 
Independent variables 
Agency size 
Agency complexity 
Risk 
Measurement 
in-house audits = billable hours * standard billing rate ($) 
contract-out audits = tender fees ($) + costs of in-house's 
supervision (billable hours * standard billing rate [$]) 
audit fees billed to the agencies ($) 
total operating expenditure ($) 
breadth and scope of agency's functions and activities - scale from 1 
(very simple) to 5 (very complex) 
audit risk: overall financial statement risk - high (1 ); low (0) 
current year audit opinion for financial statement -
qualified (1 ); otherwise (0) 
current year audit opinion for performance 
indicators - qualified (1  ); otherwise (0) 
business risk: total costs of advice to agency (billable hours for 
advice * standard billing rate [$]) 
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Predicted sign Source of data 
n/a 
n/a 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Internal records 
Annual report 
Annual report 
Questionnaire 
Internal records 
Annual report 
Annual report 
Internal records 
Table 6 
A Summary of the Audit Production Model ( continued) 
Construct Measurement Predicted sign Source of data 
Internal control level of reliance on internal control to allow for changes in Questionnaire 
the extent of substantive procedures - limited (1 ), moderate 
(2) or extensive (3) 
Big 5 audit firm Big 5 ( l ); otherwise (0) + Internal records 
Agency type "Department" - department ( l ); otherwise (0) + Annual report 
"Hospital" - hospital (1 ); otherwise (0) Annual report 
Type of arrangement contract-out (1 ); in-house (0) ? Internal records 
Agency*Type of arrangement contract-out hospital ( l ); otherwise (0) Annual report 
internal records 
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Estimation Method 
This study uses a cross-sectional method to test the hypotheses. The data is based on 
the 1998 year-end audit engagements. The cross-sectional method has the advantage 
of controlling for potential changes in the audit technology and level of audit quality 
over time. Consistent with prior audit fees and production studies, this study adopts 
an ordinary least-square (OLS) estimation technique to compare the cost efficiency 
and fees between in-house and contract-out arrangements to undertake public sector 
audits. 
The audit cost model and the audit fee model share similar independent variables to 
test the research questions. Audit cost is assumed to be highly correlated with audit 
fees in the public sector because of the move towards a contestable audit market and 
pressures on the OAG to provide "value-for-money" audits to agencies. Previous 
studies have used audit fees as a proxy to examine cost structures of accounting firms 
( e.g., Simunic, 1980; Rubin, 1988; Firth, 1997). Furthermore, production function 
studies by O'Keefe et al. (1994b), Stein et al. (1994) and Hackenbrack and Knechel 
(1997) suggest that cross-sectional variation in labour hours can largely be explained 
by the same client size, complexity and risk measures found to be important in 
previous audit fee studies. 
Prior studies report that the regression models violate important statistical 
assumptions if the audit fees or hours and client size are not transformed to 
logarithmic figures. Therefore, following prior audit fee and production models, the 
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audit cost and audit fee models in this study adopt the functional form of log-linear 
regression models to investigate cross-sectional relations between audit cost/fees and 
the exogenous engagement characteristics. Two models are used to test the 
hypotheses, as follows: 
Lncost or Lnfees25 = a + b1Lnexp + b2Complex + b3Risk + b4FSOpin + b5PIOpin + 
b6Advice + b7IControl + b8Big5 + b9Department + 
b 10Hospital + b 11 Type + e 
where: 
Lncost = natural logarithm of total audit costs 
Lnfees = natural logarithm of audit fees billed to agencies 
Lnexp = natural logarithm of total operating expenditure 
Complex = breadth and scope of agency's functions and activities ( 1  = 
very simple, 5 = very complex) 
Risk = overall financial statement risk (1 = high, 0 = low) 
FSOpin = audit opinion for financial statement (1  = qualified opinion, 
otherwise 0) 
PIOpin = audit opinion for performance indicators (1  = qualified 
opinion, otherwise 0) 
Advice = total costs of advice provided to agencies by the OAG 
!Control = reliance on internal control on a scale from 1 (limited) to 3 
(extensive) 
Big 5 = (1  = Big 5 audit firms, otherwise 0) 
Department = ( 1 = department, 0 = otherwise) 
Hospital = ( 1 = hospital, 0 = otherwise) 
Type = type of audit arrangement (1 = contract-out, 0 = in-house) 
e = error term 
25 To test the research questions, supervision costs are included in the definition of total audit costs for 
contract-out audits. As part of the sensitivity analysis, supervision costs are excluded from the 
definition of total audit costs for contract-out audits to examine the effect of supervision costs on the 
test variables. Discussions with the OAG indicate that audit fees billed to agencies take into account 
the supervision costs for contract-out audits. However, the information for the audit fee equivalent of 
supervision costs is not recorded in the OAG's database and, therefore, sensitivity analysis is not being 
performed on the audit fee model. 
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Lncost or Lnfees = a +  b1Lnexp + b2Complex + b3Risk + b4FSOpin + b5PIOpin + 
b6Advice + b7lControl + bsBig5 + b9Department + 
b10Hospital + bnType + b12Hospital*Type + e 
where: 
Lncost = natural logarithm of total audit costs 
Lnfees = natural logarithm of audit fees billed to agencies 
Lnexp = natural logarithm of total operating expenditure 
Complex = breadth and scope of agency's functions and activities (1  = 
very simple, 5 = very complex) 
Risk = overall financial statement risk (1  = high, 0 = low) 
FSOpin = audit opinion for financial statement ( 1 = qualified opinion, 
otherwise 0) 
PIOpin = audit opinion for performance indicators (1  = qualified 
opinion, otherwise 0) 
Advice = total costs of advice provided to agencies by the OAG 
!Control = reliance on internal control on a scale from 1 (limited) to 3 
(extensive) 
Big 5 = ( 1 = Big 5 audit firms, otherwise 0) 
Department = ( 1 = department, 0 = otherwise) 
Hospital = (1 = hospital, 0 = otherwise) 
Type = type of audit arrangement (1 = contract-out, 0 = in-house) 
Hospital*Type = (1  = contract-out hospital, 0 = otherwise) 
e = error term 
Conclusions 
Based on the set of conclusions from the audit fee and audit production function 
literature, two empirical models have been developed to test the research questions. 
The next chapter provides an initial investigation of the variables in the models by 
presenting the descriptive statistics for the independent and dependent variables. The 
statistics are displayed for the total sample and the two sub-samples, that is, in-house 
and contract-out arrangements. Univariate tests are also conducted to allow a more 
detailed examination of the characteristics of the variable of interest. 
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CHAPTER S 
Descriptive Statistics 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the descriptive statistics for the total sample, and the in-house 
and contract-out sub-samples. Results of the univariate tests are also presented. 
Table 7 shows the distribution of the total sample, and the in-house and contract-out 
sub-samples by agency type. Table 7 shows that no department is contracted-out, and 
statutory authorities comprise half of the total contract-out audits. Approximately 
half of the total audits in WA are comprised of statutory authority audits. A list of 
agencies for the in-house and contract-out sub-samples ( categorised by agency type) 
is provided in Appendix 2. 
Table 7 
Sample Coverage by Agency Type 
Agency Type Total Sample In-house Contract-out 
Department 45 (20%) 45 (29%) 0 (0%) 
Statutory authority 120 (54%) 84 (55%) 36 (5 1 %) 
Hospital 58 (26%) 24 ( 16%) 34 (49%) 
Total 223 (100%) 1 53 ( 1 00%) 70 ( 100%) 
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Table 8 presents the descriptive statistics for the independent and dependent 
variables. To test for univariate differences between the in-house and contract-out 
sub-samples, the Mann-Whitney U and chi-square tests are utilised for the 
continuous and dichotomous variables respectively.26 
Table 8 
Descriptive Statistics for Total Sample and Sub-samples 
Total sample In-house Contract-out 
Audit costs ($) mean 19,820 20,076 19,260 
median 9,945 10,505 9,718 
std. dev. 28,657 26,464 33 ,15 1  
Log audit costs mean 9.327 9.346 9.285 
median 9.205 9.260 9. 181 
std. dev. 1.007 1.024 0.974 
signif. 0.586 
Audit fees ($) mean 26,894 28,736 22,869 
median 13,000 13,000 9,250 
std. dev. 44,704 44,072 46,121 
Log audit fees mean 9.452 9.530 9.283 
median 9.473 9.473 9. 129 
std. dev. 1. 15 1 1. 165 1. 109 
signif. 0. 148 
Total operating expenditure mean 48,674,973 46,450,209 53,537,671 
($) 
median 5,117,000 6,721,000 3 ,298,500 
std. dev. 157,527,987 146,887,670 179,652,730 
26 While the independent group's t-test is a more powerful test of differences between two unrelated 
groups compared to the Mann-Whitney U test, the scores for the continuous variables in the sub­
samples need to be normally distributed in the population before the t-test can be used. A test of 
normality, using the Kolmogorov-Smimov statistic, with a Lilliefors significance level, indicates that 
the significance levels for the continuous variables are not significant (p :S: 0.05). As such, a non­
parametric test (Mann-Whitney U) is used to test for univariate differences for continuous variables. 
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Table 8 
Descriptive Statistics for Total Sample and Sub-samples (continued) 
Total sample In-house Contract-out 
Log total operating mean 8.675 8.739 8.535 
expenditure 
median 8.540 8.813 8 .101 
std. dev. 2.023 2.019 2.040 
signif. 0.239 
Level of complexity (1-5) mean 2.731 2.680 2.843 
median 3.000 3.000 3.000 
std. dev. 0.766 0.834 0.581 
signif. 0.062 
Total advice to agency ($) mean 2,593 3,320 1,004 
median 500 655 276 
std. dev. 8506 9887 3702 
signif. 0.001 
Reliance on internal control mean 1.740 1.732 1.757 
(1-3) 
median 2.000 2.000 2.000 
std. dev. 0.557 0.574 0.523 
signif. 0.678 
Overall high risk of % 28.7 30.7 24.3 
financial statement 
signif. 0.324 
Qualified FS audit opinion % 8.5 11.1 2.9 
signif. 0.04 
Qualified PI audit opinion % 17.9 12.4 30.0 
signif. 0.001 
Big 5 % 4.9 15.7 
Department % 20.2 29.4 
Hospital % 26.0 15 .7 48.6 
Contract-out audit % 31.4 
arrangement 
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An examination of the frequency tables and histogram graphs indicate that the 
distributions for audit costs and fees are highly skewed to the right. While the audit 
costs range from approximately $3,000 to $250,000, the majority of the agencies in 
the sample have costs less than $30,000 (i.e., 83 percent). Audit fees range between 
$1 ,000 to $350,000, with 47.5 percent of the fees range between $1 ,000 to $10,000 
and a further 33 percent of the fees range between $10,000 and $31,000. 
Approximately 30 percent of the agencies are classified as having high overall audit 
risk for financial statement audits. Only 8.5 percent of the agencies in the sample 
received a qualified audit opinion for the financial statements but a higher percentage 
(18%) for the performance indicators. The low rate of audit qualifications for 
financial statements in the WA public sector is in contrast to the qualifications 
reported in the US public sector fee studies and in other states in Australia. For 
example, Ward et al. (1994, p. 401 , footnote 6 & 7) note that approximately 29 
percent of municipalities in their sample and Rubin's (1988) sample received audit 
qualifications. Copley's (1989) municipal sample contains 25 percent audit 
qualifications. 
For the descriptive analysis, the responses for reliance on internal control can be 
presented in discrete terms, i.e., limited, moderate and extensive. The majority of the 
auditors in the sample relied moderately on the agencies' internal controls (62 
percent). Only 6 percent of the auditors relied extensively on the agencies' internal 
controls while 32 percent of the auditors relied in a limited manner. 
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The in-house sub-sample is significantly different from the contract-out sub-sample 
on three variables: audit opinions for financial statements and performance 
indicators, and total advice provided by the OAG. Specifically, in-house audits have 
a significantly higher rate of qualified audit opinions for the financial statements 
(11 %) compared to contract-out audits (3%) but possessed significantly fewer 
qualified audit opinions for performance indicators (12.4%) compared to contractors 
(30%). 
The cause of these variances may be due to the characteristics of the auditees or the 
auditors. With regard to the auditees, the in-house sub-sample may contain entities 
that are prone to receiving qualified audit opinions. The presence of departments in 
the in-house sub-sample only may influence the qualification rate because 
departments may have a higher qualification rate when compared to other agency 
type. Alternatively, this observation could indicate that contractors are less likely to 
issue qualified audit opinions. This argument can also be used to explain why the 
OAG provided significantly higher total advice to in-house audits compared to 
contract-out audits. The OAG may give proportionately greater advice to departments 
compared to other agency types. 
To determine whether the significant univariate difference between the two sub­
samples is due to the presence of departments in the in-house sub-sample, a matched­
pair sample is constructed for the three variables. The in-house and contract-out sub­
samples are matched by hospitals and statutory authorities only and agencies 
classified as "department" are excluded from the in-house sub-sample. The results 
appear in Table 9. 
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The test shows that the significant univariate difference between in-house and 
contract-out sub-samples for total advice and qualified audit opinion for financial 
statement is due to the presence of departments in the in-house sub-sample. As for 
performance indicators, the difference between the two sub-samples remains 
significant. This observation could indicate that contractors are more likely to issue 
qualified audit opinions for performance indicators compared to in-house auditors. 
Table 9 
Descriptive Statistics for the Matched-Pair Samples 
In-house Contract-out 
Total advice to agency ($) mean 1,397 1,004 
median 490 276 
std. dev. 2,708 3,702 
signif. 0.109 
Qualified FS audit opinion % 2.8 2.9 
signif. 0.975 
Qualified PI audit opinion % 12.0 30.0 
signif. 0.003 
Discussions with the OAG staff reveal that, for statutory authorities and hospitals, the 
OAG rotates the agencies to be contracted-out and selects which ones to contract-out 
in a fairly haphazard manner. However, the OAG does not contract-out departmental 
audits and a few statutory authority audits. The OAG also contracts-out indefinitely 
the audits in which it has no expertise, for example, the audits of Western Power and 
State Government Insurance Commission (SGIO). 
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For financial year-end 1998, the OAG contracted-out approximately 30 percent of 
public sector audits in WA to contractors but retained all the audits of departments 
for in-house operations (see Table 7). In addition, the OAG contracted-out about 16 
percent of the audits to Big 5 audit firms. The audit coverage by Big 5 and non-Big 5 
audit firms and, the mean and median of total costs of audits for each firm are 
provided in Appendix 3.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, audit costs are measured differently for the in-house and 
contract-out audits. Since the costs of contract-out audits are a combination of tender 
fees and the OAG's supervision costs, a descriptive analysis for the two components 
of contract-out costs is provided in Table 10. 
The results indicate that there are univariate differences between Big 5 and non-Big 5 
audit firms for tender fees and supervision costs. However, there is no significant 
difference where supervision costs are expressed as a percentage of tender fees. Big 5 
audit firms have higher tender fees when compared with non-Big 5 firms. 
The OAG's supervision costs range between 4 to 73 percent of tender fees, with a 
mean of 27 percent. Discussions with the OAG staff reveal that approximately 20 
percent of the value of tender fees are allocated to supervisory activities. 
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Table 10 
Descriptive Statistics for the Tender Fees and Supervision Costs for Contract-
out Audits 
Total contract-out Big 5 non-Big 5 
audits 
Tender fees ($) mean 15,501 36,001 11,679 
median 6860 43,800 5,750 
std. dev. 23,652 24,574 2 1,607 
signif. 0.000 
Supervision costs ($) mean 3,759 5,422 3,450 
median 1,704 5,928 1,546 
std. dev. 10,813 2,251 11,73 1 
Log supervision costs mean 7.543 8.480 7.369 
median 7.441 8.687 7.343 
std. dev. 0.965 0.585 0.922 
signif. 0.000 
Percentage of supervision mean 0.271 0.25 1 0.275 
costs to tender fees 
median 0.228 0. 157 0.23 1 
std. dev. 0. 167 0. 191 0. 164 
signif. 0.463 
Spearman (rank-order) Correlation 
Table 11 presents a matrix of Spearman (rank-order) correlation coefficients between 
the independent (including test variables) and dependent variables. 
The Spearman correlation coefficients show that the dependent variables (natural 
logarithm of audit costs and natural logarithm of audit fees) are significantly 
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correlated with all of the independent variables, except audit opinion for performance 
indicators and type of audit arrangement. In addition, audit fees is highly correlated 
with audit costs at 0.955 (p < 0.01), which implies that the OAG's fee-setting policy 
is based, largely, on the audit costs incurred. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has provided the descriptive statistics for the total sample, and the in­
house and contract-out sub-samples and the results of the univariate tests for the two 
sub-samples. A Spearman correlation matrix is presented to provide an initial 
analysis on the relations between dependent and independent variables and between 
independent variables. The next chapter presents the ordinary least-square (OLS) 
regression results to test the hypotheses. The results are presented for the base model 
and hypothesised model for both audit costs and audit fees. A sensitivity analysis is 
conducted for the hypothesised audit cost model to account for the supervision costs. 
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Table 11  
Spearman Correlation Matrix for Independent and Dependent Variables 
Lncost Lnfees Lnexp Complex Risk FSOpin PIOpin Advice !Control Big 5 Department Hospital Type 
Lnfees .955* 
Lnexp .872* . 884* 
Complex .577* .550* .533*  
Risk .444* .45 1 * .366* .204* 
FSOpin .242* .243* .210* . 1 60 . 1 6 1  
PIOpin -.056 -. 1 1 3  -.061 .088 -. 142 .025 
Advice .48 1 * .487* .388* .399* . 1 98* .091 . 1 07 
!Control .346* .347* .375* .500* . 1 90* .027 .072 . 1 26 
Big 5 .234* .205* .223* . 1 88* .222* -.070 -. 1 06 -.021 . 144 
Department .322* .342* .336* . 170 . 1 75* .407* -.060 .3 1 7* .074 -. 1 1 5 
Hospital -.339* -.4 1 3 *  -.263* . 1 28 -.354* -. 108 .522* -. 1 58  . 1 67 - . 135 -.298* 
Type -.028 -. 1 00 -.047 .099 -.066 -. 1 37  .2 1 3 *  -. 1 27 .02 1 .337* -.340* .348* 
Hospital X -.279* -.327* -.237* .068 -.269* -.040 .419* -. 1 1 5 .064 -.097 -.2 1 3 *  .7 1 5* .627* 
T e 
* significant at p < 0.01 (2-tailed) 
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CHAPTER6 
Results 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the ordinary least-square (OLS) regression results for three sets 
of analyses. The analyses are based on the development of: (1) a base model and a 
hypothesised model for audit costs; (2) supervision cost models; and (3) a base model 
and a hypothesised model for audit fees. The supervision cost models refer to audit 
cost less the supervision costs as the dependent variable, and supervision costs as the 
dependent variable. 
Regression Analyses: Audit Costs as the Dependent Variable 
To test the first and second hypotheses, audit cost is regressed on explanatory 
variables for the total sample. The regression model must fulfil several assumptions 
to ensure that the results from the model can be interpreted with authority. According 
to Gujarati (1995), the main assumptions are that: (1) the stochastic (disturbance) 
term Ui is normally distributed; (2) there is no exact linear relationship (i.e., 
multicollinearity) in the independent variables; and (3) the variance of ui is constant 
or homoscedastic. 
1 34 
To test for normality, the histogram and normal probability plot diagrams for the 
regression residuals from the base and hypothesised models are constructed and 
presented in Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4. These diagrams indicate that the residuals are 
approximately normally distributed, i.e., the residuals fit the normal distribution line 
in normal probability plot and approximate a normal bell curve in the histogram. 
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Figure 1. Histogram for the base model 
.50 
.25 
0.00 
0.00 .25 .50 .75 
Observed Cum Prob 
Std. ()a, =  .98 
Mean =0.00 
N = 223.00 
1.00 
Figure 2. Normal P-P plot for the base model 
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Figure 4. Normal P-P plot for the hypothesised model 
A test of normality, using the Kolmogorov-Smimov statistic with a Lilliefors 
significance level, was performed on the standardised residuals t9 support the 
graphical diagnosis of normality. The test indicates that the residuals for the 
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regression model are approximately normally distributed, i.e., the test could not reject 
the null hypothesis of normally distributed residuals at a significant level. 
A useful formal diagnostic for multicollinearity is the variance inflation factor (VIF). 
This factor measures ''the increase in the variance of the regression coefficient over 
that which would occur if multicollinearity were not present" (Webster, 1 995, p. 
7 19). The VIF values for the independent variables in the base and hypothesised 
regression models range between 1 . 1 88 to 2.075 and 1 .269 to 3 .657 respectively. 
Myers suggests that "though no rule of thumb on numerical values is foolproof, it is 
generally believed that if any VIF exceeds 10, there is reason for at least some 
concern; then one should combat the problem" (1990, p. 369). Based on the VIF 
values for the base and hypothesised models, multicollinearity is not a significant 
concern. 
To test the assumption that the variance of Ui is constant, graphs are plotted for the 
error terms against predicted y values for the base and hypothesised models. The dots 
on the graphs do not show any discernible relationship, therefore, suggesting that the 
variance of Ui is constant or homoscedastic. The graphs are presented in Figures 5 
and 6. 
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Figure 5. Scatterplot for the base model 
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Figure 6. Scatterplot for the hypothesised model 
All these tests provide support for the use of the multiple linear regression models in 
the analyses. For example, residuals that are normally distributed suggest that the 
OLS estimators of the regression coefficients follow the normal distribution and, 
hence, the t and F tests can be applied to test various statistical hypotheses (Gujarati, 
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1995). The absence of high multicollinearity suggests that the regression coefficients 
are determinate and their standard errors are not large, which means the coefficients 
can be estimated with great precision or accuracy (Gujarati, 1995). 
The casewise diagnostic is used to detect outliers. Residuals that are outside three 
standard deviations can indicate the presence of significant outliers. The output 
identified an observation with a studentized residual greater than the value of 3.00 for 
the hypothesised model. To ensure that this observation does not unduly influence 
the results, it is deleted from the total sample and the regression model is re-run. 
There is no significant change in the model fit (i.e., a marginal increase in the 
adjusted R2 from .823 to .832) and the coefficients for the independent variables 
remain unchanged in significance and direction. Therefore, this observation is 
retained in the sample. 
Base model for audit costs. 
Before testing the first and second hypotheses, a base model is constructed to 
determine if the major factors identified in prior audit fee and production studies can 
explain the variance in public sector audit costs. These factors are size, complexity, 
risk, internal control, Big 5 audit firms and industry. The results appear in Table 12. 
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Table 12 
Regression: Audit Costs as Explained by Control Variables: Expenditure, 
Complexity, Risk, Audit Opinions for Financial Statement and Performance 
Indicators, Total Advice, Internal Control, Big 5, Department and Hospital 
Predicted Standardised t Sig.* 
sign coefficients 
(Constant) 37.732 .000 
Lnexp + .660 16.788 .000 
Complex + .173 4.308 .000 
Risk + .084 2.567 .001 
FSOpin + .052 1.645 .051 
PIOpin + .059 1.710 .045 
Advice + .114 3.323 .001 
!Control .006 .186 .426 
Big 5 + .017 .552 .291 
Department + -.049 -1.416 .079 
Hospital -.179 -4.361 .000 
Adjusted R2 .82 
F statistic 102.405 (p < 0.001) 
N 223 
* A one-tail test is used for significance where an a priori expectation could be made 
about the effect of a variable on audit costs. 
Table 12 indicates that the coefficients for logarithm total expenditure, complexity 
and risk are positive and significant in the predicted directions. Specifically, as 
agency size, complexity and overall risk increase, audit costs increase. This finding is 
consistent with prior audit fee and production studies in the private and public sectors 
(Simunic, 1980; Rubin, 1988; Copley, 1989, O'Keefe et al., 1994b). In addition, as 
with previous audit fee and production studies, agency size explains most of the 
variation in audit costs. 
Audit qualification for financial statements and performance indicators are both 
significant at the 5 percent level in the predicted direction. Higher costs are incurred 
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for audits that received qualifications for that year. This finding is in contrast with 
prior studies in the US public sector (see Rubin, 1988; Copley, 1989; Ward et al., 
1994), which show no significant association between audit qualifications for 
financial statements and audit fees. Total cost of advice provided to the agencies is 
positively and significantly related to audit costs, thus suggesting that, as the OAG 
provides more advice to the agencies, the auditors incur higher costs to audit the 
agencies. 
The level of reliance on internal control does not significantly affect audit costs. This 
result is consistent with several prior studies ( e.g., O'Keefe et al., 1994b; 
Hackenbrack & Knechel, 1997). This result is surprising, given that the auditors have 
to form an audit opinion on agencies' internal controls. This is a distinguishing 
feature of financial statement audit between the public and private sectors. As such, it 
is expected that the evaluation of internal control would feature strongly in the 
auditors' work in the public sector, where the level of reliance would influence the 
amount of external audit effort and, hence, audit costs. However, it should be noted 
that this result pertains to changes in the extent of substantive procedures only. The 
auditors in the sample may adjust the nature and timing rather than the extent of 
substantive procedures in their reliance on the internal control. 
The Big 5 variable is not significantly associated with audit costs. This result 
suggests two interpretations. First, there is no difference in audit quality between Big 
5 and non-Big 5 (i.e., the OAG, local, second-tier) audit suppliers in the public sector 
audit market. Second, the differences in audit quality between Big 5 and non-Big 5 
audit suppliers, if any, are not reflected in audit costs. There are three possible 
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explanations. First, as discussed in Chapter 3, Big 5 audit firms have limited 
incentives to provide a higher audit quality than required by the OAG. Second, the 
OAG selects the contractor that meets, rather than exceeds, the OAG's level of 
quality. Third, it may be that the direct application of audit fee premiums for the Big 
5 in the private sector does not automatically translate into this particular market. Big 
5 audit firms could not command a premium for their reputation in this market, due 
to the tendering policies of the OAG. 
With respect to the main effects of agency type, the evidence suggests that the 
coefficient for hospitals is highly significant in a negative direction. Specifically, 
hospital audits are associated with lower audit costs compared to other agency types. 
The evidence also suggests that the coefficient for departments is not significant at a 
5 percent level (p < 0.079, one-tailed). 
Overall, the base model for audit costs explains 82 percerit of the variance in public 
sector audit costs. The high explanatory power of the model and the presence of 
several significant variables in the predicted direction suggest that the possibility of 
model mis-specification is low. The high explanatory power is also consistent with or 
superior to prior audit fee and audit production models that used the logarithm of 
audit fee/hours as the dependent variable (e.g., Francis, 1984; Palmrose, 1 986; 
O'Keefe et al., 1 994b; Craswell & Francis, 1999). 
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Hypothesised models for audit costs. 
The test variable, type of audit arrangement, is added to the base model to test the 
first hypothesis. Another test variable, the interaction between agency type and type 
of audit arrangement, is subsequently added to the model to test the second 
hypothesis. The first null hypothesis states that there is no difference in the costs of 
public sector financial statement audits between the in-house and contract-out 
arrangements. The second null hypothesis states that there is no interaction effect 
between agency type and type of audit arrangement. Tables 1 3  and 14  present the 
regression results for the main effect of type of audit arrangement, and the interaction 
effect between agency type and type of audit arrangement on audit costs respectively. 
Table 1 3  
Regression: Audit Costs as Explained by Control Variables and Type of Audit 
Arrangement 
Predicted Standardised t Sig.* 
sign coefficients 
(Constant) 37.624 .000 
Lnexp + .657 16 .759 .000 
Complex + . 1 69 4.212 .000 
Risk + .083 2.55 1 .006 
FSOpin + .053 1 .684 .047 
PIOpin + .054 1 .557 .061 
Advice + . 1 17  3.424 .000 
!Control .014  .399 .345 
Big 5 + -.004 -. 1 06 .458 
Department + -.037 - 1 .055 . 147 
Hospital - . 197 -4.670 .000 
Type ? .059 1 .706 .089 
Adjusted R2 .82 
F statistic 94. 1 99 (p < 0.001 )  
N 223 
* A one-tail test is used for significance where an a priori expectation could be made 
about the effect of a variable on audit costs. 
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Table 14 
Regression: Audit Costs as Explained by Control Variables, Type of Audit 
Arrangement and Interaction Between Hospital and Type of Audit 
Arrangement 
Predicted Standardised t Sig.* 
sign coefficients 
(Constant) 37.816 .000 
Lnexp + .649 16.478 .000 
Complex + .167 4.176 .000 
Risk + .082 2.519 .001 
FSOpin + .058 1.839 .034 
PIOpin + .055 1.598 .056 
Advice + .120 3.525 .000 
!Control .016 .469 .320 
Big 5 + -.019 -.548 .292 
Department + -.028 -.773 .220 
Hospital -.152 -3.026 .002 
Type ? .108 2.382 .018 
Hospital *Type -.090 -1.660 .049 
Adjusted R2 .82 
F statistic 87.298 (p < 0.001) 
N 223 
* A one-tail test is used for significance where an a priori expectation could be made 
about the effect of a variable on audit costs. 
As observed in Tables 13 and 14, the inclusion of test variables did not affect the 
significance and direction of the control variables in the audit cost model. More 
importantly, the coefficient for the test variable, type of audit arrangement, is not 
significantly associated with audit costs at a 5 percent level (p < 0.089, two-tailed); 
indicating no significance difference in costs between contract-out and in-house 
audits. Therefore, the first null hypothesis of no difference in audit costs between in­
house and contract-out arrangement cannot be rejected at the 5 percent significance 
level. 
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Table 14  shows that the main effect of type of audit arrangement on audit costs needs 
to be interpreted in light of the significant coefficient for the interaction variable. 
This suggests that the effect of type of audit arrangement is contingent on agency 
types, which in this case, are hospital and statutory authority. The second null 
hypothesis of no interaction effect between agency type and type of audit 
arrangement is rejected at the 5 percent significance level. 
Given the significance of agency type variables in the main and interaction effects, 
splitting the observations by agency type may provide insights into the results of the 
total sample and the consistency of the cost model across agency type categories in 
the public sector. Table 1 5  presents the regression results for the sub-samples, 
partitioned by agency type: department, statutory authority and hospital. The Big 5 
variable is excluded from the hospital's audit cost model because the OAG did not 
contract-out the 1 998 financial audits of hospitals to any of the Big 5 audit firms. In 
addition, type of audit arrangement and the Big 5 variables are not included in the 
department's audit cost model because the OAG did not contract-out departmental 
audits for year-end 1998. 
Table 1 5  shows that the audit cost model differs across sub-samples partitioned by 
agency type. As expected, agency size is the major determinant of public sector audit 
costs for all agency type. Consistent with the result for the total sample, reliance on 
internal control is not significant for any agency type. The coefficient for total advice 
provided to agency is positive and significantly associated with audit costs for all 
agency type at the 10 percent significance level. However, the significance of 
variables such as agency complexity and risk variables varies between agency type. 
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No evidence was found to suggest that higher complexity and overall risk is 
significantly associated with higher audit costs for the hospital sub-sample. The 
evidence suggests that the statutory authority sub-sample is driving the significant 
association between overall risk and audit costs in the total sample. One explanation 
for these results is that the hospitals may be homogeneous in terms of complexity and 
overall risk. A descriptive analysis indicates that hospital sub-sample has the smallest 
standard deviation (0.3072) for the complexity measure compared to the department 
and statutory authority sub-samples ( 1.0362 and 0.7637 respectively). Another 
possible reason is that the way the two variables are measured may not be sensitive 
enough to capture the hospital's variability in complexity and overall risk. 
The audit opinion on the financial statements is significantly associated with audit 
costs for the department sub-sample only. This result suggests that the department 
sub-sample is driving the results for this variable in the total sample. 
More importantly, when the model is presented by agency type, the type of audit 
arrangement is significantly associated with audit costs for the statutory authority 
sub-sample only. The coefficient is positive, which indicates that, on average, the 
costs of contract-out audits are significantly higher than in-house audits. The type of 
audit arrangement is not significantly related to audit costs for the hospital sub­
sample. This sub-analysis shows that the statutory authority audits are driving the 
significance of the interaction term in the hypothesised model for the total sample. 
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Table 1 5  
Regression: Audit Costs as Explained by Expenditure, Complexity, Risk, Audit Opinions for Financial Statement and Performance 
Indicators, Total Advice, Internal Control, Big 5 and Type of Audit Arrangement by Agency Type 
Department Statuto:ry authority Hospital 
Variables Predicted Standardised t Sig.* Standardised t Sig.* Standardised t Sig.* 
sign coefficients coefficients coefficients 
(Constant) 14.425 .000 29.861 .000 8.846 .000 
Lnexp + .482 5.125 .000 .598 9.753 .000 .661 6.284 .000 
Complex + .299 3.367 .001 .1 75 2.719 .004 -.019 -.155 .439 
Risk + .014 .191 .425 .136 3.017 .002 .009 .124 .451 
FSOpin + . 131 2.008 .026 -.028 -.626 .267 .039 .529 .300 
PIOpin + -.056 -.781 .220 .041 .832 .204 .156 2.147 .019 
Advice + .260 3.255 .001 .084 1 .535 .064 .132 1 .465 .075 
IControl - .089 1 .270 .106 .069 1 .285 .101 -.1 53 -1.189 .120 
Big 5 + - - - -.030 -.601 .275 - - -
Type ? - - - . 114 2.332 .022 -.082 -1 .038 .304 
Adjusted R2 .83 .81 .74 
F statistic 30.772 (p < 0.001) 55.814 (p < 0.001) 21 .610 (p < 0.001) 
N 45 120 58 
* A one-tail test is used for significance where an a priori expectation could be made about the effect of a variable on audit costs. 
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Supervision Costs 
This section presents additional analyses on supervision costs. To examine the 
impact of supervision costs on the test variables, type of audit arrangement and the 
interaction between agency type and type of audit arrangement, the OAG's 
supervision costs are excluded from the total costs for contract-out audits. It can be 
argued that, while supervision costs are an essential part of the contracting-out 
process to maintain audit quality and meet the accountability requirements in the 
public sector, these costs are outside the control of the contractors. By excluding 
supervision costs from contract-out audits, this study can assess the influence of these 
costs on the test variables. The results for the total sample are reported in Tables 16 
and 17. 
Table 16 
Regression: Audit Costs (less the OAG's supervision costs for contractors) as 
Explained by Control Variables and Type of Audit Arrangement 
Predicted Standardised t Sig.* 
sign coefficients 
(Constant) 35.894 .000 
Lnexp + .651 16.271 .000 
Complex + .169 4.130 .000 
Risk + .079 2.369 .010 
FSOpin + .048 1.472 .071 
PIOpin + .046 1.312 .096 
Advice + .109 3.110 .001 
!Control .013 .377 .354 
Big 5 + -.004 -.122 .452 
Big 5 + -.004 -.122 .452 
Department + -.037 -1.029 .152 
Hospital -.200 -4.643 .000 
Type ? -.045 -1.282 .201 
Adjusted R2 .82 
F statistic 89.803 (p < 0.001) 
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N 223 
* A one-tail test is used for significance where an a priori expectation could be made 
about the effect of a variable on audit costs. 
Table 1 7  
Regression: Audit Costs (less the OAG's supervision costs for contractors) as 
Explained by Control Variables, Type of Audit Arrangement and Interaction 
Between Agency Type and Type of Audit Arrangement 
Predicted Standardised t Sig.* 
sign coefficients 
(Constant) 36.154 .000 
Lnexp + .641 15.994 .000 
Complex + .167 4.095 .000 
Risk + .078 2.335 .010 
FSOpin + .053 1 .651 .050 
PIOpin + .048 1 .359 .088 
Advice + .1 12  3.229 .001 
!Control .016 .456 .325 
Big 5 + -.022 -.622 .268 
Department + -.026 -.714 .238 
Hospital -.147 -2.892 .002 
Type ? .012 .254 .800 
Hospital *Type - .103 -1 .877 .031 
Adjusted R2 .82 
F statistic 83.597 (p < 0.001) 
N 223 
* A one-tail test is used for significance where an a priori expectation could be made 
about the effect of a variable on audit costs. 
By excluding supervision costs from contract-out audits,27 the test variable, type of 
audit arrangement has no main effect on audit costs (p < 0.201 , two-tailed). This 
result is similar to the previous finding where the coefficient for this variable is not 
27 Supervision costs for a contract-out audit are defined as the difference between the total audit costs 
for the contract-out audit (as shown in the OAG's database) and the tender fees paid to the contractor. 
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significant at the 5 percent level. Table 17 shows that, with the inclusion of the 
interaction variable in the model, the coefficient for the type of audit arrangement is 
not significant; a contrast to the previous finding in Table 14. The interaction term 
remains negative and significant. The significance and direction for the control 
variables remain unchanged. 
To determine the impact of supervision costs on agency type, the total sample is 
partitioned into sub-samples by agency type (i.e., statutory authority and hospital). 
The results appear in Table 18. 
Table 18 
Regression: Audit Costs (less the OAG's supervision costs for contractors) as 
Explained by Control Variables and Type of Audit Arrangement by Agency 
Type 
Statutory authority Hospital 
Predicted Std. t Sig.* Std. t Sig.* 
sign coeff. coeff. 
(Constant) 28. 104 .000 8.362 .000 
Lnexp + .6 13 9.364 .000 .614 5 .914 .000 
Complex + . 196 2.848 .003 -.016 -. 127 .450 
Risk + . 133 2.767 .004 .010 . 142 .444 
FSOpin + -.029 -.612 .271  .009 . 132 .448 
PIOpin + .036 .678 .250 . 130 1.821 .038 
Advice + .060 1.036 . 15 1  . 141 1.582 .060 
!Control - .075 1.3 10 .097 -. 162 - 1.279 . 104 
Big 5 + -.039 -.748 .228 - - -
Type ? .018 .341 .734 -.260 -3 .335 .002 
Adjusted R2 .78 .75 
F statistic 47.381  (p < 0.001) 22.278 (p < 0.001) 
N 120 58 
* A one-tail test is used for significance where an a priori expectation could be made 
about the effect of a variable on audit costs. 
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The results for the sub-samples indicate that supervision costs influence the 
significance of the test variable. For the statutory authority sub-sample, excluding 
supervision costs changes the result for the test variable from positive significance to 
non-significance. For the hospital sub-sample, excluding supervision costs changes 
the non-significance of the coefficient for the test variable to a negative and 
significant association. These results imply that the size of supervision costs is 
significant. As such, it raises the issue about the impact of the OAG's efficiency on 
the contractors' efficiencies and the interpretation of the earlier results. 
Given the significance of supervision costs and their importance in contract-out 
audits, a preliminary test is conducted to examine the determinants of supervision 
costs. The determinants can be broadly classified into two categories. The first 
category is the characteristics of the contractor's audits and the second category is the 
characteristics of the contractor. 
The characteristics of the contractor' s  audits that may affect the OAG's  supervision 
costs are size, complexity, risk, reliance on internal control and packaged audits. As 
contractors undertake larger, more complex or riskier audits, the OAG increases their 
supervision effort to ensure that the contractors account for these agency 
characteristics. This ensures that the required level of audit quality is achieved. 
Higher reliance on the internal control by the contractor is expected to result in lower 
supervision costs. Greater reliance on an agency' s  internal control by the contractor 
means that the internal control is strong and that material misstatements or omissions 
are less likely to occur. The probability that contractors will not discover those 
misstatements or omissions is reduced and, as a result, the OAG does not monitor the 
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contractors extensively. In addition, a higher reliance on internal control by 
contractors means that there are less substantive tests for the OAG to review. 
The OAG contracts-out some audits as a package, presumably to reduce transaction 
costs when calling for tenders. The contract-out audits that are part of a package are 
expected to have less supervision costs compared to individual contract-out audits. 
The OAG reviews the audits that are part of a package more efficiently because the 
OAG is familiar with the contractor's quality of work and is able to generalise across 
other audits in the same package. The OAG is able to generalise because the audits 
that are in the same package offer the similar type of products or services, or belong 
to a particular region. An example is the grouping of hospitals in the "Eastern 
Wheatbelt" region in WA where one contractor undertakes all audits of the hospitals 
in that region. Audit package is measured as a dichotomous variable where audits 
that belong in a package (a package is defined as a single contract for two or more 
audits) are classified as "1" and others "O". The measures for size, complexity, risk 
and reliance on internal control are similar to the measures for the audit cost model. 
The characteristics of the contractor that may affect the OAG's supervision costs are 
industry specialisation, tenure and affiliation with Big 5 tier group. Contractors that 
are classified as industry specialists are expected to receive less supervision from the 
OAG. Prior studies in the public sector found that audit quality is positively related to 
the industry experience of the audit firm (Deis & Giroux, 1992; O'Keefe et al., 
1 994a). The OAG would have more confidence in the quality of the work provided 
by contractors classified as an industry specialist because the contractors are less 
likely to deliver substandard audits. Therefore, the OAG allocates less supervision 
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effort. A firm is classified as an industry specialist if it audits a significant percentage 
of total contract-out audits in the sample (see also Ward et al., 1994). Appendix 3 
indicates that Bird Cameron, Hall Chadwick and Stanton Partners audited a total of 
14 (20%), 13 (19%) and 10 ( 14%) agencies respectively, which comprise 53 percent 
of the total contract-out audits for year-end 1998. Industry specialisation is measured 
as a dichotomous variable where Bird Cameron, Hall Chadwick and Stanton Partners 
are classified as "l" and others "O". 
Contractor's tenure is expected to be negatively associated with supervision costs. As 
the contractor's tenure increases, its learning curve is expected to increase (O'Keefe 
et al., 1994b). Therefore, the OAG should decrease its supervisory activities in terms 
of providing debriefings to the contractor about the agency and reviewing the 
contractor's audit planning program and working papers since the OAG is familiar 
with the standard of the contractor's work. In addition, supervision costs from the 
evaluation of tenders are not applicable from the second year onwards. Tenure is 
measured as the number of years the engagement has been performed by a contractor. 
Supervision costs are expected to decrease for Big 5 contractors. Given that the Big 5 
firms are viewed as having greater resources, competence and independence 
(DeAngelo, 1981; Palmrose, 1986), they are less likely to violate the minimum audit 
quality required by the OAG. Therefore, the Big 5 firms will require less supervision, 
hence supervision costs, compared to the non-Big 5 firms. 
Supervision costs are expected to be lower for hospital audits compared to statutory 
authority audits because hospitals are less diverse and complex in terms of asset base, 
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basic services, management structure, regulatory environment and control 
procedures. Therefore, the hospital audits are easier to monitor. 
Table 19 presents the regression results for the supervision cost model. Following the 
audit cost model, the supervision cost model adopts the functional form of log-linear 
regression models to investigate cross-sectional relations between supervision costs 
and the exogenous characteristics. 
Table 19  
Regression: OAG's Audit Supervision Costs for Contractors as Explained by 
Expenditure, Complexity, Risk, Audit Opinions for Financial Statement and 
Performance Indicators, Total Advice, Internal Control, Audit Package, 
Industry Specialisation, Tenure, Big 5 and Hospital 
Predicted Standardised t Sig.* 
sign coefficients 
(Constant) 1 1 .766 .000 
Lnexp + .425 4.503 .000 
Complex + .083 .881 . 1 91 
Risk + .055 .619 .270 
FSOpin + .092 1 .428 .080 
PIOpin + .060 .753 .227 
Advice + .334 4.462 .000 
!Control -.236 -2.862 .003 
Package -.293 -3 .542 .000 
Specialisation .074 l .Ol l . 1 58 
Tenure -.058 -.806 .212  
Big 5 . 1 1 6  1 .421 .081 
Hospital -.069 -.729 .235 
Adjusted R2 .77 
F statistic 20.146 (p < 0.001)  
N 70 
* A one-tail test is used for significance where an a priori expectation could be made 
about the effect of a variable on audit costs. 
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The supervision cost model is significant and has high predictive power. The high 
predictive power of the model (adjusted R2 of .77) suggests that the model is a 
reasonably good fit. In addition, four out of the twelve independent variables are 
highly significant and in the predicted direction. This implies that these variables 
should provide the basis for the development of a supervision cost model. 
Nevertheless, the supervision cost model in this study remains tentative and should 
be a subject of future research. Other potential variables that may impact on 
supervision costs include the tender procurement procedures, the contractor's 
management structure and the level of audit experience in public sector audits and 
the OAG's previous work experience with the contractors. 
Evidence suggests that agency size and risk, reliance on internal control and audit 
package are significantly associated with supervision costs in the predicted direction. 
Specifically, the OAG increases its supervision effort for contractors that undertake 
larger and riskier audits. For example, the OAG increases its supervision efforts 
where more advice is provided to the agencies. 
Two surprising findings are the insignificant relation between tenure and supervision 
costs, and specialisation and supervision costs. With tenure, the possible explanation 
is that the OAG apportions the costs of evaluating and managing tenders equally 
across the engagement period. Alternatively, the OAG may be inefficient in its 
allocation of supervisory activities by not accounting for the contractor's learning 
curve or the OAG considers the contract term to be too short to have any significant 
impact on the contractor's learning ability. Specialisation, as defined in this study, 
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does not seem to play a role in reducing supervision costs.28 As indicated earlier, the 
OAG has the policy of "spreading-out" the contract-out audits to as many audit firms 
as possible and, therefore, the concept of specialisation may not apply to the contract­
out audits in the Australian public sector audit market and needs to be further 
examined. 
Another interesting result is the relation between type of contractors (i.e., Big 5 or 
non-Big 5) and supervision costs. The evidence suggests that the coefficient for the 
Big 5 variable is not significantly associated with supervision costs at the 5 percent 
level. This raises the question as to what extent do the Big 5 firms differ from the 
non-Big 5 firms in their supply of services in the public sector audit market or, 
alternatively, the OAG's treatment of all contractors. Discussions with the OAG staff 
indicate that they do not differentiate between Big 5 and non-Big 5 firms when 
allocating resources for supervisory activities. They perceive that both type of firms 
possess similar functional and industry expertise in the public sector audit market. 
Furthermore, they believe that their supervisory activities are a function of the 
partners-in-charge of the engagement and the composition of the audit team, rather 
than firm type. The result indicates that the OAG is providing more supervision to 
Big 5 audit teams compared to non-Big 5 teams, possibly due to the greater 
likelihood of Big 5 audit firms to utilise more junior level staff. 
28 Sensitivity analysis is performed on the definition of industry specialist. The regression is re-run 
separately for each of the three contractors that qualified as an industry specialist. Supervision costs 
are not significantly associated with two firms but are positive and significantly associated with the 
third firm (t = 1 .784, p < 0.004, one-tailed). 
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No evidence was found for a significant relation between agency type and 
supervision costs. The OAG does not appear to differentiate between hospital and 
statutory audits in allocating supervision costs. 
An exploratory investigation is undertaken on the supervision cost model to 
determine whether any particular audit firm or types of firms are driving the 
supervision costs. This information is useful to test the sensitivity of the cost model 
where audit firms that significantly affect supervision costs are included in the audit 
cost model as control variables. 
Appendix 3 indicates that there are 17 different audit firms undertaking contract-out 
audits. For the analysis, 16 dummy variables are included in the supervision cost 
model, each with " l"  representing the audit firm and "O" for others. The results 
indicate that two audit firms are significantly associated with supervision costs (at the 
5 percent significance level, two-tailed). The audit firm, "Firm X", has a positive 
relationship with supervision costs and another audit firm, "Firm Y" has a negative 
relationship with supervision costs.29 
To ensure that these two firms are not driving the relationship between the test 
variables and audit costs, these firms are included in the audit cost model as control 
variables. Results for the total sample suggest that "Firm X" has a positive and 
significant relationship with audit costs while "Firm Y" is not significant. Previously, 
type of audit arrangement is not significantly associated with audit costs (p < 0.089, 
two-tailed) at the 5 percent significance level. The inclusion of the two audit firms as 
29 Due to confidentiality, the two audit firms are simply known as "Firm X" and "Firm Y". 
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control variables shows that type of audit arrangement is still not significant (p < 
0. 141 ,  two-tailed). This result indicates that the two firms do not influence the 
previous result. 
With respect to the test variables, type of audit arrangement and the interaction term, 
the results remain unchanged. The results for the test variables also remain 
unchanged with audit costs less the OAG's supervision costs for contractors as the 
dependent variable. 
The two audit firms are also used as control variables in the audit cost model, 
partitioned by agency type (see Table 1 5) to investigate whether these variables affect 
the results for the type of audit arrangement. "Firm Y" is not $ignificant for the 
statutory authority sub-sample and the result for type of audit arrangement remains 
unchanged. "Firm X" did not undertake any contract-out audits of statutory 
authorities. Results for the hospital sub-sample indicate that "Firm X" has a 
significant positive relationship (p < 0.005, two-tailed) with audit costs while "Firm 
Y" is not significant. The result for the type of audit arrangement remains unchanged. 
The adjusted R2 for the hospital sub-sample increases from 0.74 to 0.78, an 
explanatory power that approximates the cost models for statutory authority and the 
total sample. The "Firm X" variable partly accounts for the difference in the adjusted 
R2 between the cost model for the statutory authority and hospital sub-samples (see 
Table 1 5). Discussions with the OAG reveal that "Firm X" had delivered substandard 
audit work for year-end 1 998 and, therefore, required a high level of supervision 
effort from the OAG. 
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The results for the test variable, type of audit arrangement, when partitioned by 
agency type, also remain unchanged with audit costs less the OAG's supervision 
costs for contractors as the dependent variable. 
Overall, the results for the total sample and the sub-samples indicate that no private 
audit firm is significantly driving the relationship between the test variables and audit 
costs. 
Regression Analyses: Audit Fees as the Dependent Variable 
To test the third and fourth hypotheses, audit fees are regressed on explanatory 
variables for the total sample. Similar to the audit cost regression models, diagnostic 
tests are conducted on the audit fee models so that the results from the models can be 
interpreted with authority. The tests suggest that the audit fee models do not violate 
the assumptions of the regression models. Casewise diagnostic did not detect any 
data point outside three standard deviations. This result suggests that the presence of 
a significant outlier is minimal and, therefore, the full sample size of 223 is used in 
the fee analyses. Discussions of the audit fee models focus on the development of the 
base model and hypothesised models. 
Base model for audit fees. 
Before testing the third and fourth hypotheses, a base model is constructed to 
determine if the major factors identified in prior audit fee and production studies can 
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explain the variance in public sector audit fees. Since prior audit fee models are 
based on an auditor's cost function, the determinants for the audit fee model are 
expected to be similar to the determinants for the audit cost model. As such, the 
determinants include size, complexity, risk, internal control, Big 5 audit firms and 
industry. Table 20 presents the regression results for the base model. 
Table 20 
Regression: Audit Fees as Explained by Control Variables: Expenditure, 
Complexity, Risk, Audit Opinions for Financial Statement and Performance 
Indicators, Total Advice, Internal Control, Big 5, Department and Hospital 
Predicted Standardised t Sig.* 
sign coefficients 
(Constant) 34.774 .000 
Lnexp + .669 19.057 .000 
Complex + . 148 4.120 .000 
Risk + .068 2.303 .01 1  
FSOpin + .049 1.729 .043 
PIOpin + .034 1.093 .138 
Advice + .119 3.875 .000 
!Control .040 1.3 10 .096 
Big 5 + -.024 -.870 .193 
Department + -.056 - 1.817 .036 
Hospital -.252 -6.900 .000 
Adjusted R2 .86 
F statistic 133.955 (p < 0.001) 
N 223 
* A one-tail test is used for significance where an a priori expectation could be made 
about the effect of a variable on audit fees. 
The results in Table 20 are consistent with the results for the audit cost model, except 
for the audit opinion for performance indicators and departmental audits. In the audit 
cost model, the audit opinion for performance indicators is significantly associated 
with audit costs but the cost difference is not reflected in audit fees. A possible 
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explanation is that the OAG is required by legislation to audit performance indicators 
from year-end 1 996 and the OAG is allowing an adjustment period for the agencies 
to prepare and fine-tune their performance indicators. 
In contrast to prior fee studies in the public sector, audit qualification on financial 
statements is positive and significantly associated with audit fees. A low qualification 
rate of 9 percent in the WA public sector and the significant association may suggest 
that qualified audit opinions are rare and, if qualified opinions are issued, auditors 
increase the amount of their evidence to justify their opinions. 
Overall, the fee model explains 86 percent of the variance in public sector audit fees. 
The fee model has greater explanatory power than the audit costs model by 4 percent. 
In summary, the determinants of audit fees in the public sector are agency size, 
complexity, risk, audit opinion for financial statement and total advice provided to 
the agencies. With the exception of audit opinion for financial statements and total 
advice provided to the agencies, this finding is consistent with prior audit fee studies 
in the public sector. The high explanatory power of the model is also consistent with 
or superior to prior audit fee models in the public and private sectors. 
Hypothesised models for audit fees. 
To test the third hypothesis, the test variable, type of audit arrangement is added to 
the base model. Another test variable, the interaction between agency type and type 
of audit arrangement, is subsequently added to the model to test the fourth 
hypothesis. The third null hypothesis states that there is no difference in the audit 
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fees of public sector financial audits between the in-house and contract-out 
arrangements. The fourth null hypothesis states that there is no interaction effect 
between agency type and type of audit arrangement on audit fees. Tables 21  and 22 
present the regression results for the main effect of type of audit arrangement and the 
interaction effect between agency type and type of audit arrangement on audit fees 
respectively. 
Table 21  
Regression: Audit Fees as  Explained by Control Variables and Type of Audit 
Arrangement 
Predicted Standardised t Sig.* 
sign coefficients 
(Constant) 34.548 .000 
Lnexp + .668 18.975 .000 
Complex + . 147 4.070 .000 
Risk + .067 2.290 .012 
FSOpin + .050 1.737 .042 
PIOpin + .032 1.035 . 15 1  
Advice + . 120 3.894 .000 
!Control .043 1.369 .086 
Big 5 + -.030 -1.017 . 155 
Department + -.053 - 1.664 .049 
Hospital -.258 -6.810 .000 
Type ? .018 .571 .569 
Adjusted R2 .86 
F statistic 121.420 (p < 0.001) 
N 223 
* A one-tail test is used for significance where an a priori expectation could be made 
about the effect of a variable on audit fees. 
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Table 22 
Regression: Audit Fees as Explained by Control Variables, Type of Audit 
Arrangement and Interaction Between Agency Type and Type of Audit 
Arrangement 
Predicted Standardised t Sig.* 
sign coefficients 
(Constant) 34.446 .000 
Lnexp + .668 18.761 .000 
Complex + . 146 4.055 .000 
Risk + .067 2.281 .012 
FSOpin + .050 1 .736 .042 
PIOpin + .032 1 .035 .151 
Advice + .120 3.885 .000 
!Control .043 1 .370 .086 
Big 5 + -.031 -1 .008 .158 
Department + -.052 -1 .619 .054 
Hospital -.255 -5.633 .000 
Type ? .021 .506 .614 
Hospital *Type -.006 -.115  .454 
Adjusted R2 .86 
F statistic 1 10.782 (p < 0.001) 
N 223 
* A one-tail test is used for significance where an a priori expectation could be made 
about the effect of a variable on audit fees. 
The test variable, type of audit arrangement, is not significantly associated with audit 
fees (p < 0.569, two-tailed) in Table 21 . This result suggests that the third null 
hypothesis of no difference in audit fees between in-house and contract-out 
arrangement cannot be rejected. Surprisingly, the coefficient for the interaction term 
is also not significantly associated with audit fees (p < 0.454, one-tailed). Therefore, 
the fourth null hypothesis of no interaction effect between agency type and type of 
audit arrangement on audit fees cannot be rejected. 
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The significance and direction of the control variables remain unchanged, with 
departmental audits remaining significant and negatively associated with audit fees. 
On average, departments are billed lower audit fees compared to statutory authorities. 
However, Table 14 indicates that the costs of departmental audits are not 
significantly different from the costs of statutory audits. An examination of the 
OAG' s Annual Report (OAG WA, 1998) reveals that audit services are provided free 
of charge to all departments and hospitals and some statutory authorities. Therefore, a 
possible explanation for this result is that the OAG tends to bill higher audit fees to 
agencies that have to pay for the audit services, i.e., statutory authorities. 
Similar to the audit cost model, the total sample is partitioned by agency type to 
provide insights into the results of the total sample and the consistency of the audit 
fee model across agency type categories in the public sector. Table 23 presents the 
regression results for the sub-samples: department, statutory authority and hospital. 
The Big 5 variable is excluded from the hospital's audit fee model because the OAG 
did not contract-out the 1 998 financial audits of hospitals to any of the Big 5 audit 
firms. In addition, the test variable, type of audit arrangement, and the Big 5 variable 
are not included in the department's audit fee model because the OAG did not 
contract-out departmental audits for year-end 1998. 
The results in Table 23 are similar to the results for audit cost models for agency size, 
complexity, risk and audit opinion for financial statement for all agency type. As 
expected, agency size is the major determinant of public sector audit fees for all 
agency type. 
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Table 23 
Regression: Audit Fees as Explained by Control Variables: Expenditure, Complexity, Risk, Audit Opinions fo:r Financial Statement and 
Performance Indicators, Total Advice, Internal Control, Big 5 and Type of Audit Arrangement by Agency Type 
Department Statutory authority Hospital 
Variables Predicted Standardised t Sig.* Standardised t Sig.* Standardised t Sig.* 
sign coefficients coefficients coefficients 
(Constant) 13.764 .000 26.327 .000 9.042 .000 
Lnexp + .579 7.215 .000 .594 9.811 .000 .763 9.424 .000 
Complex + .245 3.229 .002 .182 2.856 .003 -.070 -.739 .232 
Risk + .017 .282 .390 .101 2.269 .013 .037 .700 .244 
FSOpin + .118 2.123 .020 -.020 -.449 .327 .008 .140 .445 
PIOpin + -.026 -.429 .335 .031 .634 .264 .048 .852 .199 
Advice + .228 3.336 .001 .122 2.275 .013 .188 2.706 .005 
!Control - .086 1.434 .080 .105 1 .988 .025 -.029 -.292 .386 
Big 5 + - - - -.041 -.830 .204 - - -
Type ? - - - .036 .736 .464 .008 .132 .895 
Adjusted R2 .87 .81 .85 
F statistic 44.241 (p < 0.001) 57.497 (p < 0.001) 40.628 (p < 0.001) 
N 45 120 58 
* A one-tail test is used for significance where an a priori expectation could be made about the effect of a variable on audit fees. 
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The results in Table 23 suggest that the audit cost and audit fee models by agency 
type may differ in one explanatory variable, namely, audit opinion for performance 
indicators. This variable is significantly associated with audit costs for the hospital 
sub-sample but is not reflected in the audit fees. As noted earlier, a possible 
explanation is that the OAG is required by legislation to audit performance indicators 
from year-end 1996 and the OAG is allowing an adjustment period for the agencies 
to prepare and fine-tune their performance indicators. 
The coefficient for reliance on internal control is positive and highly significant with 
audit fees for the department and statutory authority sub-samples although they are 
weakly significant with audit costs (p < 0. 106 and p < 0. 101 respectively, one-tailed). 
These results suggest that higher reliance on internal control incurs higher audit costs 
and audit fees. This could be because the auditors perform more tests of controls to 
justify higher reliance, whereas if there is no reliance, they adopt a substantive 
approach. 
The test variable, type of audit arrangement, is not significantly associated with audit 
fees for both statutory authority and hospital sub-samples. This result is surprising for 
the statutory authority sub-sample because, in the earlier analysis, the result suggests 
that contract-out audits are more costly than in-house audits for this sub-sample. 
Overall, the audit fee models provide greater explanatory power compared to the 
audit cost models for each agency type. 
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Discussions and Conclusions 
This section provides discussions on the relations between the test variables, type of 
audit arrangement and the interaction between agency type and type of audit 
arrangement, and three dependent variables: ( 1) audit costs, (2) audit costs less the 
OAG's supervision costs for the contract-out audits and (3) audit fees. Table 24 
provides a summary of the results for the relations between the test variables and the 
three dependent variables. 
Table 24 
Summary of Results for Type of Audit Arrangement and Interaction Between 
Hospital and Type of Audit Arrangement 
Dependent variables Type of Hospital* Type of Audit 
Audit Type of Arrangement 
Arrangement Audit 
Arrangement 
Total sample Statutory Hospital 
authority 
Audit costs Significant & Significant & Significant Not 
positive negative & positive significant 
Audit costs (less Not Significant & Not Significant 
supervision costs) significant negative significant & negative 
Audit fees Not Not Not Not 
significant significant significant significant 
Results suggest that contract-out audits are more costly than in-house audits but the 
significant interaction term suggests that the effect of type of audit arrangement is 
conditional upon agency type. Further analysis reveals that contract-out audits are 
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more costly than in-house audits for statutory authority audits only. The type of audit 
arrangement for hospital audits has no effect on audit costs. This suggests that the 
statutory authority audits are driving the significant association between type of audit 
arrangement and audit costs. As discussed earlier, this result is attributed to the 
contractor's expertise in auditing a similar agency type in the private sector and the 
ability to transfer that expertise to the public sector. However, the non-significant 
interaction term in the audit fee model suggests that cost differences between in­
house and contract-out audits for hospital and statutory authority are not reflected in 
audit fees billed to agencies. 
Supervision costs have a significant impact on the interpretation of the results for 
type of audit arrangement. By excluding supervision costs from contract-out audits, 
there are significant changes in the results for the total sample and the two sub­
samples. These changes favour the contract-out audits for all groupings. Specifically, 
the costs of contract-out audits are not significantly different from the costs of in­
house audits in the total sample. When the sample is partitioned by agency type, the 
audit costs for contract-out audits are now not significantly different from the audit 
costs for in-house audits in the statutory authority sub-sample. There is a shift in the 
result from contract-out audits incurring higher audit costs relative to in-house audits, 
to no difference in costs. In the hospital sub-sample, the results favour the contract­
out audits where contract-out audits are significantly less costly than in-house audits. 
Overall, supervision costs play a crucial role in the interpretation of the results. To 
compare the relative cost efficiency between in-house and contract-out audits, 
researchers need to consider supervision costs as part of the total audit costs for 
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contract-out audits. Supervision costs are a necessary cost of having a system where 
private sector auditors are contractors in the public sector process. The presence of 
contractors inevitably raises the issue on whether the nature and amount of 
monitoring and supervisory activities for contractors are sufficient so as to ensure 
that a specific quality level has been achieved. The OAG can only fulfil its objective 
if he has quality oversight on public sector audits. This is to enable the OAG to 
discharge its accountability once the OAG is satisfied with the quality of audits 
provided to public sector agencies. However, in the context of an efficient and 
effective provision of audit services, the more significant question is probably, "to 
what extent can these oversight costs be reduced significantly while maintaining an 
appropriate level of audit quality?" The OAG, who oversees the supervisory 
activities, needs to decide on the optimal level of monitoring to ensure that the 
monitoring devices are sufficient, appropriate and able to enforce penalties to reduce 
low quality audits in the future. 
The results for audit fees raise questions about the OAG's pricing policy. Discussions 
with the OAG reveal that pricing audits is a complex process. Audit fees billed to an 
agency are not based solely on audit costs but several factors, which include the 
agency's fee history and the ability to pay. As noted earlier, all departments and 
hospitals and, some statutory authorities receive the OAG's audit services free of 
charge and, therefore, the OAG has incentives to bill higher audit fees to those 
agencies that are required to pay for the audit services. However, given that audit fees 
are highly correlated with audit costs (see Table 11), it is surprising that the cost 
differences in type of arrangement are not reflected in the audit fees. A reasonable 
explanation is that the OAG does not consider type of audit arrangement in its pricing 
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policy because the OAG may view contracting-out as a short-term arrangement (i.e., 
three to five years). As such, the OAG may discount any short-term cost differential 
to focus on the long-term cost effects when pricing their audits. Alternatively, the 
OAG may adjust the audit fees so that the contract-out audits are not penalised for 
the higher audit costs (in this case, the statutory authority audits). 
The next chapter presents additional analyses to test the robustness and sensitivity of 
the results in the audit cost and audit fee models by using audit hours as the 
dependent variable. The sample size and measure for audit hours are discussed before 
the results of the regression analyses are presented. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Further Analyses 
Introduction 
This chapter extends the previous analyses on the effects of control and test variables 
on audit costs and audit fees. This chapter uses audit hours as the dependent variable 
to provide an alternative measure for audit effort, which was measured as audit costs 
or audit fees in the preceding chapter. This provides a test on the robustness and 
sensitivity of the results in the audit cost and audit fee models. 
Regression Analyses: Audit Hours as the Dependent Variable 
Similar to the audit cost measure, audit hours are measured differently, depending on 
the type of audit arrangement. For an in-house audit, audit hours comprise total 
billable (reported) audit hours for the engagement. For a contract-out audit, audit 
hours comprise total billable (reported) supervision hours from the OAG and the 
contractor's total budgeted audit hours for the engagement. The information for the 
total billable audit hours for in-house audits is collected from the OAG' s database 
while the contractors' total budgeted audit hours for contract-out audits is collected 
from tenders. The contractors' total actual audit hours for contract-out audits are not 
available for the majority of the audits because the contractors are not required to 
disclose this information to the OAG. 
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A sample, which consists of 115 statutory authority audits, is selected to test the 
robustness of the earlier findings for control and test variables. The information for 
total budgeted audit hours is not available for individual contract-out hospital audits 
because the OAG had contracted-out the hospital audits as packages to contractors. 
Therefore, only statutory authority audits are retained in the sample to test and 
compare the test variable, type of audit arrangement, across audit cost and audit fee 
models: In addition, the information is also not available for five contract-out audits 
for statutory authority. 
Similar to the audit cost and audit fee models, the audit hour models adopt the 
functional form of log-linear regression models, where audit hours and agency total 
expenditure are transformed into natural logarithm. This is to ensure that the 
residuals from the models are normally distributed. Tests are conducted on the audit 
hour models to ensure that the results from the models can be interpreted with 
authority. The tests suggest that the audit hour models do not violate the assumptions 
of the regression models. The casewise diagnostic detected two observations with a 
studentized residual value greater than 3.00, indicating two potential outliers in the 
audit hour models. To ensure that these two observations do not unduly influence the 
results, they are deleted from the total sample and the regression models are re-run. 
While there is a marginal increase of two percent in the explanatory power of the 
models, the coefficients for the independent variables remain unchanged in 
significance and direction. Therefore, the two observations are retained in the sample. 
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Discussions of the audit hour models are based on the development of the base model 
and hypothesised model. To be consistent with the sensitivity analysis undertaken for 
the hypothesised audit cost model, the audit hours less the OAG's supervision hours 
for contractors model is also examined. Since the results in audit hour models are 
based on a reduced sample of 1 1 5 audits, the results are not comparable to results in 
the audit cost and audit fee models in the previous chapter. To compare models, audit 
costs and audit fees are regressed against control and test variables using the same 
sample as the audit hour models. The interaction variable is not included in the 
models because contract-out hospital audits have been excluded from the original 
sample size of 223 audits. 
Tables 2�, 26 and 27 present the regression results for the base model, hypothesised 
model and audit hours/costs less the OAG's supervision hours/costs for contractors 
model respectively, for each dependent variable, using the reduced sample size of 
1 1 5 audits. 
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Table 25 
Regression: Audit Hours/Costs/Fees as Explained by Control Variables: Expenditure, Complexity, Risk, Audit Opinions for Financial 
Statement and Performance Indicators, Total Advice, Internal Control and Big 5 
Audit Hours Audit Costs Audit Fees 
Variables Predicted Standardised t Sig.* Standardised t Sig.* Standardised t Sig.* 
sign coefficients coefficients coefficients 
(Constant) 8.748 .000 29.437 .000 26.117 .000 
Lnexp + .579 8.237 .000 .611 9.919 .000 .586 9.692 .000 
Complex + .206 2.656 .005 .173 2.542 .006 .185 2.769 .004 
Risk + .155 2.949 .002 .161 3 .504 .001 .118 2.602 .006 
FSOpin + -.033 -.635 .264 -.047 -1.044 .150 -.027 -.622 .268 
PIOpin + .046 .809 .211 .068 1.371 .087 .043 .872 .193 
Advice + .055 .876 .192 .064 1.149 .127 .114 2.088 .020 
!Control - .075 1.216 .114 .054 .996 .161 .103 1.930 .028 
Big 5 + -.052 -.989 .163 .052 1.117 .134 -.011 -.250 .402 
Adjusted R2 .74 .80 .81 
F statistic 41.966 (p < 0.001) 58.535 (p < 0.001) 61.333 (p < 0.001) 
N 115 115 115 
* A one-tail test is used for significance where an a priori expectation could be made about the effect of a variable on audit hours/costs/fees. 
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Table 26 
Regression: Audit Hours/Costs/Fees as Explained by Control Variables and Type of Audit Arrangement 
Audit Hours Audit Costs Audit Fees 
Variables Predicted Standardised t Sig.* Standardised t Sig.* Standardised t Sig.* 
sign coefficients coefficients coefficients 
(Constant) 8.739 .000 30. 107 .000 26.056 .000 
Lnexp + .572 7.985 .000 .587 9.565 .000 .579 9.401 .000 
Complex + .203 2.608 .005 . 164 2.45 1 .008 . 1 82 2.71 5  .004 
Risk + . 1 52 2.878 .003 . 1 52 3.360 .001 . 1 1 5  2.526 .007 
FSOpin + -.027 -.5 19  .303 -.029 -.641 .262 -.022 -.489 .3 13 
PIOpin + .039 .677 .250 .046 .928 . 1 78 .036 .720 .237 
Advice + .062 .960 . 170 .085 1 .548 .063 . 1 20 2. 17 1  .016 
!Control - .081 1 .286 . 10 1  .073 1 .348 .091 . 109 2.007 .024 
Big 5 + -.064 - 1 . 130 . 1 3 1  .012 .255 .400 -.023 -.477 .3 17  
Type ? .033 .589 .557 . 1 10 2.306 .023 .033 .692 .490 
Adjusted R2 .74 .81 .81  
F statistic 37. 1 1 1  (p < 0.001) 54.741 (p < 0.001) 54.304 (p < 0.001) 
N 1 1 5 1 15 1 1 5 
* A one-tail test is used for significance where an a priori expectation could be made about the effect of a variable on audit hours/costs/fees. 
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Table 25 indicates that the significance and direction for the agency size, complexity, 
risk measures and the Big 5 variable are consistent across the models. Overall, the 
audit hour model is similar to the audit cost model in terms of significance and 
direction for all control variables. However, audit hour and audit cost models differ 
from audit fee model in terms of total advice provided to the agencies and reliance on 
internal control. To ensure that these differences are not due to omitted variables, 
discussions for these two variables are postponed until the test variable, type of audit 
arrangement, is included in the model (see Table 26). All models are significant, with 
the audit fee and audit cost models providing the greatest explanatory power, 
followed by the audit hour model. 
In Table 26, the results for the control variables remain unchanged with the inclusion 
of the test variable, type of audit arrangement, in the hypothesised model. The 
reliance on internal control variable remains positive and significant in the audit fee 
model, and weakly significant in the audit hour and cost models (p < 0. 101 and p < 
0.091 respectively, one-tailed). As noted earlier, the positive and significant 
coefficient suggests that the auditors may be performing more tests of controls to 
justify higher reliance, whereas if there is no reliance, they are adopting a substantive 
approach. With regard to total advice provided to agencies from the OAG, this 
variable is not significant in the audit hour model only. This suggests that the OAG 
used a greater proportion of senior staff to provide advice to the agencies. 
Consistent with the result for the statutory authority sub-sample in Table 15, the test 
variable, type of audit arrangement, is significant and positively associated with audit 
costs, that is, contract-out audits are more costly than in-house audits. However, the 
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cost differences between contract-out and in-house audits are not reflected in audit 
hours and audit fees. Comparing audit hours and audit costs, this result suggests that 
contract-out audits utilise a greater proportion of senior staff compared to in-house 
audits (i.e., different labour mix). Alternatively, it could be that the costs of labour 
are more expensive for contractors compared to in-house staff (i.e., billing versus 
cost rates). Type of audit arrangement is not significant in the audit fee model 
because the OAG may view contracting-out for an agency as a short-term 
arrangement and discount any short-term cost differential to focus on the long-term 
cost effects in pricing their audits. 
Table 27 
Regression: Audit Hours/Costs (less the OAG's supervision hours/costs for 
contractors) as Explained by Control Variables and Type of Audit 
Arrangement 
Audit Hours Audit Costs 
Predicted Std. t Sig.* Std. t Sig.* 
sign coeff. coeff. 
(Constant) 8.012 .000 28.962 .000 
Lnexp + .581 7.717 .000 .600 9.362 .000 
Complex + .234 2.861 .003 .177 2.534 .007 
Risk + . 152 2.726 .004 .155 3.277 .001 
FSOpin + -.027 -.497 .310 -.030 -.634 .264 
PIOpin + .026 .426 .336 .042 .814 .209 
Advice + .006 .093 .463 .063 1 .091 .139 
!Control - .091 1 .371 .087 .080 1 .425 .079 
Big 5 + -.078 -1 .315  .096 .021 .419 .338 
Type ? -.062 -1 .069 .288 .016 .320 .750 
Adjusted R2 .71 .79 
F statistic 32.465 (p < 0.001) 49.1 1 8  (p < 0.001) 
N 115  115  
* A one-tail test is used for significance where an a priori expectation could be  made 
about the effect of a variable on audit hours/costs. 
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Table 27 shows the effect of supervisory activities on the test variable, type of audit 
arrangement, for the audit hour and audit cost models. The audit fee model is not 
presented because information for the supervision fees equivalent is not available. 
Results for the control variables remam unchanged after excluding supervision 
hours/costs from the definition of audit hours/costs for contractors. The coefficient 
for type of audit arrangement remains insignificant in the audit hour model. 
Consistent with the result for the statutory authority sub-sample in Table 18, type of 
audit arrangement is not significantly associated with audit costs after excluding 
supervision costs from contract-out audits. 
Additional tests are performed to determine if the difference in the result for type of 
audit arrangement in the audit hour and audit cost models in Table 26 is due to a 
higher proportion of senior staff hours in contract-out audits relative to in-house 
audits. To examine the difference in labour mix between contract-out and in-house 
audits, total hours are classified categorically as junior or senior hours, and the 
proportion of senior hours to total audit hours is calculated.3° For in-house audits, 
senior hours comprise Levels 8, 9, Special 7, Class 1 and Class 3 hours. For contract­
out audits, senior hours comprise partner and manager hours, in addition to the 
OAG's Levels 8, 9, Special 7, Class 1 and Class 3 hours, to account for supervision 
hours. Appendix 4 provides the staff levels in the OAG (in the ascending order of 
billable rate per hour) and the possible private sector equivalent. 
30 To reduce concern that the staff levels are not comparable between contractors and the OAG, a 
broad classification of junior and senior hours is used. 
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The regression models, with the ratio of senior hours to total audit hours as the 
dependent variable, adopt the functional form of log-linear regression models, where 
the dependent variable and agency total expenditure are transformed into natural 
logarithm. This is to ensure that the residuals from the models are normally 
distributed. The dependent variable is regressed against the control variables and test 
variable used in the audit hour/cost/fee models. The sample size is reduced from 1 15 
to 1 12 agencies because the labour mix information for three in-house audits is not 
available. 
Results suggest that the coefficient for type of audit arrangement is positive and 
significantly associated with the proportion of senior hours to total audit hours (t = 
12.698, p < 0.000, two-tailed). Contract-out audits used a higher proportion of senior 
hours relative to in-house audits. Additional test without the supervision hours for 
contractors suggest similar result (t = 10.850, p < 0.000, two-tailed). A sensitivity 
analysis is performed where the classification of senior hours for the OAG is 
expanded to include Level 7 hours. Results remain unchanged. Overall, these results 
indicate that contractors used a higher proportion of senior staff to undertake public 
sector audits compared to in-house staff. The higher cost of the contract-out audits is 
due to a higher proportion of senior staff in contract-out audits as the senior staff has 
higher rates than the junior staff. 
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Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide tests of robustness and sensitivity to the 
results found in the audit cost and audit fee models, using audit hours as the 
dependent variable. Overall, the results in the audit hour models are consistent with 
the audit cost models except for the test variable, type of audit arrangement. The 
results suggest that the higher cost for contract-out audits of statutory authority is not 
due to higher audit hours. Further tests show that the difference is due to the use of a 
higher proportion of senior hours in contract-out audits relative to in-house audits. 
The results in the audit hour models are also consistent with the audit fee models 
except for total advice provided to agencies. This is attributed to the use of a higher 
proportion of the OAG's senior staff to provide advice to the agencies. Overall, using 
audit hour as the dependent variable, the results for the control variables ( except total 
advice provided to the agencies) are robust against alternative specifications for audit 
effort, costs and fees. 
The exclusion of the interaction term from the audit hour models and the focus on 
statutory authority audits only suggest that caution is needed when comparing the 
results that used the full sample size in the previous chapter. Caution is also needed 
in interpreting the test variable, type of audit arrangement, given that the audit hours 
for in-house audits are based on actual (billable) hours while contract-out audits are 
based on budgeted hours from tenders. This can be a concern where the OAG's 
labour mix is compared with the contractors' labour mix. The contractors may 
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ultimately decide to change the labour mix and use more junior hours for the 
engagements while still maintaining the cost level. 
The next chapter concludes with a summary of the maJor findings and the 
implications of the results for literature and regulators. Limitations of the research 
and further research avenues are also discussed. 
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CHAPTER S 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Introduction 
This chapter is structured as follows. The aims and findings of this study are 
summarised in the next section. The following section discusses the contributions of 
this study to the economics of auditing literature and the implications of the findings 
to audit practice and regulation. The final section discusses the potential limitations 
of this study and future research opportunities. 
Aims and Findings of This Study 
The general purpose of this study is to provide a better understanding of the public 
sector audit market in Australia. The main impediments to understanding the audit 
service at the state level in Australia are the limited knowledge of the production 
function for government auditors (i.e., the OAG and contractors) and the differences 
in their audit production functions, the effects of institutional factors on the provision 
of audit services and the OAG's fee-setting policy. Empirical evidence in this area is 
needed so that future discussions on the changing nature of public sector audit market 
are not confined to conjectures, assumptions and anecdotal evidence. 
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The main aim of this study is to investigate the cost efficiency between in-house and 
contract-out arrangements to undertake financial statement audits in the public sector. 
It empirically tests whether there are cost and fee differences between in-house 
providers (i.e., the OAG) and contractors (i.e., public accounting firms) by examining 
audit costs and fees. The secondary aims of this study are to develop audit cost and 
fee models for the public sector. The unit of analysis is audit cost/fee at the audit 
engagement level. The data for this study is collected for a sample of financial 
statement audit engagements for year-end 1998, at the state level in WA. The data is 
extracted from publicly available and private sources. 
The audit cost and fee models are used to test for the cost differences between in­
house providers and contractors. The models are developed for the WA public sector 
at the state level. These models identify variables that have an impact on the 
distribution of audit resources in the public sector. Prior audit production and audit 
fee studies in the private and public sectors provide the basis for the development of 
the two models. The results indicate that agency size, complexity and risk are 
positively associated with audit costs and fees. This finding is consistent with prior 
studies. In addition, the total advice provided to the agencies by the OAG, and 
agency type are also significantly associated with audit costs and audit fees. Overall, 
by incorporating these factors into the models, the audit cost model explains 82 
percent of the variance in audit costs, while the audit fee model explains 86 percent 
of the variance in audit fees. Both models possess high explanatory power to explain 
the variances in audit costs and audit fees. 
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More importantly, the main findings suggest that contract-out audits are more costly 
than in-house audits. However, this finding is conditional on agency type. Further 
analysis reveals that the type of audit arrangement is significantly associated with 
audit costs for the statutory authority audits only. There is no significant difference in 
audit costs between contract-out and in-house arrangement for hospital audits. This 
analysis shows that the statutory authority audits are driving the significance of the 
interaction between type of audit arrangement and agency type. Specifically, the costs 
of contract-out audits are, on average, significantly higher than in-house audits. This 
result is attributed to the contractor's lack of expertise in auditing statutory authority 
as there is no equivalent of this agency type in the private sector. As such, the OAG 
has the greater advantage of delivering a lower audit cost for statutory authority 
audits compared to the contractors. However, the non-significant interaction term in 
the audit fee model suggests that cost differences between in-house and contract-out 
audits for the statutory authority audits are not reflected in audit fees billed to 
agencies. Further analyses, using audit hours as the dependent variable, generally 
corroborate the findings from the audit cost and audit fee models. 
Sensitivity analyses on the OAG's supervision costs reveal that these costs have a 
significant effect on the interpretation of the cost efficiency results. By excluding 
supervision costs from contract-out audits, there are significant changes in the results 
for the total sample and the two sub-samples (partitioned by agency type). Generally, 
these changes favour the contract-out audits for all groupings, where contract-out 
audits are now more cost efficient than in-house audits for hospitals, and not 
significantly different in costs for statutory authority audits. Additional tests to 
investigate the determinants of the OAG's supervision costs in contract-out audits 
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reveal that agency size, risk, reliance on internal control, total advice provided by the 
OAG and packaged audits are significantly associated with the supervision costs of 
contract-out audits. 
Contributions of This Study to the Literature 
The main contribution of this study is to add to the growing literature on audit market 
efficiency (see Dopuch et al., 2000; Knechel & Payne, forthcoming). This study 
examines audit efficiency in the public sector market by comparing the cost 
efficiency between in-house and contract-out arrangements. It provides evidence on 
the production function of different type of suppliers in the public sector and their 
relative efficiency in providing audit services. In part, this evidence contributes to the 
line of inquiry that examines the difference between government auditors and public 
accounting firms in US municipalities (see Copley, 1989; Dwyer & Wilson, 1989; 
Rubin, 1992). 
The second contribution of this study is to develop and test the audit cost and fee 
models in the public sector and provide validity on the transferability of audit models 
from the private and public sectors. This study adds to the literature that examines the 
public sector audit market. More importantly, it is one of the few non-US studies that 
examine the public sector audit market and the findings from this study suggest that 
the public sector audit studies from the US are generalisable to Australia. These 
findings add to our understanding of the range of market conditions under which it is 
so far known to hold and this is an important contribution to knowledge in its own 
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right. However, this study suggests that the measurements for agency characteristics 
need to be modified to account for the differences in state and local government 
levels. This study also found that the pricing policy of the OAG reflects the audit 
costs incurred and, therefore, for research purposes, it provides validity on the use of 
the audit fee model to proxy for the auditors' cost function. 
Implications of This Study for Audit Practice and Regulation 
This study contributes to the recent discussions on the changing nature of public 
sector audit market. With a movement towards a market-based provision of public 
sector audits, the evidence from this study allows researchers and policy-makers to 
compare the two types of audit arrangement to undertake public sector audits. 
Initial findings in the US public sector audit market suggest that greater competition 
(defined as number of bids received by the client) is associated with higher audit 
quality and lower fees (see Copley & Doucet, 1993; Raman & Wilson, 1994). The 
findings in this study suggest that industry specialisation may play an important role 
where the benefits of competition are emphasised. As exemplified in the debate and 
restructuring of the Victoria's public sector audit market, greater competition is 
frequently associated with greater outsourcing of public sector audits. However, the 
concept of competition in the Australian's public sector audit market needs to be 
evaluated in the context of its current audit arrangements. These arrangements may 
offset any benefits derived from outsourcing of audits. For example, the short-term 
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contracts may limit the contractors' incentives to invest and develop public sector 
audit skills and, as a result, offset the efficiency gained from competitive tendering. 
Changes in the public sector audit market have economic and social implications (see 
Parker, 1993; Lovell, 1996; Guthrie & English, 1997; Houghton & Jubb, 1998, 
Taylor, 1998). The main findings in this study suggest that economic benefits from 
competition (defined as contract-out audits) and the opening of the audit market to 
outside audit suppliers are conditional on the development of industry expertise in 
the public sector. The regulators should also give greater weight to the social issues 
of the reform (e.g., independence of public sector auditors) when discussing and 
deciding on the appropriate model for the public sector audit market. However, this 
study also points to the importance of evaluating the current audit arrangement and 
its possible impact on competition. For competition to have an effect on audit costs 
and quality, regulators need to examine the current incentive structure so that 
suppliers are motivated to deliver low cost and/or high quality audits. Examples of 
the incentive structures include the procurement practices of the OAGs, the length of 
the contract terms and institutional factors that affect the suppliers' incentives in the 
public sector audit market. 
This study also raises the issue of oversight activities ( defined as supervision costs 
for contractors) in public sector audits. The finding in this study suggests that 
supervision cost is a significant component of the contractor's total audit costs. 
Investigation of this issue is important because it has implications for audit quality in 
the public sector. However, in the context of an efficient and effective provision of 
audit services, the significant question is, "to what extent can these oversight costs be 
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reduced significantly while maintaining an appropriate level of audit quality?".  The 
presence of contractors in public sector audit inevitably raises the question on 
whether the nature and amount of monitoring and supervisory activities for 
contractors are sufficient. On the other hand, the Talbot report has addressed the 
issue on whether too much resources have been applied to supervisory activities, with 
Talbot (Price Waterhouse, 1995, p. 48) stating that, "I am aware of some criticism of 
this process [review of the work of all agents] but I did not find the time taken to · 
fulfil this auditing standards requirement to be excessive". The OAG, who oversees 
the supervisory activities, needs to decide on the optimal level of monitoring to 
ensure that the monitoring devices are sufficient, appropriate and able to enforce 
penalties to reduce low quality audits in the future. 
One of the contentious issues between the OAG and auditees is the audit fees billed 
to the auditees. There is the perception that the OAG prices their audit services in an 
arbitrary manner and, as a result, some auditees feel that they're being "overcharged". 
The high explanatory power of the audit cost and audit fee models in this study, that 
is, 82 and 86 percent respectively, and the presence of a few significant independent 
variables, indicate that the OAG's costing and pricing policies are consistent with 
agency-related characteristics. As such, the assumption that the OAG costs and prices 
public sector audits in an arbitrary manner, due to the lack of competition, cannot be 
supported. While the results do not provide evidence on whether the OAG 
"overcharges" its auditees (the OAG could consistently "overcharged" in line with 
auditee characteristics), preliminary evidence on the costs of in-house relative to 
contract-out audits suggests that the OAG may be costing and pricing their audits 
competitively. 
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Limitations of This Study 
There are several limitations in this study. A major concern relates to the issue of 
audit quality in the public sector. The interpretation of the cost efficiency results 
hinges upon the audit quality provided by the OAG and the contractors. Audit quality 
is difficult to measure and, to date, the OAG does not keep a formal record of 
contractors' compliance with professional standards for reporting and fieldwork that 
allow for systematic investigation of audit quality. However, the monitoring process 
employed by the OAG provides considerable assurance that, at least, minimal 
acceptable levels of quality are delivered. In addition, discussions with the OAG 
indicate that the OAG believes that the audits are of similar quality. If it is reasonable 
to assume that audit quality is homogeneous across audit suppliers because of the 
certification process, then audit cost and fee differences are more likely to reflect the 
efficiency differences in the production of audit services. Further tests on the effects 
of Big 5 audit firms on audit costs and fees suggest no statistically significant 
association. As higher quality can also be linked to higher audit hours ( and, by 
implication, costs) (Deis & Giroux, 1992), an insignificant association suggest that 
there is no difference in audit quality provided by the OAG and Big 5 audit firms. 
Another possible limitation of this study is the generalisability of the results to other 
jurisdictions. Since this sample was drawn from one jurisdiction in Australia (i.e., 
WA), caution should be exercised when generalising the results to other jurisdictions 
in Australia and in other countries because of differences in audit legislation, contract 
management, audit technology and audit market structure, among other things. In so 
far as the tendering system, e.g., competitive tenders, and the institutional factors that 
189 
govern the incentives to provide audit services in the public sector are not similar to 
WA, the results may not be generalisable to other jurisdictions. Nevertheless, 
examining one jurisdiction has the advantage of controlling for confounding results 
that may arise as a result of different regulations in each jurisdiction and assurance 
level provided by the OAGs. A focus on one jurisdiction partly accounts for the high 
explanatory power (84 percent) of the audit fee model in Ward et al. 's ( 1994) study. 
Other public sector audit studies such as Copley (1989) and Rubin ( 1992) have 
stressed the importance of obtaining a relatively homogeneous sample to test the 
audit fee models. 
Another possible limitation is the measurement of the variables. Some variables are 
subject to hindsight bias ( e.g., agency complexity) or are not sensitive enough to 
capture the variable of interest ( e.g., reliance on internal control). Auditors-in-charge 
provided an ex-post assessment of agency complexity, on a Likert-type scale from 1 
(simple) to 5 (complex). An ex-post assessment suggests that auditors may be biased 
in their evaluation, in that the responses may reflect the auditor's current experience 
with an engagement. However, it can also be argued that agency complexity is a 
fairly stable construct and, therefore, unlikely to change over a short-term period. As 
such, auditors are more likely to evaluate an agency's complexity on a long-term 
basis rather than on the current engagement. The measure for the level of reliance on 
internal control may be limited by the scope of responses that may limit the 
sensitivity of the scale. Rather than relying on a three-point scale (i.e., limited, 
moderate, extensive), future studies should, for example, incorporate a 7-point 
Likert-type scale from 1 (limited) to 7 (extensive) or a 100-point scale to increase the 
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sensitivity of the measurement. The lack of variance in the responses may account for 
the lack of significance between reliance on internal control and audit costs and fees. 
Future Research 
Given the importance of the research issue, that is, contestability in the public sector 
audit market, future studies should address one of the limitations in this study by 
replicating this study in other jurisdictions in Australia and other countries. 
Replications are important because they assess initial findings and allow researchers 
to determine their confidence in the findings (Lindsay & Ehrenberg, 1 993; Lindsay, 
1995; Bamber, Christensen & Gaver, 2000). Lindsay argues that replication (under 
different conditions, different instruments, different methods and/or different 
researchers) provides a more crucial test of the reliability and validity of facts, 
hypotheses and theories. Therefore, facts are established when there is a "significant 
sameness" in related studies rather than interpreting the test of significance. 
However, in replicating studies, researchers should carefully note the main 
institutional factors in the public sector audit market in various jurisdictions and how 
those factors can impact on the findings. 
In addition, there are several ways to test the effects of competition on audit costs. 
For example, one can test the effects of the Victorian's public sector audit market 
restructuring in year-end 1999 on audit costs. The costs of audits that were not 
contracted-out before the restructuring are compared with the costs of the same audits 
that were obliged to be contracted-out in year-end 1999. However, the possible effect 
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of low-balling needs to be taken into account when interpreting the results. Another 
method would be to examine the level of competitiveness in each jurisdiction and its 
effect on audit fees and costs. Competition can be defined as the percentage of audits 
that are contracted-out or the number of tenders received. 
Future research may focus on refining the use of cost data to investigate the relative 
efficiency between in-house providers and contractors. Data on charge-out rates, staff 
level of employee and audit hours per engagement may provide a more powerful test 
to investigate the issue of efficiency. For example, future studies can investigate the 
impact of labour or activity mix on the use of resources. In addition, future studies 
can focus on the OAG's charge-out rates for in-house and contract-out audits, with a 
focus on the Big 5 and non-Big 5 audits. This allows researchers to determine 
whether the OAG's pricing policy follows, on average, a cost-reimbursement policy. 
Reform in public sector audit is based on the idea that a competitive audit market can 
deliver cheaper and/or higher quality audits. At present, the issues of audit demand 
and audit quality in the Australian public sector audit market are highly ambiguous. 
The absence of a capital market in the public sector suggests that the demand for 
audit in the public sector is probably not as strong as the demand in the private 
sector. The audit in the public sector may have a sole function of monitoring, rather 
than monitoring and signalling as found in the private sector. Future studies should 
address issues relating to audit quality, expertise and industry specialisation in the 
public sector. For example, what is the level of demand for audits in the public sector 
at the state level? Given that public agencies do not have the option of choosing their 
external auditors, how can the level of demand be determined? Alternatively, do all 
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agencies demand the same level of audit quality? A greater understanding of audit 
quality in the public sector audit market is important because it allows policy-makers 
and researchers to assess the relation between cost efficiency and effectiveness and 
the potential trade-off between the two concepts. As such, investigating the nature 
and, the cost and benefit of supervision costs would be a worthwhile research 
endeavour. Future research can examine the components of supervisory activities as 
"necessary' and "not necessary" or "important" and "not important" to assist 
discussions on whether supervision costs should be included in the costs of contract­
out audits. 
The measurements of agency risk and complexity in this study are based on the 
auditor's assessments. Future studies can seek to identify and _provide different 
measures of agency risk and complexity. This will allow the researchers, who do not 
have access to private sources, to develop an appropriate fee model and, thus, avoid 
mis-specifying the model. In addition, future studies should also measure 
assessments of control risk rather than reliance on internal control. Various 
components of control risk can be examined such as internal audit or management 
philosophy and attitudes. 
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Appendix 1 
Department: 
Aboriginal Affairs Department 
Agriculture WA 
Chemistry Centre 
Commerce & Trade 
Conservation & Land Management 
(CALM) 
Contract & Management Services 
(CAMS) 
Culture & the Arts Ministry 
Department of Land Administration 
(DOLA) 
Department of Minerals & Energy 
(DOME) 
Department of Public Prosecutions Office 
(DPP) 
Education Department 
Education Services 
Electoral Commission 
Energy Office 
Environmental Protection 
Equal Opportunity Commission 
Fair Trading Ministry 
Family & Children's Services 
Fisheries Department 
Governor's Establishment 
Health Department 
Industrial Relations Commission 
Information Commissioner 
Local Government 
Main Roads 
Ministry of Justice (MOJ) 
Multicultural Interests Office 
Office of Seniors Interests 
Ombudsman's Office - Parliamentary 
Commissioner 
Planning Ministry 
Police Service 
Premier & Cabinet Ministry 
Productivity & Labour Relations 
(DOPLAR) 
Public Sector Standards Office 
Racing, darning & Liquor Office 
Resources Development 
Sport and Recreation Ministry 
State Revenue Department 
Training Department 
Transport Department 
Treasury Department 
Valuer General's Office (VGO) 
Water Regulation Office 
Women's Policy Development Office 
Worksafe WA 
Statutory Authority: 
Aboriginal Affairs Planning Authority 
Agricultural Practices Board 
Agriculture Protection Board (APB) 
Albany Port Authority 
Alcohol & Drug Authority 
Animal Resources Authority 
Anti Corruption Commission 
Art Gallery 
Betting Control Board 
Building & Construction (BCITB) 
Building Management Authority (BMA) 
Bunbury Port Authority 
Bunbury Water Board 
Burswood Park Board 
Busselton Water Board 
Carnarvon Banana Industry 
Compensation Committee 
Central Metropolitan College T AFE 
Central West College 
Centre for Application of Solar Energy 
(CASE) 
Coastal Shipping Commission 
(Stateships) 
Construction Industry Long Service 
Leave 
Country High Schools 
Curriculum Council of WA 
Curtin University 
Dairy Industry Authority 
Dampier Port Authority 
Disability Services Commission 
East Perth Redevelopment 
Eastern Goldfields Transport 
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Appendix 1 (continued) 
Edith Cowan University 
Egg Marketing Board 
Esperance Port Authority 
Financial Institutions Authority 
Fremantle Cemetery Board 
Fremantle Port Authority 
Gaming Commission 
Gascoyne Development 
Geraldton Port Authority 
Gold Corporation 
Goldfields Esperance Development 
Govt Employees Superannuation 
Govt Employees' Housing 
Grain Pool 
Great Southern Development 
Commission 
Great Southern Regional College 
Greyhound Racing Association 
Health Promotion Foundation 
Health Review Office 
Hedland College 
Herd Improvement Service 
Heritage Council 
Homeswest 
Horticultural Produce Commission 
Keep Australia Beautiful 
Kimberley Development Commission 
Kings Park Board 
Landcare Trust 
Law Reform Commission (W ALRC) 
Legal Aid Commission 
Legal Contribution Trust 
Legal Costs Committee 
Library Board (LISWA) 
Local Health Authorities Analytical 
Commision 
Lotteries Commission 
Meat Industry Authority 
Meat Marketing Corporation 
Metro Bus 
Metro Cemeteries Board 
Metro Health Service Board 
Mid West Development 
Midland TAFE 
Minerals & Energy (MERIW A) 
Murdoch University 
Museum 
National Trust 
Parliamentary Super Board 
Pathology & Medical Research Centre 
Peel Dev Commission 
Perth Market Authority 
Perth Theatre Trust 
Pilbara Dev Commission 
Planning Commission 
Port Hedland Port Authority 
Potato Growing Industry Trust Fund 
Potato Marketing Corporation 
Poultry Industry Trust Fund 
Public Education Endowment 
Public Trustee 
Queen Elizabeth II Medical Centre 
(QEII) 
Racecourse Dev Trust 
Racing Penalties Appeal Tribunal 
Real Estate & Bus Agents Board 
Recreation Camps & Reserves Board 
Rottnest Island Authority 
Rural Adjustment & Finance Corporation 
Rural Housing Authority 
Screen West (WA Film) 
Settlement Agents Supervisory Board 
Small Business Dev Corp 
South East Metropolitan T AFE 
South Metropolitan College 
South West Development Commission 
South West Regional T AFE 
Sports Centre Trust (Superdrome) 
State Supply 
Subiaco Redevelopment 
Swan River Trust 
Totalisator Agency Board (TAB) 
Tourism Commission 
Treasury Corporation 
University of Western Australia 
Waters & Rivers Commission 
West Coast College 
Western Australia Institute of Sport 
(WAIS) 
Western Australia Land Authority 
(WALA) 
Westrail 
Wheatbelt Development Commission 
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Appendix 1 (continued) 
Workcover WA 
Workplace Agreements 
Zoo 
Hospital: 
Albany Health Service 
Ashburton Health Service 
Avon Health Service 
Beverley Hospital 
Boddington Hospital 
Boyup Brook Health Service 
Bridgetown Hospital 
Brookton Health Service 
Bruce Rock Hospital 
Bunbury Health Service 
Collie Health Service 
Corrigin District Hospital 
Cunderdin Hospital 
Denmark Hospital 
Dongara Health Service 
Donnybrook Health Service 
Dundas Health Service 
East Pilbara Health Service 
Esperance Health Service 
Gascoyne Health Service 
Geraldton Health Service 
Gnowangerup Hospital 
Harvey Health Service 
Hawthorn Hospital 
Jerramungup Hospital 
Kalgoorlie Health Service 
Katanning Health Service 
Kellerberrin Hospital 
Kimberley Health Service 
Kojonup Hospital 
Kununoppin Hospital 
Laverton & Leonora Health Service 
Merredin Health Service 
Morawa Health Service 
Mount Henry Hospital 
Mukinbudin Health Services 
Mullewa Health Service 
Murchinson Health Service 
Nannup Health Service 
Narembeen Health Service 
Nickol Bay Hospital 
North Midlands Health Services 
Northampton Kalbarri Health 
Northcliffe Nursing Post 
Peel Health Services 
Pemberton Hospital 
Plantagenet Hospital 
Quadriplegic Centre 
Quairading Hospital 
Ravensthorpe Health Service 
Roebourne Hospital 
Tambellup Hospital 
Warren District Hospital 
Western Health Service 
Wickham Hospital 
Wyalkatchem-Kooda 
Y algoo Health Services 
Y arloop Health Service 
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Appendix 2 
In-house Audits 
Department: 
Aboriginal Affairs Department 
Agriculture WA 
Chemistry Centre 
Commerce & Trade 
Conservation & Land Management 
(CALM) 
Contract & Management Services 
(CAMS) 
Culture & the Arts Ministry 
Department of Land Administration 
(DOLA) 
Department of Public Prosecutions Office 
(DPP) 
Education Department 
Education Services 
Electoral Commission 
Energy Office 
Environmental Protection 
Equal Opportunity Commission 
Fair Trading Ministry 
Family & Children's Services 
Fisheries Department 
Governor's Establishment 
Health Department 
Industrial Relations Commission 
Information Commissioner 
Local Government 
Main Roads 
Minerals & Energy (DOME) 
Ministry of Justice (MOJ) 
Multicultural Interests Office 
Office of Seniors Interests 
Ombudsman's Office - Parliamentary 
Commission 
Planning Ministry 
Police Service 
Premier & Cabinet Ministry 
Productivity & Labour Relations 
(DOPLAR) 
Public Sector Standards Office 
Racing, Gaming & Liquor Office 
Resources Development 
Sport and Recreation Ministry 
State Revenue Department 
Training Department 
Transport Department 
Treasury Department 
Valuer General's Office (VGO) 
Water Regulation Office 
Women's Policy Development Office 
Worksafe WA 
Statutory Authority: 
Aboriginal Affairs Planning Authority 
Agricultural Practices Board 
Agriculture Protection Board (APB) 
Albany Port Authority 
Alcohol & Drug Authority 
Animal Resources Authority 
Anti Corruption Commission 
Art Gallery 
Betting Control Board 
Building & Construction (BCITB) 
Building Management Authority (BMA) 
Bunbury Port Authority 
Bunbury Water Board 
Burswood Park Board 
Camarvon Banana Industry 
Compensation Committee 
CASE - Centre for Application of Solar 
Energy 
Central Metropolitan College T AFE 
Coastal Shipping Commission 
(Stateships) 
Country High Schools 
Curriculum Council of WA (98) 
Curtin University 
Dampier Port Authority 
Financial Institutions Authority 
Fremantle Cemetery Board 
Fremantle Port Authority 
Gaming Commission 
Grain Pool 
Great Southern Development 
Commission 
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Appendix 2 (continued) 
Great Southern Regional College 
Health Review Office 
Hedland College 
Herd Improvement Service 
Heritage Council 
Homeswest 
Horticultural Produce Commission 
Keep Australia Beautiful 
Kimberley Development Commission 
Kings Park Board 
Landcare Trust 
Law Reform Commission (W ALRC) 
Legal Aid Commission 
Legal Costs Committee 
Local Health Authorities Analytical 
Commission 
Lotteries Commission 
Meat Industry Authority 
Metro Bus 
Metro Cemeteries Board 
Minerals & Energy (MERIW A) 
Murdoch University 
National Trust 
Parliamentary Super Board 
Peel Dev Commission 
Perth Theatre Trust 
Pilbara Dev Commission 
Planning Commission 
Port Hedland Port Authority 
Potato Growing Industry Trust Fund 
Poultry Industry Trust Fund 
Public Education Endowment 
Public Trustee 
Queen Elizabeth II Medical Centre 
(QEII) 
Racecourse Dev Trust 
Racing Penalties Appeal Tribunal 
Real Estate & Bus Agents Board 
Recreation Camps & Reserves Board 
Rottnest Island Authority 
Rural Adjustment & Finance Corporation 
Rural Housing Authority 
Settlement Agents Supervisory Board 
Small Business Dev Corp 
South Metropolitan College 
South West Development Commission 
South West Regional T AFE 
Sports Centre Trust (Superdrome) 
State Supply 
Swan River Trust 
Tourism Commission 
University of Western Australia 
Waters & Rivers Commission 
Western Australia Institute of Sport 
(WAIS) 
Wheatbelt Development Commission 
Workcover WA 
Workplace Agreements 
Zoo 
Hospital: 
Albany Health Service 
Ashburton Health Service 
Avon Health Service 
Beverley Hospital 
Bruce Rock Hospital 
Collie Health Service 
Corrigin District Hospital 
Cunderdin Hospital 
Denmark Hospital 
Donnybrook Health Service 
East Pilbara Health Service 
Harvey Health Service 
Hawthorn Hospital 
Jerramungup Hospital 
Kimberley Health Service 
Mount Henry Hospital 
Nickol Bay Hospital 
Peel Health Services 
Plantagenet Hospital 
Quadriplegic Centre 
Quairading Hospital 
Roebourne Hospital 
Wickham Hospital 
Y arloop Health Service 
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Appendix 2 ( continued) 
Contract-out Audits 
Statutory Authority: 
Busselton Water Board 
Central West College 
Construction Industry LS 
Dairy Industry Authority 
Disability Services Commission 
East Perth Redevelopment 
Eastern Goldfields Transport 
Edith Cowan University 
Egg Marketing Board 
Esperance Port Authority 
Gascoyne Development 
Geraldton Port Authority 
Gold Corporation 
Goldfields Esperance Development 
Govt Employees Superannuation 
Govt Employees' Housing 
Greyhound Racing Association 
Health Promotion Foundation 
Legal Contribution Trust 
Library Board (LISW A) 
Meat Marketing Corporation 
Metro Health Service Board 
Mid West Development 
Midland TAFE 
Museum 
Pathology & Medical Research Centre 
Perth Market Authority 
Potato Marketing Corporation 
Screen West (WA Film) 
South East Metropolitan T AFE 
Subiaco Redevelopment 
Totalisator Agency Board (TAB) 
Treasury Corporation 
West Coast College 
Western Australia Land Authority 
(WALA) 
Westrail 
Hospital: 
Boddington Hospital 
Boyup Brook Health Service 
Bridgetown Hospital 
Brookton Health Service 
Bunbury Health Service 
Dongara Health Service 
Dundas Health Service 
Esperance Health Service 
Gascoyne Health Service 
Geraldton Health Service 
Gnowangerup Hospital 
Kalgoorlie Health Service 
Katanning Health Service 
Kellerberrin Hospital 
Kojonup Hospital 
Kununoppin Hospital 
Laverton & Leonora Health Service 
Merredin Health Service 
Morawa Health Service 
Mukinbudin Health Services 
Mullewa Health Service 
Murchinson Health Service 
Nannup Health Service 
Narembeen Health Service 
North Midlands Health Services 
Northampton Kalbarri Health 
Northcliffe Nursing Post 
Pemberton Hospital 
Ravensthorpe Health Service 
Tambellup Hospital 
Warren District Hospital 
Western Health Service 
Wyalkatchem-Kooda 
Y algoo Health Services 
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Appendix 3 
Big 5 Audit Firms: Total agencies Total costs of contractors ($) 
Median Mean 
Arthur Andersen 2 52,843 52,843 
Deloitte Touche Tomatsu 3 1 1 ,41 6  1 1 ,853 
Ernst & Young 2 26,804 26,804 
KPMG 3 59,565 58,703 
PWC 1 83,605 
Total 11 47,078 41 ,324 
Non-Big 5 Audit Firms: Total agencies Total costs of contractors ($) 
Median Mean 
Anderson Mountford 1 6,474 
Barret Partners 5 4,097 4,0 1 3  
BDO Nelson 2 1 0,649 1 0,649 
Bentleys 1 1 9, 128 
Bird Cameron 14 8,01 0  9,9993 
Bulter Settineri 1 1 0,729 
Grant Thornton 6 5,685 20,426 
Hall Chadwick 1 3  8,795 27,81 1 
Horwath 4 7,633 9,3 1 7  
Pannell Kerr Forster 1 20,068 
Shakespeare 1 20,864 
Stanton Partners 10 8,577 1 1 ,020 
Total 59 7,689 15,086 
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Level 
Level 1 
Level 2 
Level 4 
Level 5 
Level 6 
Level 7 
Level 8 
· Level 9 
Class 1 
Class 3 
Special 7 
Appendix 4 
Note Private sector equivalent 
Junior 
Junior 
Junior 
A person at this level is Senior 
described as a team leader 
in the OAG 
A person at this level is Senior 
described as a senior team 
leader in the OAG 
Senior 
Manager 
Manager 
Partner 
Partner 
Partner 
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